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Abstract 
 
The goal of this work is to go beyond context free analyses of EU external action and to analyse the 
implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Mediterranean by taking into 
account the role of local actors in the countries that are the final recipients of the policy. The starting 
assumption is that the implementation of the ENP cannot be explained merely in light of the ENP 
policy design and genetic weakness, as well as only in light of EU interests and actorness. While 
relevant, these explanations at the core of the prevailing top-down approach to the study of EU 
external policies provide just a frame of explanation, insofar as they are not able to fully capture ENP 
implementation’s dilemmas, as well as how implementation works on the local ground. Moreover, 
they are not able to explain the commitments-payments gap and the different implementation 
performance of the neighbouring countries. The aim of this thesis is to analyse how EU external 
policies are implemented in the domestic context of the recipient countries and to explain the obstacles 
and the facilitating conditions, which affect implementation on the ground and account for the 
countries’ different performance. By using the ENP in Morocco and Tunisia as a case study, this work 
analyses the role played by three specific domestic actors -political actors, administration and civil 
society- in determining ENP implementation performance on the ground. Secondly, it investigates 
how the Arab Spring affected these explanatory variables and, in turn, shaped the implementation of 
the policy after 2011. The work argues that domestic actors can make a difference insofar as the degree 
of (mis)fit between the goals of domestic political actors and the ENP reform agenda, the degree of 
administrative capacity and the degree of strength and autonomy of civil society influence the 
implementation of the ENP on the ground and the absorption of EU funds. Secondly, if after 2011 there 
was a big variance in the way Mediterranean countries absorbed and implemented ENPI funds, this is 
because the Arab Spring, with its different degrees of change and (in)stability across countries, altered 
in a different way the value of the three explanatory variables, determining different ENP 
implementation performances.
1 
 
Introduction 
 
In the "art and craft" of European Union (EU) external policy-making, implementation is one of 
the most problematic aspects. It is an interactive endeavour that ultimately depends upon the skilful 
hands of multiple actors and upon “external” circumstances that might potentially alter it (Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984, p. 183; O'Toole, 2004, p. 326). EU institutions and the Member States are not the 
only relevant actors of the implementation’s endeavour. In the domain of external policies, 
implementation inevitably depends also on the interaction with the third countries that are the final 
recipients of the policy and upon their domestic actors and conditions. It is up to local actors’ will and 
capability to implement EU programs and spend EU money for specific purposes so to guarantee 
implementation on the ground. Similarly, systemic events altering local conditions in the recipient 
countries might affect the pace and the quality of implementation. The consequences of the Eurozone 
economic crisis, the Arab Spring or the Ukraine crisis are all examples of circumstances potentially 
altering the implementation of EU external policies.  
Traditionally, the literature on EU external policy-making has mainly adopted a top-down 
approach that frames the policies and their implementation from the EU point of view. In the recurrent 
debate on the EU rhetoric-practice gap, the inconsistency between EU stated goals and actual outcomes 
is explained by focusing on the role of the European institutions or on the limits of the EU approach in 
terms of policy content, instruments and outcomes (e.g. Smith, 2003; Borzel & Risse, 2004; Barbé & 
Johansson-Nogués, 2008; Dearden, 2008a; Orbie, 2009). While this “inside-out” perspective is 
fundamental, it is not able to fully capture the “dilemmas of the implementation” (Bicchi, 2010a) that 
lay behind EU external policies, as it does not shed light on how implementation actually works on the 
local ground and how the EU interacts with local actors. The adoption of the sole top down perspective, 
by starting from the authoritative decision and analysing the role of the EU centrally located actors 
and their instruments, fails to fully account for implementation in the domain of external policies, as 
“a wide gap can arise between expectations in Brussels and actions in non-member countries” (Bicchi, 
2010a, p. 982).  
On this point of view, the analysis of the interaction with local actors and conditions is a 
“missing link” (Robichau & Lynn, 2009) in the study of EU policy-making towards third countries. 
While Europeanization and enlargement literatures deal with the question of the extent to which 
member and candidate states “make European policies work” (Siedentopf & Ziller, 1988), here the 
puzzle is to what extent neighbours and third countries make EU external policies work.  
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The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Mediterranean is a case in point. The 
increasing gap between the money committed to sustain reforms in these countries and the actual 
payment rates reveals that the peculiarities of the local implementing environment influence the 
recipient country’s capacity to absorb- and therefore spend- EU funds. At the same time, the variation 
of performance across the countries of the same region shows that Brussels has to deal with different 
outcomes as generated by the different manner in which its policy has been implemented in Tunis or 
in Rabat. Furthermore, in the post-Arab Spring environment, where some of the old constraints 
disappear while others continue to stand, and where the stage is set for new political actors, ENP’s 
sensitiveness to neighbours’ domestic conditions becomes even more important in light of the different 
degrees of change and (in)stability after 2011.  
Using the ENP in Morocco and Tunisia as a case study, the aim of this thesis is to analyse how 
EU’s external policies are implemented in the domestic context of the recipient countries. By focusing 
on the role of local actors, and in particular on the role of domestic political actors, administration and 
civil society, it seeks and to explain the factors that in terms of obstacles and the facilitating conditions 
affect implementation on the ground and account for the countries’ gaps and different performance.  
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Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized in two parts, one theoretical and one empirical.  The first part, which 
includes the first two chapters, defines the research puzzle, the research questions, the literature 
review, the theoretical framework and the methodology. In particular, it sets out the framework to 
analyse the implementation of EU external policies in third countries and suggests the notion of 
governance as a framework for implementation. Moreover, it discusses the hypotheses of the study 
and what domestic variables are hypothesized to account for the implementation of the ENP on the 
ground. Domestic political actors, administration’s capacity and civil society are analysed in terms of 
their implications for the implementation of the ENP. Furthermore, in order to address the research 
questions, the Arab Spring is investigated as an intervening variable that modifies the values of the 
selected explanatory variables and influences the implementation of the ENP after 2011. To test the 
hypotheses, Morocco and Tunisia are adopted as meaningful case studies because of their different 
paths in the wake of the uprisings and in light of their opposite performance in terms of absorption 
capacity after 2011. Finally, the methodology, including the questionnaire used for the interviews, is 
illustrated. 
The second part, which is composed of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, tests the hypotheses and discusses 
the empirical analysis. In particular, the three chapters respectively analyse the role of domestic 
political actors, administration and civil society in Tunisia and Morocco, by investigating how these 
variables affect implementation on the ground; whether and how they changed after the Arab Spring 
as well as how this change influenced the implementation of ENP’s programs in the two countries.   
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Chapter I 
The implementation of the ENP in the Southern neighbours: the importance 
of local actors and domestic conditions 
 
 
 
1.1 The Research Puzzle 
 
Of the many EU external policies that embody the “complexity of joint action” in 
implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984), the ENP in the Southern Mediterranean is indeed a 
case in point. Launched in 2004 as a logical response to the historic enlargement that changed the 
external borders of the Union (European Commission, 2004a), the ENP has become a framework to 
promote political, social and economic reforms, development and modernization in the 
neighbourhood1 (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). As such, it has emerged as the main EU reform policy for the 
Mediterranean and the fundamental venue for Euro-Mediterranean relations (Panebianco, 2008). Since 
2005, almost all Mediterranean partners2 have gradually adopted an ENP Action Plan (AP), i.e. a 
bilateral political document, which sets an agenda of political and economic reforms by reflecting EU’s 
interests and democratic values, the country’s needs and capacities, as well as by defining short and 
medium-term priorities for action.  
In order to implement the bilateral AP, the ENP is equipped with a specific financial 
instrument, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), today called European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)3, which is the ENP’s financial tool and is one of the six instruments 
of EU external action4. It provides a framework for planning and delivering EU assistance in the 
neighbourhood (ENPI Regulation, 2006), by defining how, where, when and for what EU money can 
be spent (European Commission, 2009, p. 52). The ENPI, therefore, provides funding to the 
                                                     
1 The ENP includes 16 countries. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and 
Syria are the Southern neighbourhood; while Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are 
the Eastern neighbourhood.  
2 With the exception of Algeria, Libya and Syria. Algeria adopted a mere “road map” for the implementation of 
the Association Agreement. Libya started the negotiations for a Framework Agreement (equivalent of an 
Association Agreement) that were suspended in February 2011. Syria agreed upon an Association Agreement 
with the EU, but never signed it.  
3 The ENPI was adopted from 2007 to 2013 and replaced by the ENI for the period 2014-2020.  
4 Along with the Instrument for Stability, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights, the European Development Fund, and the EU instrument for nuclear safety. 
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neighbouring countries to sustain their internal reforms and to transform political decisions into 
concrete actions on the ground. Funds are programmed through two sets of programmatic documents 
that are jointly negotiated between the EU and the local authorities: the National Indicative Programs 
(NIP), which cover the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2013, and Annual Action Programs (AAP), which, 
through specific Action Fiches, identify every year specific programs of bilateral cooperation according 
to the priority areas set by the NIPs. The AAPs determine the type of program, the funds committed, 
the objectives pursued, the expected results and the implementation methods. The main purpose of 
these documents is to program EU aids in order to achieve the goals of the AP. Under the new ENI, 
EU assistance is instead defined in a single document called Single Support Framework.  
 
Figure 1. ENP’s main implementing documents 
                                                                                     Implemented through  
  
 
 
Since 2007, which was its first implementation year, ENPI has provided more than €9 billion 
(out of €13 billion originally committed) and the new ENI was granted a budget of €15.4 billion for the 
period 2014-2020. Yet, in the last ten years, the ENP and its implementation were often blamed for the 
ENP What 
Policy Content Action Plan Agenda of political/economic reforms; 
Medium/short terms priorities 
Policy Instrument ENPI Financial tool to allocate resources and deliver 
EU assistance 
Programmatic/Operat
ive Documents 
Country Strategy Papers 
(CSP) 
Define general goals for a period of 7 years (2007-
2013). 
National Indicative Programs 
(NIP) 
In line with the CSP, they define more specific 
goals and allocate resources for the periods 2007-
2010 and 2011-2014. 
Annual Action Program 
(AAP) 
In line with the priority areas set by the NIPs, 
they identify specific programs of bilateral 
cooperation every single year. 
6 
 
recipient countries’ slow uptake of reforms. Since its establishment, the policy has suffered of 
implementation problems that prevented it from achieving its aims, with the major consequence that 
“there is hardly any other external policy of the EU with a larger gap between its stated objectives and 
the actual outcomes” (Lehne, 2014, p. 4).  
The Arab Spring was a further test for the effectiveness of the ENP and, as the protests crossed 
the Mediterranean, the policy poor record came even more under the spotlight. “The popular uprisings 
showed that the Arab population shared many of the very principles and values promoted by the EU 
[…]. However, it was also clearly evident that the democratic revolts occurred despite, rather than 
because of the actions of Europe” (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 59). Against this background, the EU 
could not help but review the policy in the attempt to keep the pace with a “changing neighbourhood” 
(European Commission, 2011a). The new ENP was anchored to the promotion of deep democracy and 
inclusive economic development, in the name of an incentive based approach that rewards all the 
countries proceeding with reforms (European Commission, 2011b; European Commission, 2011a). 
Furthermore, in order to support a real “more for more”, additional resources were allocated to 
Mediterranean countries under the new SPRING5 umbrella program. Yet, even if the EU committed 
more funds to neighbours in fact it spent less than before, with a widening gap between what has been 
promised and what has been actually delivered (Bicchi, 2014b, p. 27).  
The ENP’s gap between goals and outcomes is widely captured by the analysis of the ENPI 
allocations to sustain reforms in the partner countries. The level of payments and the payments-to-
commitments ratio is generally considered as an indicator of program performance. The underneath 
logic is that payments normally occur only when specific contractual obligations are carried out (e.g. 
signature of financing agreements, respect of disbursement conditions in budget support operations, 
service contracts or grants in projects operations, etc.). This means that if the recipient country does 
not proceed with specific reforms and respect disbursement conditions, or if specific activities are not 
carried out, payments are delayed or not executed and the overall performance of the program lags 
behind. From the outset, the ENPI has revealed an increasing gap between its payments and 
commitments and significant differences have emerged in the neighbouring countries in the way they 
have absorbed and implemented their allocations of funds.  
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth 
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Figure 2 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENPI Overview 2007-2013 (European Commission, 2014b) and ENPI Statistical 
Annex 2015 (European Commission and High Representative, 2015). The data shown in the figure does not include regional 
cooperation.  
 
 
The payments-commitments gap shown in Figure 2 for the southern neighbourhood region 
reveals that ENPI performance has diminished across the years, with the period 2011-2014 faring worse 
than the previous period 2007-2010. Therefore, despite the sharp increase in EU allocations after the 
Arab Spring, disbursement rate has significantly decreased since 2011, with a substantial lag between 
payments and commitments (Bicchi, 2014a; Bicchi, 2014b). This trend goes exactly in the opposite 
direction of the previous MEDA program6 and financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP), where low levels of effective payments during the first phase (1995-1999) were 
gradually offset by a significant growth in the period 2000-2004 under MEDA II (Natorski, 2008). While 
the general decline in the rate of payments from 2011 onward is easily explicable in light of the 
instability generated by the Arab Spring, one of the most interesting aspects is the considerable 
difference in the way the countries of the region have absorbed and implemented ENPI funds (ANNEX 
1).  
Overall, in the period 2007-2010 (Table 1), i.e. during the first four years of ENPI 
implementation, the analysis of the cumulative payments-to-commitments ratio for each country 
reveals that Morocco is the largest beneficiary of EU funds and the country with the best performance 
in terms of absorption capacity. In Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt cumulative payments are also 
very high, representing more than the 90% of the original commitments, while Libya lags behind with 
                                                     
6 It was replaced by ENPI in 2007. 
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a mere 17%.  After the Arab Spring, the ranking is completely overturned. In particular, by looking at 
Table 2, which illustrates the cumulative payments-to-commitments ratio in the four years between 
2011 and 2014, two main considerations deserve attention.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, in line with the general trend already outlined above, as commitments increased in 
comparison to the previous period the disbursement rate declined for every country (with the 
exception of Libya). This is especially true for Jordan and Egypt that dropped nearly by half over the 
considered period. 
Second, in a context of uncertainty and instability where all the southern neighbours were 
confronted with reduced absorption capacity, Tunisia was the only country that, against all odds, was 
able to maintain a high payment rate (84%), which earned it the first place in the ranking. This is of 
particular interest if we consider that since 2011 Tunisia has undergone huge political transformations. 
The country, therefore, was not only able to absorb EU’s funds in spite of the prevailing uncertainty, 
but it also fared better than other countries less affected by the Arab Spring. In this regard, Morocco is 
a case in point. If in the period 2007-2010, Morocco had one of the best performances in terms of 
                                                     
7 Both Tables 1 and 2 are author’s elaboration. Source: ENPI Overview 2007-2013 (European Commission, 2014b) 
and ENPI Statistical Annex 2015 (European Commission and High Representative, 2015). Please note that 
Palestine was excluded from the analysis in light of its special character. Similarly, Israel was not included as it 
receives disproportionately low amounts of EU funds in view of its status as a developed economy and, therefore, 
it is often considered as an outlier (Tocci and Cassarino, 2011). 
8 The commitments-payments ratio for Morocco is this high because during the period 2007-2010 payments 
exceeded commitments. 
Table 27 
ENPI 
Payments-
to-
Commitme
nts Ratio 
2007-2010 
1 Morocco8 113.92% 
2 Algeria 94% 
3 Jordan 94% 
4 Egypt 93% 
5 Tunisia 90% 
6 Syria 84% 
7 Lebanon 67% 
8 Libya  17% 
1 Tunisia 84% 
2 Algeria 68% 
3 Jordan 58% 
4 Egypt 50% 
5 Lebanon 48% 
6 Morocco 45% 
7 Libya 40% 
8 Syria 38% 
Table 1 
ENPI Payments-to-Commitments Ratio 2011-2014 
 
ENPI Payments-to-Commitments Ratio 2007-2010 
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payments-to-commitments ratio, after 2011 it has drastically reduced its absorption capacity, lagging 
behind all the other countries. This is particularly relevant if we consider that it did better only than 
Syria and Libya, where low performance is not surprising at all and obviously related to the ongoing 
war. Furthermore, in comparison to other countries such as Tunisia, the Moroccan regime appears to 
have gone largely unchanged despite the Arab uprisings and its good relations with the EU have been 
maintained throughout and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Balfour, 2012a, p. 32). Therefore, one 
might expect the “Moroccan Spring” to have a reduced impact on the implementation of the ENP, with 
less uncertainty and relatively minor changes in the country’s policy performance and funds 
absorption. By contrast, the country’s developments after 2011 seem to have greatly affected the 
implementation of the ENP on the ground.  
Why is this the case? What do explain implementation gaps in the neighbouring countries and 
their variance in performance? The data reveal that in the domain of external policies implementation 
is a huge challenge for the EU (Dearden, 2008b) and that adequate attention should be devoted to the 
peculiar local conditions that affect the recipient country’s ability to receive and spend the resources 
allocated to meet policy goals. The implementation of the ENP cannot be explained merely in light of 
the ENP policy design and genetic weakness, as well as only in light of EU interests and actorness. 
These explanations do not allow to fully account for implementation success and problems, as well as 
for the gaps between payments and commitments or the variance across countries. As suggested by 
Darbouche (2008), scholarly debates on EU external action “tend to focus on the internal policy 
dynamics of the EU and its institutional mechanisms, whilst paying less attention to the explanatory 
potential of variables at the receiving end of policy processes” (p.372). In this sense, giving analytical 
agency to Southern Mediterranean policy recipients is important to understand how European policy 
initiatives fit into their agendas and capacities, as well as how reforms are concretely implemented on 
the ground (ibid.). Whereas the EU cannot be neglected from the explanatory picture, insofar as it plays 
an important role in terms of application or not of conditionality and design of policy programs, 
domestic actors in the neighbouring countries matter by favouring or hindering the implementation 
of the ENP on the ground. In this sense, the puzzle is to what extent local actors in neighbouring 
countries make EU external policies work, i.e. how, when and why they can make a difference. The 
contrasting performances among countries raise some fundamental questions about the factors that 
account for the considerable differences and gaps in implementation, as well as the way the Arab 
Spring affected the implementation of the ENP at the local level. Furthermore, they provide the 
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opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis between the best country (Tunisia) and the worst 
(Morocco9) in terms of absorption capacity after 2011.   
Finally, an analysis of implementation on the ground is key to opening the “black box” of 
numerical data. It is useful not only to explain the gap between commitments and payments, i.e. the 
reasons that constrain a country’s absorption capacity, but also to investigate positive cases where the 
level of effective payments is high vis-a-vis original allocations. This is particularly significant to shed 
light on the conditions behind positive performance, as well as to unveil any difficulty or delay that 
could have occurred during implementation and that at first sight could be overlooked only because 
eventually the payment was executed.  
 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The rationale of this work is to go beyond context free analyses of EU external action and to analyse 
implementation in the domain of external policies, by taking into account local actors and conditions 
in the countries that are the final recipients of the policy. In particular, it seeks to analyse the role 
played by three specific domestic variables -political actors, administration’s capacity and civil society- 
in determining ENP implementation performance on the ground. Furthermore, if it is true that these 
three variables play a role in the implementation of the ENP, then it is interesting to investigate how 
the Arab Spring affected them and, in turn, shaped the implementation of the policy after 2011. The 
main research questions will be: 
1) How do domestic actors account for the differences and the gaps in implementation at the local 
level?  
2) How did the Arab Spring affect implementation at the local level?  
These two explanatory research questions should be preceded by a third more general and descriptive 
question, i.e.  3) How are EU external policies implemented in the recipient countries?  
This question is justified on the idea that before explaining why EU external policies are implemented 
in a certain way, or before explaining the dynamics that account for implementation differences, 
                                                     
9 Morocco is actually not the last in the ranking of the payments-to-commitments ratio for the period 2011-2014. 
Yet, Syria and Libya, which are the last two countries in terms of performance, would not be suitable for a 
comparative analysis in this case. Given their current exceptional situation, it would be impossible to control the 
intervening variable of war.  
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successes or problems, descriptive questions should precede explanatory ones (White, 2009, p. 47). To 
answer this general question, three guiding sub-questions may be helpful: What kind of actions are 
carried out to implement the goals of the policy? What kind of actors are involved? What is the 
interaction between the central external actors (donors) seeking to put the policy into effect and the 
local actors (recipients) upon whom action depends?  
 
 
1.3 The ENP as a case of external policy’s implementation 
 
Drawing on Keukeleire & McNaughtan (2008), EU’s external policy can be defined as the set of 
policies “directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and 
the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals” (p.19). External 
policies are therefore different from the mere “external relations” that are only about maintaining 
relations with external actors, without aiming at influencing them or their environment (ibid.). 
Furthermore, we define it as “a set of policies” because EU external policy is multifaceted and can be 
framed as the sum of different policy areas, ranging from political and economic dimension, to social 
and environmental aspects (Panebianco, 2012b, p. 24).  
In line with this definition, the ENP is an external policy that “concentrates on developing 
bilateral relations between the EU and individual countries, in an attempt to influence their internal 
and external policies” (Smith, 2005, p. 762-763). In this sense, it fits in the definition of “structural 
foreign policy”, i.e. a policy that is aimed at influencing or shaping structures in a sustainable way” 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 330). At the same time, the ENP10 “is a prime example of a 
comprehensive approach” to external policy that “combines long-term political association, trade 
policy, sector policies and financial cooperation with shorter-term policies and measures of 
CFSP/CSDP instruments” (European Commission, 2013a, p. 19). This is why the policy is often 
considered as a framework composed of different “regimes” (i.e. sets of principles, norms, rules, 
procedures) across a wide range of sectors, with the purpose to regulate neighbourhood relations in 
many spheres of activity (Bendiek, 2007, p. 27).  
In light of the research problem mentioned above, the ENP is an interesting case to study the 
implementation of EU external action for different reasons. First, by borrowing from the definition 
                                                     
10 For a specific analysis of the notions “external policy” vs. “external relations” as applied to the ENP case, see 
Kuznetsov (2009) who distinguishes respectively between “neighbourhood policy” and “good neighbourly 
relations”. 
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provided by Sedelmeier (2005: 401-405) with reference to EU’s enlargement policy, the ENP can be 
regarded as a “composite policy” that draws on policies in a broad range of issue areas and that has a 
macro and meso dimension. The macro dimension concerns the overall framework of the policy in 
terms of broader objectives and instruments. The meso dimension translates this framework into 
substantive policy outputs (i.e. the Action Plans and the Country Strategy Papers), and sets the policy 
instruments into the various areas11 of the composite policy (i.e. the Annual Action Programs). Against 
this background, the ENP is an interesting umbrella to analyse the implementation of the EU external 
action on the ground and its frustrations in different areas.  
Secondly, as a policy that relies on a wide range of financial instruments, implementation 
methods and modes of interaction with domestic actors, the ENP is a good case to show the complexity 
of implementation in external policies. Under the ENP, the EU makes use of both budget support, 
based on a direct disbursement into the country’s national treasury, and decentralized projects, where 
payments may be devolved to local authorities or non-governmental actors. In both cases, local actors 
are “veto-points” that lengthen the chain of command and increase the chances to take different 
directions from the originally intended course (Bicchi, 2010a, p. 977). Actors on the ground, therefore, 
resemble what bottom-up implementation studies call as the “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980), 
i.e. the final actors whose discretion and capability impinge upon the translation of the policy into 
action. In this vein, success depends on the partner countries’ capacity and willingness to implement 
reform programs.  
Thirdly, implementation is evolution, i.e. “at each point we must cope with new circumstances” 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. 163). The ENP in the Southern Neighbourhood is a good case to 
analyse the implementation of EU external policies in unstable and changing contexts. The uprisings 
in the Arab world demonstrated the existence of a fertile ground for the structural changes that the EU 
was hoping for but that the ENP itself could not induce (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 330). Therefore, 
the ENP implementation gaps- namely the decreasing rate of payments after 2011 and the variation in 
countries’ performances- highlight how sensitive the EU is to the changeable domestic conditions in 
target countries (Bicchi, 2009, p. 76), and call for an investigation of the local implementing 
environment and its peculiarities. 
                                                     
11 As said by Sedelmeier (2005: 405), “the key characteristic of a composite policy is that different groups of policy-
makers have the lead for its different components”. For more information on the way the ENP’s multi-sector 
character informed the policy formulation and generated a “competitive collaboration” between the various 
agents involved in the drafting of the ENP, see Jeandesboz (2007).  
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Fourth, the ENP has been the main vehicle for EU funds to Southern Mediterranean countries 
(Bicchi, 2014a, p. 318) and it has remained the main tool to address the challenges posed by the Arab 
Spring events (Gillespie, 2013). Hence, it is a good case to analyse the implementation of EU aids on 
the ground. 
Finally, because of its broad nature, the ENP is part of -and intersect with- other external 
policies of the EU, such as EU development policy, EU wider foreign policy and EU Mediterranean 
policy. According to the ENPI regulation (2006: art.10), the support to be provided to neighbouring 
developing countries “should be coherent with the objectives and the principles of the European 
Community Development Policy”, in line with the European Consensus on Development that allowed 
for a substantial broadening of the EU’s development orbit beyond strictly aid policies (Orbie, 2012, p. 
21). With its support for prosperity and for the fight against poverty (two of the famous three Ps 
defined in the EC Communication (2003) a “Wider Europe”), the ENP clearly commits to poverty 
eradication, which is the primary objective of EU development policy. Moreover, with its multi-faceted 
approach, the ENP is consistent with the notion of comprehensive development supported by EC 
Communication (2011), “Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change”, 
which states that the goals of development, democracy, human rights, good governance and security 
are intertwined. 
The engagement in the neighbourhood can also be seen as a highly distinctive feature of the 
broader EU foreign policy in its immediate periphery (Dannreuther, 2007; Marchetti, 2006; Varwick & 
Lang, 2007). As a policy that contributes to further advancing and supporting the EU’s foreign policy 
objectives (European Commission, 2004a, p. 8), the ENP ties in elements from the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (former second pillar) and external relations (former first pillar), by 
including perspectives on political dialogue, prevention and management of conflicts (Jeandesboz, 
2007, p. 388). Finally, the ENP is also one of the two volets of the EU Mediterranean Policy, together 
with the EMP (Panebianco, 2008). The ENP in fact did not replace the EMP, but merely reconfigured it 
(Seeberg, 2009, p. 81), in line with the EU “policy topping approach” which is based on the introduction 
of new policies in addition and over existing ones (Herman, 2006, p. 373). Overall, therefore, the 
analysis of the implementation of the ENP provides interesting insights on the implementation of other 
important external policies of the EU.  
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1.4 Literature review 
 
Since the launch of the ENP in the early 2000s, there has been a big bulk of academic works 
analysing the policy, its characteristics and its implementation. Overall, two main lines of research 
have informed the literature on the ENP.  
 
1.4.1 Rationale and evolution of the ENP 
 
The first line of research focuses on the rationale, scope and evolution of the policy. Academic 
contributions in this domain analyse the origins and features of the ENP as a policy that emerged to 
be an alternative to the accession process, but that drew its main characteristics from the previous EU 
enlargement policy (Dannreuther, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Bechev & Nicolaïdis, 2010; Cadier, 2013; 
Haukkala, 2008; Primatarova, 2005; Gebhard, 2010). Along the same lines, other contributions 
investigate the implications of the ENP in terms of the benefits the EU is willing to grant neighbouring 
countries in exchange for economic and political reforms, and the relative challenges stemming from 
incentives that do not include the membership perspective (Comelli, 2004; Johansson-Nogués, 2004; 
Dodini & Fantini, 2006; Balfour & Rotta, 2005; Tocci, 2005). Some other literature adopts a governance 
perspective and frames the relationship between the EU and its neighbours as harmonization that 
should lead to the extension and adoption of EU internal rules by neighbouring countries (Barbé et al., 
2009, p.834-835). In this context, the ENP is the EU most ambitious project of external governance 
(Wetzel, 2011) and its rationale is rooted in EU perception of interdependence and in its attempt to 
engage externally in those areas of governance that, albeit securitized inside, are vulnerable in third 
countries (Lavenex, 2004).  
With reference to the Mediterranean area, most studies on the evolution and content of the ENP 
analyse its relationship with the EMP and the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the broader 
implications in terms of Euro-Mediterranean relations and scope for reform (Bicchi, 2011; Comelli, 
2005; Süel, 2008; Alcaro & Aliboni, 2005; Baracani, 2006). More specifically, someone sees the ENP as 
the bilateral component of the wider Euro-Mediterranean system of governance (Cardwell, 2010). 
Finally, whereas some literature adopts an optimistic stance seeing the ENP approach as a new driving 
force in the Mediterranean (Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005), others claim that the ENP is ill designed to 
promote the socio-economic development of the neighbourhood (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005), even 
more so after Spring 2011.  
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1.4.2 ENP effectiveness and implementation performance: an inside-out approach 
 
The second and most relevant line of research on the ENP concerns implementation in terms of 
effectiveness and performance. In this context, the idea of a gap between rhetoric and practice is a 
recurrent and significant theme (Cavatorta & Rivetti, 2014). In light of Mediterranean countries’ 
immunity to sustainable reforms and to EU’s policy incentives, some scholars stress the existence of a 
“dysfunctional relationship” between the conceptual underpinnings of the ENP and its desired policy 
outcomes (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011, p. 934-35). Similarly, others identify in the ENP ‘the risk of 
a new “capability-expectation gap” in the international relations of the EU’ (Kahraman, 2005, p. 2). 
Lehne (2014) talks of “implementation problems” and “incoherent implementation”, while Tocci 
(2014) mentions a general ENP “failure”. Along the same lines, Whitman and Wolff (2010) point to the 
ENP as a policy that is “ineffective” in addressing challenges in the neighbourhood and Bosse (2007: 
59) refers to a gap between political rhetoric on shared values and the capability to enforce these values. 
Others bring up the attention on the ENP “underperformance” (Gnedina & Popescu, 2012) and on the 
discrepancies between what the EU promises and what actually delivers (Bicchi, 2014).  
Against this background, the scholarship working on the implementation of the ENP is mainly 
concerned with assessment, evaluation and impact in order to appraise outcomes as to whether the 
ENP has achieved its goals (e.g. Kleenmann, 2010; Bicchi, 2010b; Whitman & Wolff, 2010) and to 
investigate the factors that account for its shortcomings. Most explanations for ENP poor 
implementation adopt an “inside-out” approach, i.e. their analysis is conducted from the point of view 
of the EU, with a focus on the structural underpinnings of the ENP and on EU instruments, roles and 
capacities to fulfil the original goals of the policy. In this context, for some scholars the real cause 
behind ENP underperformance can be laid on the very nature of the policy and on its weak incentives 
unable to foster reforms in target countries. In the absence of a membership perspective, the ENP is 
not able to motivate neighbours to change their domestic institutions and policies because the 
promised incentives are too modest to obtain costly reforms (Whitman & Wolff, 2010; Epstein & 
Sedelmeier, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Schimmelfenning & Scholtz, 2008). This is particularly true 
for the Mediterranean, where the carrots offered in the context of the ENP are not sufficiently appealing 
for the neighbours to accept reforms and harmonization with EU rules (Tovias, 2010; Panebianco, 
2012b; Youngs, 2005, p. 10). Furthermore, as the benefits on offer from the ENP are not directly 
connected to fulfilment of objectives and are rather only vaguely summarized at the start of the Action 
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Plans, the latter can hardly provide a real incentive for reform (Smith, 2005). This is why the notion of 
“conditionality-lite” seems to be better suited to capture the weakness and vagueness of the incentives 
and conditions within the ENP (Sasse, 2008).  
If implementation of the ENP consists in carrying out Actions Plans’ goals, then 
implementation is inevitably flawed in light of the weaknesses underneath these bilateral documents. 
Most scholars define the Action Plans as a patched shopping list, lacking a real plan for implementation 
and reflecting a policy that is overloaded by a huge density of goals (Herman, 2006; Missiroli, 2007). 
Others stress the absence of clear benchmarking, the lack of criteria and timetables for implementation, 
and the ambiguity of concepts -such as democracy or rule of law- that vaguely specify the envisaged 
reforms (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011; Balfour, 2007; Smith, 2005). On this point of view, the Action 
Plans are a “masterpiece of diplomacy” (Del Sarto, 2007, p. 71) as their ambiguity is the only mean to 
overcome the impasse of interests that are often difficult to reconcile in the negotiations between the 
EU and the neighbours. 
Other authors focus on the interests, role and actorness of the EU, stressing that the ENP is 
designed to meet the self-interest of the EU and its member states (Missiroli, 2010; Smith, 2005; 
Cavatorta et al. 2008). In particular, if the ENP is not able to fulfil its promised goals in the domain of 
democracy and human rights, it is because in the neighbourhood the EU is a realist actor in normative 
clothes and pursues a realist agenda where values are tramped by stability and security concerns 
(Seeberg, 2009; Panebianco, 2008; Emerson, et al., 2005; Pace, 2007; Tocci, 2006). Therefore, ENP 
implementation in this domain is flawed because of the unwillingness of the EU to apply conditionality 
and to endanger stability in the name of democratic reforms. “EU values vs. EU interests” has thus 
become a recurring theme in the literature concerned with the ENP and its implementation. Many 
academic works have adopted a qualitative and “content” analysis approach aimed at analysing the 
words in the ENP documents and their meanings, in order to assess the gap between rhetoric and 
practice. The prevailing idea shared by scholars is that the EU has not been consistent in the promotion 
of values, which remains unsatisfactory on the ground in the name of a logic of utility (Barbé & 
Johansson-Nogués , 2008; Bosse, 2007; Bogutcaia, Bosse, & Schmidt-Felzmann, 2006; Jeandesboz, 2007).  
After the Arab Spring, the academic debate on the performance of the ENP has become even 
more heated. A plethora of academic works agree that the Arab revolts were a clear litmus test for the 
weakness of EU policy and a challenge to the traditional assumptions of stability over political change 
(Tocci & Cassarino, 2011; Driss, 2012; Balfour, 2012a; Panebianco, 2012a; Behr, 2013; Freudenstein, 2011; 
Perthes, 2011). While someone analyses the failure of the ENP as a consequence of the changing 
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geopolitical context and of the dramatic transformation of the neighbourhood (Tocci, 2014), most of 
the post-2011 literature continues to link the discussion on ENP implementation to its policy design, 
pointing to the incapability of the EU approach to respond adequately to rapidly changing 
circumstances (Lehne, 2014). Scholars focus on the factors that explain policy failure in light of the 
uprisings, while critically analyse the reviewed ENP and assess the extent to which it embodies a real 
change vis-à-vis the past. In this regard, ENP performance is analysed as affected by an approach that 
is not really new and where the logic of the “more for more” is actually a “more of the same” (Bicchi, 
2014a; Ebeid, 2012; Schumacher, 2011; Teti, 2012; Khader, 2013). Furthermore, implementation risks to 
be hampered by the lack of EU delivering capacities in light of its institutional structure (Morillas & 
Soler i Lecha, 2012). Since in the field of the “more for more” member states are the real decision 
makers, scholars question the real willingness and capacity of the EU to deliver the promised 
incentives and to implement monitoring mechanisms (Balfour, 2012b; Tocci & Cassarino, 2011; Tocci 
& Colombo, 2012).  
 
1.4.3 ENP effectiveness and implementation performance: an outside-in approach 
 
In the literature on the ENP examined so far, the analysis departs from the EU in terms of 
implementation capacities and policy design. By contrast, few works have explicitly adopted a 
reversed “outside-in” approach that devotes more attention to the domestic context of the target 
countries and that investigates the role of local dynamics behind ENP’s deficits. In this sense, some 
scholars say that the problem is not the EU that is not offering enough, but the authoritarian 
consolidation of some neighbours that makes it difficult to induce change and promote interests and 
values (Gnedina & Popescu, 2012). Some literature provides more detailed analyses of the neighbours’ 
domestic dimensions, pointing out the local features (in particular the role of domestic political elites) 
that account for ENP’s problems and showing that the impact of EU conditionality depends on how it 
resonates in the domestic environment of the recipient countries (Seeberg, 2009; Wolczuk, 2009). 
Similarly, Casier (2011, p. 46) focuses on the way the ENP provisions resonate with the role of domestic 
actors and their agenda in neighbouring countries; and Kratochvil & Lippert (2008) shed light on the 
attitude of political elites towards the ENP, their relative costs and benefits and the reasons for 
sustaining or opposing a specific reform. Along the same lines, Haddad and Pagodda (2006) analyse 
why and to what extent the governments of the southern partner countries would be willing to reform 
their economies and political regimes and the interests that they pursue. Others interestingly analyse 
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how Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours perceive EU values and see the ENP (Bosse, 2007; 
Bogutcaia, Bosse, & Schmidt-Felzmann, 2006; Bendiek, 2008); while someone else adds domestic 
variables to the explanation of the ENP’s limited results in promoting governance in the 
neighbourhood (Kleenmann, 2010). Finally, according to the most recent literature, if EU funds were 
“lost in transition” with an increasing gap between payments and commitments, it is a direct 
consequence of the political unrest and uncertainty which, after the Arab Spring, stirred the 
Mediterranean countries’ domestic environment (Bicchi, 2014a). 
 
 
1.4.4 The limits of the existing literature 
 
In light of the above-discussed state of the art, we can identify two main features that 
characterize the established literature on the implementation of the ENP.  The first is that scholars have 
mainly adopted a top down and inside-out perspective. As shown above, implementation is analysed 
from the point of view of the EU and ENP policy design, EU interests and its institutional architecture 
are identified as the main explanatory variables for implementation problems. While this perspective 
provides important insights, it does not fully account for the ENP gaps and its “dilemmas of 
implementation” (Bicchi, 2010a), as it does not shed light on how implementation actually works on 
the local ground and how the EU interacts with local actors and conditions. Some scholars have in this 
sense recognized the need to shift the focus on the recipient country’s domestic conditions, on the claim 
that EU policy-making is not unidirectional but rather influenced by the way its “targets” receive and 
implement the policy (Pace, Seeberg, & Cavatorta, 2009). However, in the case of the ENP, few works 
have really adopted an outside-in approach that focuses on domestic conditions and implementation 
on the ground, while studies investigating the variance of performance across neighbouring countries 
are even rarer. Similarly, the post- Arab Spring literature has analysed the uprisings more in terms of 
pitfalls and opportunities for the EU, and less in terms of impact on the implementation of the ENP. 
Therefore, “the generally predominant inside-out analysis has to be complemented by an outside-in 
perspective, in which not the EU but the other region or society is the point of departure” (Keukeleire 
& Delreux, 2014, p. 332). 
The second feature of the literature on the ENP is that scholars have principally focused on 
implementation in terms of outcomes and goals’ achievement, without taking into account what has 
actually been implemented. This approach is consistent with the trend that has traditionally informed 
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the study of EU external policy-making, where attention is more on outcomes and impact evaluations, 
and less on procedural aspects12 (Dannreuther, 2007). However, the assessment of implementation in 
terms of impact/outcomes (i.e. the goal achievement) should be preceded by adequate analyses of 
implementation as a process (i.e. the modes of execution and the practices on the ground). 
Implementation cannot be assumed as an automatic process, and if the policy discourses fail to be 
transformed into practice, it makes little sense to evaluate the potential impact of the policy (Bicchi, 
2010a). Outcomes cannot be properly assessed without looking at the processes, i.e. before 
investigating the gap between EU promises and performances “evaluators have to know [...] what 
went wrong and why” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. xvi). In this vein, the micro-implementing 
environment of the recipient countries and implementation processes cannot be neglected.  
 
 
1.5 Minding the gap: the importance of local actors and domestic conditions 
 
This thesis seeks to complement existing literature on the ENP and to fill some of the gaps in 
the current research. On the assumption that the focus on EU or policy-related variables is not able to 
fully account for countries’ implementation gaps, variance in performance or for the impact of the 
Arab Spring on implementation on the ground, it analyses ENP implementation in terms of recipient 
countries’ local actors and domestic conditions before and after 2011. As suggested by Casier (2010, p. 
112), “the focus has been too much on the EU. More efforts should be undertaken to investigate how 
the ENP is received in the target countries”. There are in this sense several reasons as to why local 
actors in neighbouring countries are an important starting point for the investigation of 
implementation dynamics. 
 First, scholars normally tackle the implementation of the ENP in terms of “harmonization” to 
EU standards, “transposition” of EU norms or “adoption” of EU rules in the neighbouring country. 
However, since the primary goal of the policy is to support domestic political reform and economic 
transitions in the neighbourhood (Gänzle, 2009), the ENP touches directly upon the ability of the 
neighbours to conduct reforms. Therefore, implementation is something more than the mere 
transposition of EU norms. Rather, it implicates the broader reform capacity of the recipient country 
and the Action Plans become a central policy implementation tool directly linked to the partner 
countries’ reform agenda. In this sense, an analysis of the implementation of the ENP on the ground 
                                                     
12 See Jupille (1999); Ginsberg (2001) Hill (1993).  
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and a focus on domestic actors provides a privileged and dynamic observation point on the 
neighbours’ internal political processes and policy-making. The implementation of ENP programs in 
a given policy sector is likely to be a mirror of the same goals, conflict of interests and difficulties that 
characterize the country’s policy process in that sector. An investigation of the ENP on the ground is 
thus relevant not only to explain how the policy is received and implemented in the partner countries, 
but also to gain insights on their internal dynamics and processes, and on how political power and 
conflicting interests in society are managed. 
Secondly, implementation is a crucial pathway that determines whether a policy is effective or 
not (Milio, 2010, p. xvii) and a greater understanding of the local context and actors becomes of prime 
importance to ensuring correct implementation of aid programs (Dearden, 2008b). The ENP has greater 
chances of being effective and promoting reforms if it is correctly implemented in the partner country. 
As shown in the first paragraph, an allocation of extra funds to the neighbours does not necessarily 
have an impact in terms of policy effectiveness, as, if the resources are not absorbed, the possibility to 
produce any result is nipped in the bud. Especially in the post Arab Spring environment, it has become 
crucial not just to show the gap between EU’s promises and practice, but “also to identify the 
mechanisms through which this happens, so as to better understand how to redress the imbalance in 
political initiative” (Bicchi, 2014b, p. 39).  
By focusing on local actors in the neighbouring countries, this thesis attempts to provide a novel 
investigation not yet tackled in the literature. In particular, it seems to come at a perfect timing, in a 
crucial moment that sees the ENP being at the crossroads and engaged in a thorough overhaul of its 
principles, instruments and scope. While someone warns that the ENP in its original version is today 
dead (Tocci, 2014), the dramatic transformation of the neighbourhood in the last years has posed the 
need to completely rethink EU approach and to adapt it to actors and developments on the ground. 
This is why Juncker’s Commission decided to launch in March 2015 public consultations for a deep 
review of the ENP, with the purpose to reframe the policy in light of a better understanding of partners’ 
values, interests and aspirations, difficulties and ongoing changes (European Commission, 2015). This 
thesis thus attempts to a better understanding of “what’s going on” in the neighbourhood, by 
providing insights on the implementation of the ENP in light of its current review and future 
reformulation. As the notion of policy cycle assumes, the policy process is divided into several phases 
where what happens in implementation influences policy (re)formulation through an interactive 
learning process (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 45). In the current moment of policy review, an analysis of 
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implementation on the ground contributes to an understanding of the ongoing programmatic decision 
making that will likely shape ENP’s future developments.  
Finally, in order to explain the role of domestic actors in the implementation of the ENP, this 
work relies upon an original data collection and provides new data on ENPI payments, which are 
usually very rare. Normally, EU accounting data on countries’ payments and commitments is only 
given on an aggregated level, with the major consequence that it is very hard to reconstruct, on a 
disaggregated level, the actual commitments and payments per single ENP program. Here the biggest 
effort was exactly to obtain this kind of data, in order to open the “black box” of aggregated numbers 
and obtain a clearer picture of countries’ absorption capacity. The existing data in fact does not allow 
to understand which countries’ programs actually received funds, how much and when.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Chapter II 
Explaining implementation in the neighbouring countries:  explanatory 
variables and methodology 
 
 
 
2.1 Implementation theory and EU policy making  
 
Implementation is the translation of a policy into action (Barrett, 2004, p. 251) by a wide range 
of instruments and actors. As an interaction between the setting of goals and the actions geared to 
achieve them (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. 8), implementation is the stage of the policy process 
where the theory of change embedded in the policy design, the instruments and the resources allocated 
during the formulation process are tested against reality (Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001, p. 336). 
As such, implementation is a link between policy expectations and results and therefore it is the 
foundation of evaluation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. xvii). In order to understand policy success 
or policy failure and why certain policy outcomes were achieved or not, the key issue is indeed to 
assess precisely what has been done and what went wrong and why (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p. 157). 
In this context, implementation studies pessimistically contend that “implementation gaps” in terms 
of a tension between original intentions and final outcomes are normal. Implementation is a complex 
and non-linear process where the mere execution of the policy (process) does not automatically imply 
the goals’ achievement (outcomes). Pressman and Wildavsky’s work “How great expectations in 
Washington can be dashed in Oakland” (1984) gives a flavour of these difficulties by convincingly 
pointing out how the implementation of a large-scale federal project can be very difficult. Against the 
backdrop of several “decision points” which must be passed during the implementation process, of 
different perspectives and of asymmetric relations between the formulators and the implementers, it 
is very easy that the “high hopes of the centre are often dashed against the rocks of the periphery” 
(Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001, p. 353).  
If Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) wonder how policy programs in a federal system can work 
at all, it is not surprising to detect implementation problems in a complex and multi-level governance 
system as the EU (Dimitrakopoulos & Richardson, 2001). Policy process in the EU is essentially a multi-
level and multi-arena game, with a large number of actors, and facing an array of policy-making 
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venues (Richardson, 2001, p. 8). This is due to the hybrid nature of the EU policy system, “where 
decision-making is conducted at one major level (European) and implementation at another (national) 
- or rather a multiplicity of national levels” (Pridham, 1996, p. 48-49). Hence, the policy process goes 
through a number of levels, stages, and actors while final implementation inevitably relies upon the 
will and the capability of national political systems to adopt and implement EU law and policies. This 
means that successful implementation is a question of how to make actors at the lower national and 
subnational levels observe and implement the results of political decision-making (Lampinen & 
Uusikylä, 1998, p. 233). Therefore, what applies to implementation in general is particularly true for 
the domestic execution of EU policies (Treib, 2014). In this domain, Europeanization research, i.e. the 
literature studying the processes through which Member States transpose and implement EU norms 
at the domestic level and the factors that facilitate or constrain compliance with EU law, has become 
an important subfield in EU studies13 (Sverdrup, 2005; Leiber, 2007). A large bulk of quantitative 
studies has paid attention to implementation performance in the EU, debating about the existence of a 
transposition problem at the domestic level and inquiring about the magnitude of Member States’ non-
compliance (Börzel, 2001; Haverland & Romeijn, 2007; Azzi, 2000; Mendrinou, 2007). Others have 
instead focused on implementation processes, investigating the interplay between the European and 
domestic factors (Börzel, 2000, p. 142) that account for implementation deficits and for performance 
variation across member states (Borzel & Risse, 2000; Bursens, 2002; Collins & Earnshaw, 1992; Falkner 
et al. 2004, 2007; Giuliani, 2003; Kaeding, 2006; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; König & Luetgert, 2008; Mbaye, 
2001; Pridham, 1996; Tallberg, 1999).  
If implementation is a complex process for the policy-making within the EU, it is even more 
convoluted when it comes to EU external policy-making. In this field, EU’s external action range from 
security to development cooperation and makes use of several financial instruments. EU external 
policies are formulated through a very complex and complicated decision-making process (Borzel & 
Risse, 2004), spanned over the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission’s DGs, the 
Council and the Member States. Normally, in order to program EU external action, the identification 
and approval of specific programs and projects is developed on the basis of documents prepared by 
the Commission’s services in cooperation with beneficiary countries and Member States (Natorski, 
2008). In this context, final implementation inevitably lies in the coordination and interaction with the 
third countries that are the final recipients of the policy and whose will, local conditions and capability 
guarantee implementation on the ground. Domestic players and context features are essential as they 
                                                     
13 For a complete review of Europeanization literature, see also Mastenbroek (2005) and Treib (2014).  
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ultimately affect the implementation of EU’s external policies and can dash Brussels’ expectations. In 
the case of the ENP, implementation cannot be given for granted as an automatic process linearly 
following from the policy objectives defined in the Action Plans. “The passage [of legislation] does not 
guarantee implementation according to the legislative intent” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 3) as the mere 
knowledge of the policy goals is not a guarantee for compliance and successful implementation 
(Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005). Policy realization is conditional on external circumstances (Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984) and on the contextual factors within the implementing environment (Matland, 
1995). Against this background, how can we analyse and explain the implementation of EU external 
policies in third countries?  
 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework for a comprehensive understanding of implementation 
dynamics 
 
2.2.1   Dependent Variable: Implementation as a process  
 
In the established literature, implementation is defined in several ways14. Many definitions are 
concerned with the meaning of the verb to implement, while others analyse it in terms of interaction 
between goals and expectations, on the one hand, and actions and results, on the other (see note 14). 
For the purpose of this work, implementation is understood as the process translating policy into action 
(Barrett, 2004, p. 251), i.e. the process that encompasses those actions (decisions, activities etc.) by 
public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at achievement of objectives set forth in 
the policy decision (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, p. 447-8; Lester & Goggin, 1998, p. 5).  
As already mentioned, the literature on EU external policies and implementation is dominated 
by a “goals achievement bias” which tends to focus on outcomes while underplaying processes. The 
latter involves action on the behalf of the policy, whereas outcomes refer to the ultimate effect on the 
                                                     
14 For Hill and Hupe (2002:3) implementation means to carry out, accomplish, fulfil, complete; similarly, for 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983:20) it is “the carrying out of a basic policy decision” and for John (1998:204) it is 
the turning of policy intentions into action. Others analyse implementation in terms of interaction. For Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1979: xv) implementation is the “interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to 
achieve them“; for Ferman (1990:39) it is the interaction between policy expectations and perceived policy results; 
O'Toole (1995: 43) defines it as the “connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual 
results”; finally, for Barrett and Fudge (1981:4) implementation is the interaction and negotiation “between those 
seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends”. 
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policy problem (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009). The process therefore is fundamental to explain why specific 
outcomes are achieved or not. To grasp the notion of implementation as a process we can recall the 
Eastonian distinction between implementation “output” and “outcome” (Easton, 1983). The 
“outcome” refers to the goal achievement and asks the question: Do the activities have any effect on 
the problem? The “output”, instead, concerns the “implementation behaviour” by asking the 
questions: “Are the specified activities established?” and “How is the policy being implemented by 
the implementation agency?” (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 145). Along these lines, here the analysis is on 
implementation as output, on the idea that the investigation of EU external policies and their 
implementation gaps should focus on processes in order to explain the why of specific outcomes. In 
other words, as O'Toole (2000: 273) puts it, “what happens between the establishment of policy and its 
impact in the world of action?” 
In the case of the ENP, implementation is the process through which reforms are implemented 
in the neighbouring country. Therefore, “implementation behaviour” is defined in terms of those 
actions or activities (such as signing agreements, disbursing and spending funds, passing new laws, 
adopting and enforcing policy decisions), which the EU (Commission and local delegations) and local 
actors undertake in order to implement reforms and to achieve the goals established in the Annual 
Action Programs and in the Action Plans.  
As already mentioned, the level of payments and the payments-to-commitments ratio15 is 
considered as an indicator of implementation performance on the logic that, if the recipient country 
does not proceed with specific reforms and respect disbursement conditions, or if specific activities are 
not carried out, payments are not executed or delayed. However, for a detailed investigation of 
implementation processes, numerical data on payments and commitments should be complemented 
with an analysis of policy dialogue. Policy dialogue is a common platform for discussion between the 
EU and the partner country (government, national control bodies and civil society) on policies 
objectives and their expected results. As such, it is a framework to take stock of implementation of 
reforms and it can be used as a forward-looking tool to identify policy slippages, to assess progress 
and to reach a common understanding with the authorities on measures to meet policy objectives 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 11). Policy dialogue, therefore, is essential to ensure a clearer link 
between the use of resources and achieving results (ibid). In this sense, it allows to take stock of 
                                                     
15 This is what Guillaumount & Guillaumont (2007, p. 4) define as a country’s absorptive capacity, which is 
measured as the gap between commitment and payment. 
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implementation processes and the difficulties that could have occurred during implementation and 
that at first sight might be overlooked by high rates of payments16.  
Given this definition of implementation processes and in order to understand what went wrong 
and why, an analysis of how the policy is implemented is not enough. Rather, it is necessary to point 
out the casual explanatory factors that affect implementation processes. “Evaluators are able to tell us 
a lot about what happened – which objectives, whose objectives, were achieved – and a little about 
why[emphasis added] – the causal connections” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, p. 203). 
 
 
2.2.2 Explaining implementation: traditional approaches and their limits in the domain of external 
policies  
 
Two main theoretical approaches have traditionally informed implementation research. While 
adopting different perspectives, top-down and bottom-up studies are both addressed to understand 
the factors that facilitate or constrain implementation and that cause difficulty in reaching the stated 
goals (Winter, 2006; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Matland, 1995).  
Top-down approaches start from the authoritative decision and look at the actions directed at 
the achievement of the stated goals. Implementation is assumed to be a hierarchical process where 
policy designers are the central actors and the attention is on the factors that can be manipulated at the 
central level (Matland, 1995, p. 146). The analysis is top-down as implementation is assumed to be a 
hierarchical process that from the “top” moves down the administrative system for execution (Barrett, 
2004, p. 252). A direct causal link is assumed between policies and observed outcomes and the impact 
of implementers on policy delivery is overlooked (Pulzl & Treib, 2006, p. 91). Implementation is 
influenced by the number of actors and the problems of coordination between the links in the 
implementation chain (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984); the degree of required change and the validity 
of the casual theory (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975); the characteristics 
and commitment of the implementing agencies (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975); the clarity of policy 
goals and roles (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984).   
                                                     
16 The interviews conducted with EU officials in Delegations in Tunisia and Morocco, revealed that, especially in 
budget support, policy dialogue is an important indicator for the implementation processes. The rationale is that 
EU’s support to a third country’s sectoral policies is avant tout a political question and political results cannot be 
measured only by the quantitative indicator based on the disbursed funds.  
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Against this background, a top-down analysis applied to the ENP starts from the policy goals 
set forth in the Action Plans and in the Annual Action Programs, and looks for the actions directed at 
the achievement of the objectives. This is the predominant approach in the literature and 
implementation performance is explained from the EU stance in terms of inconsistencies and lack of 
clear and genuine goals; long chains of commands that from Brussels to the Delegations produce small 
deviant steps (Bicchi, 2010a) or lack of adequate incentives and sanctions from the EU. However, while 
insightful, this kind of analysis provides just a frame of explanation. By overlooking the contextual 
factors within the implementing environment of the recipient countries, it fails to fully account for 
gaps and performance’s variation in EU external action. 
By contrast, bottom-up theories provide a “reversed focus” as they study what actually 
happens at the recipient level and analyse the real causes that influence action on the ground (Pulzl & 
Treib, 2006, p. 92). Here implementation problems originate from the interaction of the policy and the 
micro-level setting (Berman, 1978). Central planners cannot influence micro-level factors, as local 
organizations react to the macro-level plans, develop their own plans and implement them, with the 
major consequence that there is a wide variation in how the same national policy is implemented at 
the local level (Matland, 1995). Implementation is thus influenced by the services’ deliverers or “street-
level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980) and it may be shaped in a way that is completely different to that of 
policy formulators (Barrett & Fudge, 1981). In particular, Hjern & Porter (1981) focus on the role of 
“implementation structures”, i.e. the networks of private and public organizations that are involved 
in the policy execution and whose capacities and patterns of coordination influence implementation 
within a particular locality.  
Along these lines, a bottom-up analysis to EU external policies provides a reversed focus vis-à-
vis top-down explanations and complementarily accounts for implementation gaps by scrutinizing the 
domestic context of the recipient country in terms of micro-level peculiarities and implementation 
structures. Yet, in the case of the ENP, and more generally in the domain of external policies, bottom-
uppers encounter the same theoretical difficulties of top-downers. If the latter overlook actors and 
conditions on the ground at the recipient level, the former downplay the role of the EU and its 
interaction with domestic actors. Given the peculiar and multilevel character of external policies, the 
two aspects cannot be neglected. The main theoretical difficulty is that in the domain of external 
policies the macro level of the EU ultimately overlaps with the micro level of the recipient. EU 
Delegations in third countries are a case in point as they perfectly embody this overlapping: they are 
EU representatives whereas deeply embedded in the micro-implementing environment of the 
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recipient country. This is even more relevant if we consider the growing role of Delegations, which, on 
the wave of the de-concentration process17 and the Lisbon Treaty, improved their functions in aid 
implementation and country analysis, and became important actors in bringing the EU closer to the 
relevant context (Bicchi, 2014a).  
The main problem behind the adoption of top-down or bottom-up perspectives is that they 
were conceived to explain national policy implementation without external interferences. In order to 
account fully for the implementation of EU external action, the two approaches should be integrated 
and re-conceptualized in such a way to avoid rigid analyses and to address the peculiar and multilevel 
character of external policies.  
 
 
2.2.3 Explaining implementation in the domain of external policies: governance as a framework for 
implementation 
 
The governance approach provides an interesting “third way” to study implementation, as an 
“alternative” focus that while drawing on the top-down/bottom-up debates avoids their analytical 
rigidity. Its main merit is to emphasize the multivariate character of policy action and the multi-layered 
structural context where multiple actors are involved in arrays of negotiation, implementation and 
service delivery (O'Toole, 2000, p. 276). In implementation research, the concept of governance is 
rooted in the so-called third generation studies that combine central steering and local autonomy (Pulzl 
& Treib, 2006, p. 95). In this regard, Goggin, et al. (1990) recognize the multi-dimensional character of 
implementation theory (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 100) and adopt the perspective of centrally defined 
policy decisions whose implementation depends upon negotiations between lower implementers and 
central authorities. Hence, the focus is upon state/local level inducements and constraints, 
organizational capacity, co-ordination and interaction among mutually dependent actors (Scharpf, 
1978) at different layers and units of government (Ripley & Franklin, 1982). Similarly, Elmore (1985) 
combines “forward mapping”, i.e. the analysis of policy goals and instruments with “backward 
mapping”, i.e. the implementation behaviour at the lower level; and Sabatier’s (1986) advocacy 
                                                     
17 The de-concentration process was launched in 2001 to allow a large-scale devolution of project management 
towards the Delegations, on the idea that “anything that can be better managed and decided on the spot, close 
to what is happening on the ground, should not be managed or decided in Brussels” (European Commission, 
2000, p.20).  
29 
 
coalition framework starts from the variety of public and private actors involved with a policy problem 
and combines it with the external socio-economic conditions that constrain actors’ behaviour. 
By recognizing the multi-actor and multilevel character of policy action, these studies abandon 
simplistic hierarchical models and go beyond the top-down/bottom-up centred debate on the question 
of the appropriate unit of analysis (O'Toole, 2000, p. 266). They pave the way to an understanding of 
implementation framed in terms of governance, as they move away from a concentration on 
government as a locus (Hill & Hupe, 2002, pp. 13-16) and draw attention on the wide range of actors 
and processes of policy, wherever they might be (O'Toole, 2000, p. 276). Therefore, the governance 
approach provides a complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds of variables 
that can influence implementation processes, by emphasizing different layers of cooperation and 
societal actors (ibid.). 
In European studies, governance perspective is widely adopted as an analytical tool to study 
the peculiarities of EU political system and its policy-making18 (Longo, 2008). While the “multilevel” 
governance model explains important aspects of EU internal system19 (Marks, Hooge, & Blank, 1996), 
the notion of “external” governance emerges spontaneously to conceptualize EU’s external relations 
when mutual interdependence is high and adaptation to EU templates meets the interest of third 
countries (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2009, p. 792). The modes of governance, therefore, are a 
heuristic device for the analysis of EU- third country relations (ibid, p. 796-797).   
Opting for a governance perspective, the ENP is less a traditional hierarchical “conditionality 
framework” with a clear hierarchy of goals, strategies, and instruments, and rather more open to 
horizontal co-owned governance structures (Lavenex, 2008, p. 939-944). Against this background, 
“despite a dominance of the EU's agenda, third countries have to agree with the selection of topics of 
cooperation and can bring in their own priorities” (Lavenex et al., 2009, p. 816). The principle of joint 
ownership, which is at the very base of the ENP, calls for a clear recognition of mutual interests and 
for priorities that are defined by common consent, varying from country to country (European 
Commission, 2004a). Hence, it is up to ENP countries to decide to what extent they would like to 
cooperate with the EU (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). The joint elaboration of ENP Action Plans 
and program commitments, the joint evaluation of progress, the attempt to establish stable sectoral 
communication (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2009), as well as policy dialogue, they 
                                                     
18 For a detailed review of the notion of governance and its use in Comparative Politics, International Relations 
and EU studies see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger (2006). 
19 In particular, it is useful to explain EU decision-making processes, which unfold across different territorial 
levels and multiple public and private actors.  
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all pave the way to implementation in terms of governance, i.e. a system where the responsibility for 
policy design and implementation is distributed between different levels and actors (Milio, 2010, p. 
14). This is even more relevant if we consider that, under the ENP, aid modalities seek to promote 
neighbours’ domestic ownership of policies and the use of domestic capacities and institutions for 
implementation. Especially in budget support, the purpose is to protect governments’ ownership of 
the policy process and to leave them the right political space to decide how to reach policy goals. This 
implies that ENP implementation can be framed as governance across different levels and actors. Its 
efficiency is not only conditional on EU institutional strength, rules’ legitimacy and resources 
(Freyburg et al. 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2009; 2011) but also on the domestic structures of 
the recipient countries in terms of administrative and implementation capacities, as well as 
coordination and actors’ agreement on the need for common arrangements (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex 
et al. 2009). 
In order to frame implementation in terms of governance, Milward and Provan’s definition 
(1999, p.3 quoted in Hill and Hupe 2002, p.14-15) is quite attractive. They define governance as 
“concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rules and collective action, often including agents 
in the private and non-profit sectors, as well as within the public sector. The essence of governance is 
its focus on governing mechanisms – grants, contracts, agreements – that do not rest solely on the 
authority and sanctions of government”. Following this definition, while the ENP is mainly 
intergovernmental and executed primarily by the recipient state and its administration, private actors 
and representatives of civil society are constantly involved as part of programs’ stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the governing mechanisms in terms of grants, contracts and agreements rest on both the 
EU (either the Commission or the Delegations) and the domestic actors of the recipient country 
(institutions and non-state actors).  
Instead of the sterile top-down/bottom-up distinction, the governance approach bypasses the 
limits of traditional implementation studies and gives attention to the variety of loci and horizontal 
and vertical relations that inform implementation process (Hill & Hupe, 2002). In particular, 
implementation is reframed in terms of performance via governance in the delivery of policy results 
(O'Toole, 2000, p. 281). In this way, in the domain of EU external policies, the conditions on the ground 
at the recipient level can be studied and it is possible to avoid the rigidities of analyses based on a 
single and specific analytical direction. 
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2.3 Implementation and domestic conditions: looking for explanatory variables 
 
Governance is here adopted as a framework for capturing implementation of EU external 
policies, across different levels and actors. In this vein, and in light of the above mentioned ENP’s 
features (neighbours’ ownership, decentralized and budget support aid modalities etc.), in order to 
analyse the connection between governance and implementation it is necessary to consider how 
implementation gaps are influenced by institutions and actors operating on a decentralised level 
(Milio, 2010, p. 15), i.e. in the recipient neighbouring countries. 
The bulk of the analysis here is a focus on the neighbouring countries’ political elites and veto 
players, administration and its capacities, as well as on civil society and its autonomy. These three 
variables are considered as the main elements of the “domestic (f)actors explanation” for the 
effectiveness of ENP external governance (Barbé et al. 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2009; 
Freyburg et al., 2011) and are identified by implementation, Europeanization and development studies 
as important actors potentially hampering implementation on the ground. Furthermore, as here we 
want to understand how the Arab Spring affected the implementation of the ENP on the ground and 
countries’ different performance after 2011, the analysis of these three variables is well suited for this 
purpose. Administrative capacity, political elites and state-civil society relations were in fact some of 
the main elements directly affected by the Arab Spring and its consequences.  
 
 
2.3.1 The role of domestic political actors 
 
Domestic political actors in neighbouring countries play a critical role in determining which 
ENP reforms will be adopted and how. The implementation of reforms is in fact inevitably influenced 
by the goals and the interests of ruling elites and policy processes are closely linked to political 
processes, since they essentially aim at deciding how different interests in society should be considered 
or not, given limited resources (European Commission, 2007b). Domestic political actors can be 
defined as the actors who have the political power to influence policy decisions. In this sense, they can 
be seen as “veto players”, i.e. actors whose agreement is required to promote policy change (Tsebelis, 
1995). Veto players can be “institutional”, according to their institutional role as defined in a country’s 
constitution, or “partisans” if generated by the political game20 (Tsebelis, 2002).  
                                                     
20 For an extensive investigation of veto player analysis and its state of the art see Ganghof (2003). 
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Europeanization literature recognizes the importance of domestic political and institutional 
actors to explain why some Member States fail to comply with European standards (Falkner et al. 2004) 
and sees domestic political actors as “veto points” that determine the quality and the time of 
implementation (Haverland, 2000). If a directive is not in line with the policy legacy of the country or 
with actors’ preferences, it is more likely that the implementation process gets stuck (Duina, 1997; 
Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006; Treib, 2003). Similarly, enlargement literature recognizes that the 
success of conditionality depends on the recipient countries’ veto players and the extent to which 
reforms resonate with their interests (Schimmelfenning & Scholtz, 2008; Wolczuk, 2009; Vachudova, 
2008; Sadurski, 2006). 
In the ENP, the goals and the interests of key institutional and political actors are crucial for the 
implementation of reforms, as their support or opposition to policy change, as well as their degree of 
attention for a specific policy sector, ultimately influence the execution of ENP’s reform programs 
(Lavenex, 2008; Hagemann, 2013). This is even more relevant if we consider that, under budget 
support, ENP programs normally sustain already existing governmental and national policies. 
Therefore, the same goals and (conflict of) interests that influence the implementation of a national 
policy in a given sector are likely to be mirrored in the implementation of the corresponding ENP 
program. Against this background, for the purpose of this analysis, domestic political actors are 
operationalized by considering their goals and resources. The goals are analysed in terms of the degree 
of (mis)fit between domestic actors’ objectives, as expressed in their political agenda, and those in the 
ENP reform agenda. In this way, it is possible to understand their attitude towards ENP-related 
reforms and to single out the actors in favour or against specific policy changes and why. Their 
resources are instead analysed in terms of power vis-à-vis other actors and expertise to promote 
specific goals.  
 
 
2.3.2 Administration’s Capacity 
 
Administration is traditionally concerned with the carrying out of public policy (Heady, 1996). 
Therefore, administrative capacity as the ability of the state to provide services to citizens through its 
bureaucratic structures (Esman, 1978) is considered as a key tool of policy implementation. 
International development studies have increasingly stressed the linkage between poor 
implementation of development programs and lack of administrative capacity (Sapru, 1994; Ugwuanyi 
33 
 
& Chukwuemeka, 2013). This is why international donors, including the EU, attach high importance 
to capacity building and provide a wider range of instruments and technical assistance for this 
purpose.  
Scholars suggest that, in many cases, countries’ poor implementation or non-compliance with 
international agreements are not necessarily intentional or due to missing political willingness, but are 
rather related to a lack of administrative capacity21 (Milio, 2007). Europeanization literature recognizes 
that Member States’ bureaucratic efficiency, internal division of competences or administrative 
constraints may unintentionally hamper the successful implementation of directives (Mbaye, 2001; 
Bursens, 2002; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999). Similarly, enlargement literature sheds light on the 
importance of domestic institutions and internal coordination for the transposition of EU acquis 
(Zubek, 2011; Verheijen, 2000).  
In the case of the ENP, administrative capacity is referred to the capacity of institutions in the 
recipient country to implement key reforms. The implementation of the ENP bilateral programs and 
the absorption of EU funds are thus related to the capacity of the administration to carry out specific 
actions and to meet the reforms goals. Administrative capacity is therefore a key implementation tool, 
especially if we consider that under budget support programs the responsibility for the management 
of the transferred funds rests with the partner government. This means that once EU funds are 
transferred to the national treasury (only after the respect of the agreed conditions for payment), they 
are planned for, budgeted, spent and audited through the procedures of the partner government 
(European Commission  2007a; 2012, p. 11). Furthermore, as budget support is focused on performance 
and results appraisal, and disbursement is assessed against data that should be reliable, the partner 
country should have a well-functioning system in place for monitoring progress (European 
Commission, 2012, p. 46). Similarly, in the programs that are based on project approach under indirect 
management (former decentralised management) the European Commission may entrusts budget 
implementation tasks to the partner countries, which in this case are in charge of awarding grants or 
managing all the other relevant procedures (e.g. procurements, calls for tenders etc.). For this purpose, 
a specific “project management unit” is normally created by the partner country. These examples show 
the importance of a sound administrative capacity for the implementation of the ENP.   
                                                     
21 The debate around voluntary and involuntary non-compliance is rooted in International Relations literature, 
and it evolves around two main approaches. The enforcement approach considers states’ willingness as the main 
cause of compliance, while the management approach points to the role of administrative and financial 
capabilities. For an analysis of these approaches in Europeanization literature, see Tallberg (2002) and Treib 
(2014). 
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Give these considerations, administrative capacity is here defined as the ability to implement 
reform and to oversee the correct implementation of the overall program (Milio, 2010) and it is referred 
to all the structures -such as ministers, agencies and departments- that are in charge of carrying out 
the required functions. Indicators to measure administrative capacity are coordination between the 
actors involved and resources in terms of both information (clarity of goals and roles) and sufficient 
administrative personnel.  
 
 
2.3.3 The role of civil society 
 
Civil society22 is a crucial actor for policy implementation. Its importance rests on the 
recognition that societal problems cannot be solved exclusively by governments and that civil society’s 
participation to the policy process improves the quality of planning and implementation, by better 
targeting the needs of beneficiaries (Brinkerhoff, 1999a; 1999b; Bratton, 1989a). In this sense, civil 
society plays different roles, as policy advocate and dialogue promoter on the “demand side”, and as 
service deliverer and project manager, on the “supply side” (Bratton, 1990; Brinkerhoff, 1999b). 
Similarly, in the domain of external policies, civil society is a key actor in the implementation of aid 
programs, as it implements projects and takes part in policy discussions and consultation processes 
with external donors, by contributing to a better definition of their strategy (European Commission, 
2002).  
In the case of the ENP, the very principle of ownership highlights the importance of an active 
participation of civil society for a successful implementation of reforms (Rossi, 2012, p. 121). In the 
wake of the Arab Spring and of the increasing attention to civil society’s role in driving political 
changes, the relevance of non-state actors in implementation of EU programs is even bigger. This is 
why the new ENP attaches great importance to the partnership with civil society. Furthermore, as civil 
society organizations normally share the same values and commitments the EU wants to promote in 
its ENP relations, civil society is ultimately a crucial actor for programs’ implementation (Rommens & 
                                                     
22 The literature defined the notion of civil society in different ways. Alfred Stepan defines it as an "arena where 
manifold social movements…and civic organizations from all classes ... attempt to constitute themselves in an 
ensemble of arrangement so that they can express themselves and advance their interests” (1988, p.3-4). Similarly, 
Larry Diamond defines civil society as referring to formal and informal groups of “citizens acting collectively in 
a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make 
demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable” (1994, p.5). 
35 
 
Thiers, 2008). Civil society organizations can either carry out projects that aim to implement the 
priorities of a specific ENP program, or can autonomously put forward initiatives and proposals for 
financing (European Commission, 2002). In the case of budget support, while the recipient country’s 
government is the main actor that directly manages EU funds, civil society participation is crucial for 
the policy targeting and for the definition of the national strategies supported by the corresponding 
ENP program. Furthermore, since budget support funds flow through the government accounts and 
are managed through its own budgetary procedures and arrangements, civil society organizations are 
an important mechanism for accountability, especially in those countries where parliaments are too 
weak to carry out their control.  
The scope of civil society in policy formation and implementation is influenced by the 
willingness of the state to respond to inputs from non-state actors and more generally by the 
government-civil society interactions (Brinkerhoff, 1999b). In particular, the type of political regime 
(whether authoritarian or democratic) and the prevailing legal framework and its regulations (whether 
restrictive and limiting organizations’ activities as well as the possibility to receive public funds) define 
the space available to civil society (Sidel, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 1999a; 1999b; Bratton, 1989b). This is 
particularly the case of the Southern Mediterranean where the fate of civil society has been closely tied 
to the regimes in place and crucially affected by their strong autocratic features (Kienle, 2011, p. 146). 
Furthermore, according to Knodt and Jünemann (2007, p. 262), state-civil society relations can be seen 
in a dichotomous or integrative way. In the first case, civil society is completely independent of the 
state and in a conflictive and polarized relation to it; in the second case, there are no definitive divisions 
between the state and civil society and the latter both controls the state and enhances its legitimacy. 
Against this background, in the case of the ENP, scholars have recognized the importance of an active 
and autonomous civil society and of participation as one of the conditions for the effectiveness of ENP 
external governance (Freyburg et al. 2011; Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011). At the 
same time, civil society’s empowerment is not enough if organisations are lacking the expertise and 
the capacity to handle managerial and technical issues (Brinkerhoff, 1999b). 
Civil society is here analyzed considering its numerical strenght, its “space” and degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis the state and its capacity to implement projects. In the first two cases, indicators 
are: - the number of CSOs existing in a given policy area as influenced by the existing legal framework; 
the type of existing administrative procedures; -restrictions to freedom of association; -degree of 
involvement of civil society in policy formulation and implementation; -the extent to which civil 
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society actors are able to influence specific policy decisions. In the second case, indicators are: expertise 
and resources (personell and money). 
 
 
2.3.4 The Arab Spring  
 
Not so many events attracted scholars’ attention as the Arab Spring23 did in the last couple of 
years (Panebianco, 2012b). The wave of protests24 that swept across the Mediterranean was seen as a 
moment of historic proportion that profoundly changed the political landscape of the region. The 
events put the countries on a path of political transformation, which in some cases led to major shifts 
with the toppling of well-established authoritarian regimes (Tunisia and Egypt). In other cases, it 
instead led to minor changes in the wake of more limited top-down reforms (Morocco and Jordan) 
while in some others it crumbled into the void of civil war (Libya and Syria). Whatever the outcome, 
and whether leading to regime change or not, the uprisings in fact had a big impact on Arab political 
systems (Asseburg, 2012, p. 5). The popular revolts delivered unprecedented twin blows: leadership 
change, i.e. the removal of the incumbent rulers in response to mass demands; and institutional change, 
i.e. the renegotiation of the rules of the game (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015, p. 3). As such, the 
Arab Spring ultimately affected domestic political actors, administrative capacity and state-civil 
society relations.  
First of all, in many cases the Arab Spring changed the existing political arena, leading to elites’ 
reshuffles. Following the uprisings, elections were held in many countries across the region, including 
those that were only moderately affected by the protests (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). This 
paved the way to the establishment of (new) political parties (Amour, 2013) that were now allowed to 
run for votes and to emerge as a vehicle for political expression and representation (Hamid, 2014). 
While in some cases old elites were able to resist change through a mere readjustment of their ruling 
strategies, new actors outside the traditional political game were able to emerge (Perthes, 2012). This 
is the case of Libya, where members of the exiled and marginalized opposition under Gheddafi re-
emerged in the National Transitional Council (Lacher, 2012), or the case of Tunisia, Egypt and 
                                                     
23 The label Arab Spring is highly contested, as it is blamed to be too much optimistic against an uncertain and 
ambiguous reality. Nevertheless, here the term is used in a neutral connotation, to merely refer to the uprisings 
that affected the political systems of the Mediterranean neighbouring countries. For an analysis of the “linguistic” 
debate on the “Arab Spring” label, see Aarts et al. (2012).  
24 For an analysis of the causes and implications of the Arab Spring, see Joffé (2011) and Brownlee, Masoud, & 
Reynolds (2015).  
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Morocco, where Islamists gained the largest share of votes in political elections. The Arab Spring, 
therefore, affected domestic political actors in the neighbouring countries, with élites’ reshuffles and 
the emergence of new actors.  
Second, by fostering leadership and institutional/constitutional changes, the Arab Spring 
generated instability and institutional volatility, with a high degree of officials’ turnover. Therefore, it 
impinged upon the administrative capacity of Mediterranean countries, since political instability and 
recurrent changes of government can affect the administrative context and its delivery capacity (Milio, 
2010). 
Finally, the Arab Spring shaped state-civil society relations. The manifestation of huge cross-
class popular protests was probably the main empirical novelty for the Arab World (Bellin, 2012). The 
collapse of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt allowed people to associate without restrictions for the first 
time in decades (Kienle, 2011). Furthermore, the revolutionary context prompted the development of 
public participation and public sphere (Amour, 2013), with the major consequence that people in 
power became more dependent on the public acceptance of their policies (Asseburg, 2012, p. 5). These 
developments shaped the role of civil society in policy formulation and implementation, since, as 
suggested by Brinkerhoff (1999b) in government/civil society relations, the objectives of the relatively 
stronger partners tend to prevail. 
Overall, the Arab Spring is both a systemic opportunity and a constraint that transforms the 
fixed settings where actors can move (Panebianco, 2012a, p. 155). As such, it potentially alters the value 
of the selected explanatory variables and influences their causal relation with implementation. 
 
  
2.4 Hypotheses 
 
To explain ENP implementation on the ground, the main argument of this thesis is based on 
the importance of three domestic variables in neighbouring countries: the role of domestic political 
actors, the role of administration’s capacity and the role of civil society. The hypothesis is that there is 
a positive relation between these variables and the implementation of the ENP on the ground (H1). 
Namely: 
 
H1a: the degree of (mis)fit between the goals of domestic political actors and the ENP reform agenda 
shapes the implementation of the ENP on the ground, insofar as the more the policy addresses the 
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orientation and the interests of local political actors, the more likely is smooth implementation and 
fund absorption.  
 
H1b: the degree of administration’s capacity shapes the implementation of the ENP, insofar as the 
sounder administrative capacity, the more likely smooth implementation and funds absorption.  
  
H1c: the strength and the degree of autonomy of civil society influence the implementation of the ENP, 
insofar as the stronger and more autonomous is civil society, the more likely are smooth 
implementation and funds absorption. 
 
These relationships are better illustrated by the right part of Figure 3 (1st Hypothesis).  
 
Figure 3- Hypotheses 
 
Secondly, if H1 is valid, i.e. if it is true that domestic political actors, administration’s capacity 
and civil society have a determinant role in the implementation of the ENP on the ground, the 
countries’ variance in performances after 2011 is explained as an effect of the Arab Spring on these 
three specific variables (H2), and in turn on implementation. To put it differently, if after 2011 there 
was a big variance in the way Mediterranean countries absorbed and implemented ENPI funds, this is 
because the Arab Spring, with its different degrees of change and (in)stability across countries, altered 
in a different way the value of domestic political actors (H2a), administration (H2b) and civil society 
(H2c), determining different ENP implementation performances. This effect occurs through the 
mechanisms that were identified in the previous paragraph. By paving the way to new elections and 
to renegotiations of the rules of game through institutional and constitutional changes, the Arab Spring 
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altered the value of the variable domestic political actors, leading to the emergence of new actors and 
to élites reshuffles with a consequent potential change on actors’ goals and resources. Similarly, by 
generating institutional volatility and turnover, it affected countries’ administrations and their 
capacities in terms of ability to implement reforms and oversee correctly programs’ implementation. 
Finally, by impinging upon state-civil society relations, it shaped the strength and the space reserved 
to civil society. The first (left) part of Figure 3 (2nd Hypothesis) better illustrates the relationship 
between the Arab Spring, its mechanisms and the effect on the explanatory independent variables. 
 
 
2.5 Case Selection  
 
In order to answer the research questions and to test the hypotheses, this work builds on the two 
different cases of Morocco and Tunisia. These two cases present a number of interesting aspects that 
allow to analyse the dynamics behind the implementation of the ENP. Moreover, they respect the 
primary criterion for cases selection, i.e. they provide variation on dimensions that are relevant to the 
research problem and to the objective of the study (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 83).  
The two countries have both a long-standing tradition of cooperation with the EU25 and were 
among the first neighbours to adopt an AP in 2005. However, while departing from very similar APs, 
they had different performances in the implementation of the ENP. If Morocco emerged as a “good 
practice” country (Natorski, 2008) and as the “bon élève” of the ENP in light of its very good results in 
the implementation of the AP’s priorities, by contrast Tunisia stood out as the “bad” because of its 
resistance to turn economic success into political opening (Bicchi, 2010b; Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 
2008). Moreover, Morocco and Tunisia display a useful variance in the independent variables of this 
study. They have always had different kind of domestic political actors, with an executive monarchy 
and competitive authoritarian regime for the first and a presidential regime with a hegemonic electoral 
authoritarianism for the second. Their administrative capacity has always been different, with Tunisia 
being more developed than Morocco. Finally, civil society has traditionally been more open and 
articulated in Morocco vis-à-vis the stifled and closed environment of Tunisia, which left little room to 
                                                     
25 EU cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco can be dated back to the 1960s and the 1970s, when the two countries 
signed with the European Community trade and cooperation agreements to sustain their socio-economic 
development. In the 1990s, a broader framework to manage political, economic and cultural cooperation was 
established with the signature of the EMP Association Agreements. Since then, the two countries were among 
the main beneficiaries of the MEDA programs.   
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non-state actors and civil society’s organizations. The choice of these two cases is therefore justified on 
the idea that they allow to analyse the different performances in the implementation of the ENP and 
to test the first hypothesis. Furthermore, as shown in the first chapter, the data on the ENPI cumulative 
payments- to commitments ratio for the period 2011-2014 provides the opportunity to conduct a 
comparative analysis between the best (Tunisia) and the worst (Morocco) country in terms of 
absorption capacity after 2011 (see Figure 4). 
 
              Source: Author’s own elaboration on the ENPI data (2015). 
 
The case selection is also justified on the ground that the Arab Spring generated contrasting 
results in these two countries. Tunisia is where the uprisings kicked off, where the regime collapsed 
and where authoritarian rule was supposed to be the most solid; whereas Morocco is a case of partial 
awakening that did not move much during the uprisings and where the fundamentals of the regime 
are still in place, with a mere reconfiguration of authoritarian power (Pace & Cavatorta, 2012; Cavatorta 
& Dalmasso, 2013). In this regard, they are useful to test the second hypothesis, i.e. that their different 
performance after 2011 is due to the diverse way the uprisings affected their domestic political actors, 
administration’s capacity and civil society.  
Overall, therefore, Tunisia and Morocco are meaningful case studies which allow to test the 
hypotheses of this work and which recall Seawright and Gerring’s (2008, p. 297) definition of “diverse 
cases”, i.e. the cases which “exemplify diverse values of X, Y or X/Y”. 
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2.6 Methodology and Data Collection 
 
The gist of methodology is a comparative case study. A case study is an in-depth examination that 
allows for a thorough understanding of complex issues and processes, and that emphasizes detailed 
contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships (Soy, 1997). As 
such, it can extend knowledge or add strength to what is already known through previous research 
(ibid.). As a case study, the comparative case study still strives for the “thick description” typical of 
case study method, but it examines in rich detail the context and the features of two or more instances 
of specific phenomena, in order to discover contrasts, similarities or patterns across the cases 
(Campbell, 2010, p. 174). In this sense, it produces more generalizable knowledge about causal 
questions.  
Here the purpose of the case study is to offer an in-depth insight into the specific features of 
domestic political actors, administration and civil society in the neighbouring countries and how they 
affect the implementation of the ENP. Furthermore, it allows for a comparative analysis between 
Tunisia and Morocco in order to generate evidence to test the hypotheses. In particular, following 
George and Bennett (2005, p.63-72), the comparison here is both “structured”, in the sense that the 
research questions were asked for each of the case under study, and “focused”, i.e. it deals only with 
certain aspects of the examined cases.  
Whereas someone critics the case study method on the idea that the analysis of a small number of 
cases does not offer grounds for generality of findings (Soy, 1997), or that the definition of the method 
is often too vague (Gerring, 2006, p. 6), the case study remains a widespread research method that 
offers different benefits. In policy studies, one of its major strengths is that it enables to study 
thoroughly the complexity of programs and policies in their precise socio-political context. Moreover, 
it allows to analyse the influence of key actors and their interactions and to explain how and why 
things happened. Finally, it is useful for exploring and understanding the dynamics of change, as well 
as for determining the factors that were critical in the implementation of a policy program, by 
describing and interpreting events as they unfold in the real life setting (Simons, 2009, p. 23). In order 
to design case study research, scholars propose some main steps (Soy, 1997; Yin, 2014; Stake, 1994; 
George & Bennett, 2005): 
-Define the research questions and hypotheses 
-Select the cases 
-Determine data gathering and analysis techniques  
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-Collect data in the field 
-Analyse data 
The first two steps have already been defined. Research questions were described in the first chapter 
and hypotheses and explanatory variables were introduced in the previous paragraphs. Moreover, 
Tunisia and Morocco were chosen as two cases of contrasting performance in terms of implementation 
and absorption capacity.  
 
 
2.6.1 Data Collection 
 
The data were collected through three main methods: document analysis, interviews, and 
access to the EU financial transparency system. The document analysis is based on an extensive study 
of two main categories of documents: 
-Programmatic Policy Documents: Morocco and Tunisia’s Annual Action Programs and Action Fiches 
between 2007 and 2013, in order to identify which programs and projects were financed and the EU 
funds that were committed. 
-Evaluation reports: ENP Implementation General Reports and ENP Progress Reports for Tunisia and 
Morocco between 2006 and 2015; and Evaluation reports per single ENP program (where available). 
The documentary analysis was enriched by interviews that were conducted with key actors 
involved in the implementation of ENP programs. The interviewees were systematically selected by 
identifying the actors mentioned under the heading “Parties Prenantes” in the Action Fiches of each 
analysed program. In some cases, they were identified through snowballing. Furthermore, for each 
program three categories of actors were interviewed: political actors, administration, and civil society. 
The interviews were semi-structured to allow for hypotheses testing and a specific questionnaire was 
designed for this purpose to serve as a basis for the interview. The aim of the questionnaire was to 
identify the role of domestic political actors, of administration and its capacity, and of civil society in 
implementation, as well as their main characteristics and the difficulties encountered during 
implementation. Some questions were also devoted to understand whether and how the Arab Spring 
shaped each explanatory variable (see Annex II). The use of interviews was extremely useful to obtain 
specific information on implementation processes on the ground and to identify the difficulties per 
single ENP program. The ENP evaluation reports are normally very generic and merely focused on 
the achievement or not of certain outcomes. As such, they do not allow to grasp implementation 
processes or the peculiarities of specific ENP programs, and interviews become therefore a 
43 
 
fundamental tool for data collection. However, interviews have also a big limit, i.e. the difficulty to 
obtain reliable data in light of the risk to collect biased information. This is why in this work the insights 
gained from the interviewees were often cross-checked through the use of “objective” data gained 
from evaluation reports and official documents and statistics.   
Finally, the figures on ENP payments were collected through the EU financial transparency 
system or other internet sources such as OpenAid Search or the IATI Register of International 
Transparency. In this sense, this thesis draws upon original data, by providing new data on ENP 
payments that are normally scarce. As recognized by other scholars trying to proceed with the same 
analysis, the biggest difficulty is that EU accounting data is only given on an aggregated level. It is 
quite easy to find figures on countries’ payments and commitments per single year, but as they are 
only at an aggregated level “it is by no means trivial to reconstruct actual commitments and payments 
for the different programs and investment facilities within the ENPI” (Wesselink & Boschma, 2012, p. 
14). Therefore, traditional data does not allow to understand who gets what, when and how within a 
specific ENPI program. The lack of disaggregated data is actually a problem that all the scholars 
working on the implementation of EU financial instruments have been struggling with. With reference 
to the MEDA program, Natorski (2008, p. 6) recognizes the existence of an empirical gap widened by 
the enormous difficulties in obtaining reliable empirical data. In this context, the analyst is forced to 
become a “statistical detective”, who is often faced with official numbers that “do not square” (Mañé 
Estrada and Maestro Yarza, 2001: 5; quoted in Natorski, p. 6). Here, the biggest effort was exactly “to 
make the number square” and to disaggregate data on payments and commitments by obtaining data 
on payments per single ENP program, with a request for document access through the EU Financial 
Transparency System.  
 
 
2.6.2 Data Collection in the field 
 
The fieldwork was carried out in a time-span of seven months spent in Morocco, Tunisia and 
Brussels. Furthermore, the fieldwork in Tunisia was complemented by an internship period of four 
months in the section of political cooperation at the EU Delegation in Tunis. Overall, 65 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with political and administrative officials, as well as civil society 
organizations in both Tunisia and Morocco; with EU officials in Delegations in Rabat and Tunis; with 
EU officials in Brussels, from the Commission-EUROPEAID and the EEAS (see ANNEX III). The main 
goal of the fieldwork was to conduct interviews, in order to complement and enrich desk-based 
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research, and to collect additional information and documentation, including data on payments. In 
particular, in order to enlighten the difficulties for implementation on the ground, the interviews were 
tailored to point out the main obstacles and difficulties encountered in the implementation of a specific 
program or aid modality. For instance, in the case of budget support programs whose payments were 
not executed or delayed, the interviews tried to find out which specific disbursement conditions were 
not respected by the country and why. 
 
 
2.6.3 Analysis 
 
The ENP is an “umbrella” which funds regional, inter-regional and bilateral programs. Here the 
data analysis is restricted only to the implementation of bilateral programs as they are the most 
important component of the ENP, which attracts the vast majority of funding (Wesselink & Boschma, 
2012, p. 13; Comelli, 2004) and allows to study the dynamics of implementation on the ground for 
single neighbor. The analysis starts from 2007 as this was the ENPI first year of implementation, and 
it covers Morocco and Tunisia’s Action Fiches within the NIP 2007-2010 and the NIP 2011-2013. For 
Morocco, the following Action Fiches were selected: 
- The ENPI Program to support the National Human Development Initiative (AAP 2007/AAP 
2012) 
-  The ENPI support to National Alphabetization Strategy and Education Policy (AAP 2007/2010; 
AAP 2009/2010) 
- The ENPI Program to support the reform of the health system (AAP 2008) 
- The ENPI support to gender equality (AAP 2011)  
- The ENPI program to support the Instance d’ Equité et Reconciliation ( AAP 2008) 
- The SPRING support to Morocco  
For Tunisia, the following Action Fiches were selected: 
- -The ENPI Program to support the national budgetary reform (AAP 2007) 
- -The ENPI Program to support Environment (AAP 2007) 
- -The ENPI Program to Economic Integration (AAP 2008-AAP 2010) 
- -The ENPI Program of Economic Revival I, II, III (AAP 2011/2012/2013) 
- -The ENPI Program for Market and Competitiveness 
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- -The ENP program for Education and Employability 
- -The SPRING Program for Tunisia (Program to Support Justice+ Program to Support Civil 
Society, AAP 2012).  
This choice is justified on the ground that these key different ENP bilateral Programs allow to take 
stock of implementation and its different dynamics across years, as well as before and after the Arab 
Spring. Moreover, they offer a good diversification in terms of policy sectors. Even if the two countries 
have different Action Fiches in light of their specific needs, the bilateral programs remain perfectly 
comparable as they address very similar goals, if analyzed against the broader objectives of the two 
countries’ Action Plans. Annex IV shows Morocco and Tunisia’s programs for the period 2007-2013. 
The data on commitments were reconstructed on a disaggregated level26.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26 The commitments indicated in each Action Fiche for a given year were mathematically added (e.g. all the 
Action Fiches for 2007) to verify whether the final result was the same as indicated on an aggregated level by the 
Statistical Annex in the same given year (e.g. total country’s commitments for 2007).  
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Chapter III 
 
The implementation of ENP programs in Morocco and Tunisia: the role of 
domestic political actors 
 
 
         Domestic political actors play a key role in the implementation of the ENP. Their goals and 
(conflict of) interests, their agenda and their support or opposition to policy change, as well as their 
specific role and veto player status defined by the constitution and by the rules of the game shape the 
internal processes of domestic change. As such, domestic political actors inform the political dialogue 
with the EU and determine which ENP reforms will be adopted and how. The implementation of an 
ENP program in a given sector is likely to reflect the same interests and difficulties that characterize 
the country’s policy process in that sector. In this sense, the degree of (mis)fit between the goals of 
domestic political actors and the ENP reform agenda shapes the implementation of the ENP, on the 
idea that, by quoting Maggi (forthcoming), the more the EU policy addresses the orientation and 
capabilities of domestic political actors, the more likely smooth implementation and fund absorption 
by the neighbouring country is easy to achieve. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role of domestic 
political actors in Morocco and Tunisia and how they affect the implementation of the ENP programs 
on the ground. For this purpose, a general analysis of Moroccan and Tunisian political actors is firstly 
carried out, in order to point out their role within the political system and their veto player status, as 
well as their specific goals and resources in terms of power strategies and expertise. Quoting Dente 
(2011, p.42), political actors’ goals can be “process-related goals”, i.e. objectives that are not strictly 
related to the problem as such, but essentially linked to the policy process in terms of relations with 
the other actors; and “content-related goals” (ibid. p. 61), i.e. specific objectives and preferences directly 
related to the problem as such and to the solutions that could be adopted. 
By analysing political actors’ roles and goals, it is possible to identify the specific political and 
institutional context where ENP programs are supposed to be implemented and how the objectives of 
the concerned actors and their attitude towards ENP-related reforms affect the implementation of the 
policy.  
 
 
47 
 
3.1. Tradition and State-Penetrated Pluralism: Domestic Political Actors in Morocco  
 
The political regime, as one of the main components of a country’s political system, can be 
defined as the set of values, norms, rules of the game and structures of legislative and enforcement 
authority that inform a political community (Morlino, 1980, p. 33-35). While the values are the general 
ideologies and beliefs at the base of the regime, formal norms and informal rules of the game set 
political conflicts and shape the transformation and execution of public demands. Finally, the 
structures of authority define the distribution and exercise of power (ibid). In Morocco, the ideology 
informed by the dualism of tradition and modernity, on the one hand, and the constant overlapping 
of formal constitutional norms and informal rules of the game, on the other, shape policy processes 
and the relations between the regime’s main structures of authority, i.e., the King, the Parliament and 
the Government. 
 
 3.1.1 The King: an institutional veto player and a policy entrepreneur between formal and informal 
rules 
 
Morocco is a centralized political system with much power held by the King (Zartman, 1990, p. 
223). According to the Constitution (2011), Morocco is a constitutional monarchy based on a formally 
granted separation of powers (art.1) and on a multi-party system (art.7). Yet, the country’s regime 
resembles more an executive monarchy where, from Hassan II to Mohamed VI, the King plays a large 
role and whose formal extensive constitutional powers are reinforced by strong informal powers 
(Storm, 2007, p. 116).  
In terms of formal norms as stated in the Constitution (2011, Title III), the King is the head of 
the State and the guarantor of its continuity. As such, he is an arbiter between the institutions and is in 
charge of the cohesiveness of the system. He appoints the government and presides the cabinet 
meetings; he can dismiss the cabinet and dissolve the parliament, and exerts his statutory powers by 
royal decrees. Finally, he presides over the supreme council of magistracy and the royal armed forces. 
The King has therefore a strong power over all aspects of the state apparatus, paving the way to a 
system where the monarchy dominates the institutional realm (Daadaoui, 2010a, p. 3-4). Moreover, 
there is formally no provision or sanction in case of abuse of royal power (Maghraoui, 2001a, p. 79). 
Against this background, the King is an institutional veto player, as he is an actor whose agreement is 
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required to promote policy change and whose prerogatives derive from his institutional role and 
power as codified in the Constitution.  
           Yet, we cannot properly understand Moroccan politics and the role of the monarchy without an 
analysis of the extensive informal powers and mechanisms of political control that allows it to shape 
the political game. For example, while the King has the formal power to appoint the prime minister 
and, on the latter’s recommendations, the cabinet, traditionally he has not followed these 
recommendations. Therefore, although not formally holding ministerial posts, the King does so in 
practice by appointing loyal technocrats that give the monarchy an informal foot in government 
(Storm, 2007, p. 117). Similarly, while formal political elections should be the results of popular 
legitimacy, informally political power is a royal gift (Sater, 2009a, p. 30) that depends upon parties’ 
attitude to enter into a pact with the regime. Finally, since the King can on his own initiative terminate 
the functions of one or more members of the cabinet, this makes members of the government 
informally responsible to him and secondarily to the parliament (Maghraoui, 2001a, p. 79). This 
complex linkage between formal norms and informal rules of the game is embedded in the concept of 
tradition, which is a fundamental element of the governing system and which plays the role of an 
implicit constitution (Monjib, 2011, p. 4). As the King is the head of state on the one hand, and the 
symbol of the national unity and the “Commander of the Faithful”27 on the other, he is both a temporal 
and a spiritual ruler, whose royal decisions are therefore sacred (Daadaoui, 2010a, p. 3). The 
constitution itself seals this mutual relationship between formal norms and informal rules of the game 
by endowing the King with sacred characteristics28 that are not subject to debate (Sater, 2009b, p. 181).  
           This dual institutional and spiritual nature informs the resources and the strategies at the King’s 
disposal to influence political and policy processes. In particular, he benefits from political-symbolic 
resources, such as the consensus that derives from charisma, personal status or ideology (Dente, 2011, 
p. 44). His broad political and popular legitimacy is rooted both in tradition, which grants a wide 
spiritual consensus able to secure the monarchy from instability (Daadaoui, 2010a, p.3), and in 
temporal authority, i.e. the monarchy as a symbol of national unity and a legitimate form of 
governance (Maghraoui, 2001a, p. 75).  
                                                     
27 The symbolic role of the King was built through key moments of Moroccan history. For example, in the 
aftermath of the independence, Mohamed V emerged from the struggle for liberation as both a strong political 
and religious leader; as the hero of independence and as the protector of the faith (Storm, 2007, p. 14). Similarly, 
Hassan II’s miraculous survival of the two coups attempted by the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) in the 70s boosted 
his crafted image of divinely protected King (Boukhars, 2010, p. 40). Furthermore, the King and his Alaoui 
dynasty, which has been governing Morocco since 17th century, allegedly descend from the Prophet Muhammad.   
28 According to article 23 of 1996 Moroccan Constitution, “The person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable”. 
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        In terms of strategies, the King has traditionally adopted key tactics at the institutional level to 
shape and control the political arena. The first of these strategies is the manipulation of political 
contestation, by promoting and institutionalizing a competitive multi-party system in order to 
fragment and control political forces, exacerbate their internal divisions and foster the proliferation of 
new parties (Daadadoui, 2010b, p. 197; Storm, 2007, p. 17; Maghraoui, 2011, p. 684). In this context, 
cooptation is a key mean by which the monarchy selects not only its political allies but also its 
opponents (Maghraoui, 2001a, p. 80), by allowing the latter to join the governmental coalition in 
exchange for a moderation of their positions (Storm, 2007). Another strategy is to swing the royal 
approach from hardliner, i.e. by resorting to repression29 (Ottaway & Riley, 2008, p. 164) every time the 
monarchy’s dominance could be undermined, to liberalizer, i.e. by calling for elections and for top-
down reforms when faced with the risk to loose popular support (Storm, 2007). Finally, the King’s 
control of power dynamics is achieved by promoting the emergence of pro-monarchy parties or by 
appointing loyal technocrats in the executive. The makhzen and the shadow government of royal 
advisors (Arieff, 2013a, p. 3) are a case in point. 
         Given these considerations, what is the role of the King in Morocco’s policy processes and 
decision-making? Firstly, the King is a major agenda-setter for the country, pushing reforms on the 
national agenda (Malka & Alterman, 2006, p. vii) and informing political debates. Over the years, the 
speeches of the King have become a point of reference for political parties and often serve as a guideline 
for the government (Maghraoui, 2011, p. 691).  
         Second, the King has often emerged as an arbiter in policy-making. When sensitive issues are at 
stake risking to divide the Kingdom, the King claims his royal prerogative to be a “conflict manager” 
able to settle controversial questions. The issue of cultural pluralism with reference to the Berber 
language and its formal recognition and teaching, on the one hand, and the reform of Morocco’s 
personal Status Code (the mudawwana) in order to improve women’s rights and status, on the other, 
are a case in point. The first case is referred to the vexed question of Berber cultural rights, whose 
recognition has traditionally been regarded as undermining the integrity of Moroccan Arabic identity. 
Largely repressed during the 1980s, the Berber-Amazigh movement resurged during the early 1990s 
(Silverstein & Crawford, 2004), signing the “Agadir Charter” to outline Berbers’ specific cultural 
demands. However, in the same period the government’s attempts to marginalize the Berbers in the 
public sphere and to limit the activities of Amazigh associations culminated with the arrest of some 
                                                     
29 This is what happened in the 1960s and the 1970s, during the so-called “years of lead”. In order to face the 
popular riots sparked by the economic crisis, Hassan II suspended the Constitution, dismissed the government 
and limited civil freedoms.  
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young Berber activists (Ennaji, 2014, p. 99). Faced with the outcry, the King decided to invoke his royal 
authority to settle an issue which touched directly upon Moroccan nationalist discourse and which, in 
the King’s opinion, fell within his own responsibility as the guarantor of Moroccan unity. Therefore, 
in August 1994 he delivered a speech with the purpose to balance Moroccan society’s competing claims 
while attempting to satisfy the demands of Berber activists (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998, p. 124).    
        Similarly, when in the 1990s heated debates on the reform of the mudawwana and the improvement 
of women’s legal status started to polarize Moroccan civil society and political panorama, by opposing 
feminist associations to Islamist and conservative segments of society, the King delivered a speech to 
settle the controversy and to depoliticize the on-going debates. Hassan II asked political parties not to 
bring the issue into their programs and electoral campaigns (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998, p. 119) and 
labeled the mudawwana as a “religious” matter that fell only and exclusively under his own 
responsibility, as Commander of Faithful (Harrak, 2009). In this context, after inviting women’s 
associations to address the issue directly to the Palace, he consulted with a delegation of women chosen 
by him (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998, p. 119-120) and created a special Commission in charge of 
reforming the Personal Status Code. The final approved (small) changes to the Code were officially 
promulgated by royal decree. The Berber and women questions, therefore, are two examples of 
controversial issues that show how the King can act as an arbiter of the policy process or as a “director”, 
i.e. the “subject who guides the process”, alters the status quo and settles existing conflicts (Dente, 
2011, p. 62). Furthermore, by asserting his royal prerogative to act above the fray of daily politics 
without bearing the costs of controversial decisions, and by reminding other actors that he was the 
only one entitled to manage key delicate issues, the goals of the King as a “director” were mainly 
“process-related goals” essentially linked to the relations with the other actors.  
          Finally, the King is often regarded as a master of reforms and a “prime mover”, as the actor that 
has traditionally taken all the major decisions in the country, and the only one in Moroccan political 
arena able to push through controversial reforms (Kohstall, 2010, p. 17; Maghraoui, 2011, p. 681). In 
this sense, the King resembles what Dente (2011, p.61) defines as the “promoter” or “initiator”, i.e. the 
one that raises the problem and proposes to adopt specific solutions. Mohamed VI’s policy initiatives, 
which owed him the title of the “King of Reform” (Maghraoui, 2001b), are a case in point. For example, 
in the domain of women’s rights, he took the initiative to appoint women to posts traditionally 
reserved to men and he proposed a statute, which was then approved by the parliament, to reserve 30 
parliamentary seats to women (Malka & Alterman, 2006, p. 47). In the domain of human rights, he 
gave a new input to Moroccan human rights policy, by launching the Instance d’Equité et Réconciliation 
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(IER) as an institution in charge of investigating past human rights’ abuses and compensating the 
victims. In the domain of social development, he gave birth to the Initiative Nationale pour le 
Développement Humain (INDH), a broad and comprehensive initiative to face the high level of poverty 
and the low human development of the country. Finally, in the domain of education, he launched the 
National Charter for Education, in the wake of the reform program already initiated by his father 
Hassan II. In all these cases, the King as an “initiator” pursues “content-related goals” with specific 
preferences and the solutions.  
          Interestingly enough, in order to push for reforms, the King often sets special Commissions that 
are created to draft reform programs and to build consensus on sensitive policy issues, by integrating 
different political and civil society actors in the policy process (Kohstall, 2010, p. 205). The special 
Commission on the reform of the Personal Status Code, or the COSEF, i.e. the Commission in charge 
of the reform of education, are an example. In these cases, these Commissions are an instrument which 
is not only relevant to push for specific content- related goals, but also process-related goals by 
controlling the process and mediating among different competing actors and interests. In this sense, 
the Commissions represent a tool to institutionalize the practice of royal arbitrage (Denoeux & 
Maghraoui, 1998, p. 117).  In many cases, therefore, the roles of the King as a both promoter and as a 
director can coincide and be mixed (Dente 2011, p. 62), and he emerges as a policy entrepreneur, that 
uses his knowledge to further his policy ends and that waits for problems to float by and to which 
attach solutions (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165-6). 
          To sum-up, in Moroccan policy process the King plays different important roles in both agenda 
setting and decision-making. These roles are further reinforced by the Constitution (2011, art. 50) 
which states that, after being passed by Parliament, a law does not take effect until it has been officially 
promulgated by royal decree (dahir). However, the policy process in the country cannot be limited only 
to the King, as it is a rather complex process dependent also on the consensus and the role of political 
parties, in line with the consensual and pluralist nature of Moroccan political system.   
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3.1.2 Vibrant or Constrained Arena? The role of Political Parties 
 
            Morocco is a pluralist political system where the King managed to open up political 
contestation, allowing for political inclusion and the development of a multi-party system30. Since the 
early years after independence, an increasing number of political parties populated the political arena 
and participated in elections. The high degree of pluralism is exemplified by numbers, with over 15-
20 parties contesting parliamentary seats since the 80s (Storm, 2007), and reaching a peak of 36 parties 
in 2007 elections. However, in spite of this apparent vibrant political space, Morocco’s pluralism is 
state-penetrated (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 249) with party contestation unfolding in an unfree environment 
where the King has the ultimate control (Storm, 2007, p. 24) and where parties’ normal functions cannot 
be properly carried out.   
Normally, political parties are in charge of representing popular will, by mediating between 
the citizens and the state and by simplifying, aggregating and articulating individual interests (Della 
Porta, 2002).  In this context, their goal is to contest through elections, in order to gain access to political 
power and exercise it. In Morocco, the parties’ room for manoeuvre to carry out these basic functions 
is constrained by both political parties’ key characteristics and by the political system in which they 
are embedded.  
In terms of key characteristics, Moroccan party phenomenon did not originate as an 
institutional need tied to parliamentary and political representation (A'boushi, 2010), but rather it was 
organizationally linked to the struggle for independence (Jandari, 2012, p. 7), with all the main parties 
emerging in the context of the National Movement. Parties came out as weak organizations whose 
deep internal divisions led to a proliferation of new parties that resulted from parties’ internal splits 
and subsequent merger, with the major consequence of a general uncooperative climate fed by the 
persisting resentments among parties and their members (Storm, 2007, p. 34). Moreover, parties in 
Morocco are generally lacking a clear program/political agenda while ideology has a poor role in the 
definition of their priorities, with deputies switching party allegiances easily and frequently31 (Willis, 
2007, p. 15). Thus, Moroccan parties resemble political shops opening for business during election 
campaigns (Jandari, 2012, p. 19). These key internal and organizational features limit parties’ capacity 
to carry out their representative function and feed a general popular disaffection towards political 
                                                     
30 The country’s Constitution of 1962 states that “there shall be no one-party system”. The same principle was 
confirmed in the following constitutional amendments of 1970, 1972, 1992, 1996 and 2011.  
31 For instance, at the end of the third year following 1997 elections, 102 deputies had changed party and someone 
more than once. See Willis (2007).   
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parties, on the idea that they are unable to truly represent popular will and the preferences of society 
(Howe, 2005; National Democratic Institute, 2012; Daadaoui, 2008, p. 249-250; 2010a). Moreover, their 
limited capacity to address different segments of the population and to cover all the country’s 
constituencies in municipal elections reduce their representative action. Finally, Moroccan political 
parties do not completely fit into the traditional definition of parties as groups whose ultimate goal is 
to capture and exercise political power through elections (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 249-250). Rather, their 
main objective is to position themselves and to get more space into the political system, by contesting 
the rules of the game set by the state and the institutional supremacy of the regime (ibid.). In this 
regard, with the exception of Islamist parties who pursue specific agendas and content-related goals, 
the greatest part of Moroccan parties is committed to pursuing process-related goals.  
In terms of political system, the high degree of party-system fragmentation and the 
predominant role of the King are also a constraint to the normal functioning of parties. The royal 
control of political elections is a case in point. By deciding whether and when to call for new elections 
or not, by harassing opposition parties and by favouring loyalists in elections, the King and the makhzen 
have traditionally had a clear control of political processes and of the parliament and government’s 
composition (Maghraoui, 2001a). For instance, until the early 2000s, only four of Morocco’s post-
independence prime ministers had a formal party affiliation, with the vast majority being royal 
technocrats (Willis, 2007, p. 3). Moreover, the fragmentation of the party scene alimented a pluralism 
that is often empty of content (Jandari, 2012) and that prevents political parties to have a strong popular 
base (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 249), with governments always lacking absolute majority and composed of a 
mix of different parties (Storm, 2007, p. 125). In this way, the key features of the political system 
constrain the legislative and executive power of parties32, as well as their representative function33. 
Morocco thus resembles a “competitive electoral” authoritarianism (Grassi, 2008), i.e. a competitive 
multiparty system fuelled by a “manipulated pluralism” (Zartman, 1990).  
However, in spite of this background and of their weaknesses, Moroccan political parties and 
oppositional forces are relevant actors, which, throughout the cycles of conflict and consensus that 
have informed their relation with the King, have often displayed an increasing capacity to contest and 
negotiate the rules of the game (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 286). In this sense, oppositional parties’ main 
                                                     
32 It is worth mentioning that the law 36-04 of 2006, which regulates political parties, defines them as 
“organizations” whose role is to organize and represent citizens, without mentioning any further institutional or 
political role related to the exercise of power (see Kohstall 2010; Jandari 2012 and Storm 2007).   
33 For example, there were no elections between 1970 and 1977, denying the citizenry’s right to be represented 
through parties and limiting the capacity of the parliament to be a tool for voicing opposition. See Storm (2007, 
p. 37). 
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strategy has often been to boycott elections and constitutional referendums every time they were 
dissatisfied with the rules of the game or with the content of the new constitutions. Moreover, before 
taking part in the first opposition-led government of Moroccan history in 1997 (Daadaoui, 2008, p. 286), 
some of the biggest parties (such as the USFP- Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires) and the Koutla 
(i.e. the union and the common platform of oppositional forces) directly confronted with the monarchy 
and refused several times its invitations to join the coalition governments (A'boushi, 2010). 
Oppositional parties have also tried to enter often into talks with the King by asking for reforms and 
the constitutional amendment of 1996 can be partly seen as the result of their successful pressure 
(Storm, 2007).  
Moroccan political parties do have a role in policy-making, in light of a pluralistic system where 
the King needs the support of political parties to achieve consensus and effectively implement reforms. 
In this regard, Kohstall (2010) shows that the involvement of political parties in the Commissions in 
charge of education and women reforms was key to achieving consensus and to easily obtaining the 
subsequent adoption by Parliament, as parties were already bound by the agreement their 
representatives had reached behind closed doors. Similarly, parties within the government have a key 
role in supporting or hindering the implementation of reforms, insofar as the lack of political 
engagement can often prevent the adoption of key implementation or budgetary measures. This is the 
case of the IER’s recommendations, which, despite being a royal initiative, took years to be 
implemented, or the case of the new personal status code, whose implementation has been slow and 
with serious difficulties, in light of the government’s lack of enthusiasm vis-à-vis the reform (Malka & 
Alterman, 2006, p. 48-49). Henceforth, “the King decides on basic policy lines and the government 
implements them with more or less freedom of interpretation” (Kausch, 2007, p. 6). 
 
 
3.2 The implementation of ENP programs in Morocco: the role of domestic political actors 
 
Since the launch of the ENP, Morocco has been at the forefront of the neighbourhood policy. It 
is one of the first countries to have adopted an Action Plan in 2005 and the primary recipient of EU 
funds in the Mediterranean34, with more than €1 billion allocated under the ENPI since 2007. In terms 
of programs implementation and funds absorption Morocco has registered remarkable results with an 
extremely high payments-to-commitments ratio (113.92%) for the period 2007-2010, in comparison to 
                                                     
34 The EU is Morocco’s main international donor, contributing to more than the half of its international aids.  
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the other Mediterranean neighbours (see Table 1, Chapter 1). Moreover, the NIP 2007-2010 was very 
broad and covered different policy domains, from social development to human rights and 
governance.   
Morocco ENP Progress Report for 2007 describes the country as a partner that has progressed 
in all the domains of the AP, with excellent performances in terms of cooperation programs’ 
implementation and absorption capacity of EU funds (European Commission, 2008). Similarly, the 
country’s ENP Progress Report for 2010 confirms the satisfactory implementation of the AAPs of the 
previous years (European Commission, 2011d, p. 22), as reflected by the high payments rate for 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 (see figure 5 below).  
The goals of Moroccan political actors and their willingness to be an active partner of the 
neighbourhood policy have inevitably influenced the policy dialogue with the EU and the 
implementation of the ENP in a positive way, contributing to the country’s very good performances. 
Morocco ENP Country Report confirms this point, by stating the “the country has given the new 
European Neighbourhood Policy a very warm reception and has been very cooperative regarding its 
implementation” (European Commission, 2004b, p. 5).  
The King has always shown a clear interest in the engagement with the EU and Mohamed VI 
has been defined as “probably the most European-oriented Arab leader” (Warning, 2006, p. 21). 
Hassan II’s formal application to join to the European Community in 198735, and Mohamed VI’s 
demand of an “Advanced Status”36  that could be «plus et mieux que l’association, […] moins que 
l’adhésion»37, are examples of the royal attitude towards the EU. A content analysis of Mohamed VI’s 
386 royal discourses delivered between 1999 and 2014 shows that by average at least three speeches 
per year contain clear references to “les amis Européennes” and to the strategic partnership with the 
EU, reiterating Moroccan engagement to build solid relations with the EU in multiple dimensions and 
domains of actions38 (Mohamed VI, 2010).  
Relations with the EU were already good under the EMP even before the formulation of the 
ENP and Morocco was among the first partners to sign an Association Agreement in 1996, which 
entered into force on 1 March 2000 (Bicchi, 2010b, p. 209). The ENP therefore came to  represent a 
                                                     
35 For this purpose, Hassan II sent a letter to the Danish president of the Council of Ministers. However, the 
application was rejected for geographical reasons as Morocco is not a European country (Haddadi, 2002, p.151). 
36 Morocco was the first Mediterranean country to obtain an “Advanced Status” from the EU, on 13-10-2008.  
37 Mohamed VI, Speech. 20 March 2000, Paris.   
38 http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-du-roi [Last Accessed June 2015]. The content analysis was carried out over 
386 discourses delivered in the last 16 years. The purpose was to quantify and analyze the presence of the 
following words within royal speeches and their contextualized meanings: “European Union”; “Strategic 
Partnership”, “Euro-Mediterranean Relations”, “Advanced Status”, “European Neighbourhood Policy”. 
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continuation of the Kingdom’s European aspirations (Darbouche, 2008, p. 372), with the King explicitly 
sharing the goals of the policy as addressed to manage the challenges of the neighbourhood, while 
demanding to the EU a strong engagement for its successful implementation (Mohamed VI, 2005a).  
Following the guiding role of King’s speeches, Morocco’s ministers and government officials 
adopted the same narrative of royal discourses (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 205), and even left-wing parties and 
trade unions supported the cooperation with the EU as a strategic option (Senyücel et al., 2006, p. 16). 
During his first cabinet as Moroccan Prime minister for the period 1998-2000, the USFP oppositional 
leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi declared, at the dawn of the Association Agreement with the EU, that 
all the conditions were finally favourable to achieve “une phase qualitativement supérieure” in EU-
Morocco relations39. Similarly, in the exploratory talks with the EU, the following technocratic 
government of Driss Jettou (2002-2007), which was in power during the launch of the ENP and 
Morocco’s adoption of the Action Plan, expressed its full agreement on “the goals, methodology and 
implementation calendar” of the ENP40 and identified it as a venue for a further strengthening of the 
relations between the two actors (EuroMed Synopsis, 2005). This is also confirmed by the fifth meeting 
of the EU-Morocco Association Council, where the EU Delegation welcomed Morocco as a pioneering 
country in the ENP and praised it for having defined the AP’s goals “au plus haut niveau politique” 
(Association Council EU-Morocco, 2005). Finally, Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi from Istiqlal party, 
who led the government from 2007 until the post Arab Spring’s elections, defined the ENP as a “saut 
qualitatif” which allowed the rapprochement of Morocco to the EU, in light of their geographical 
proximity and common values41.  
Morocco’s consistent orientation towards Europe as supported by the King and all political 
forces, be they left-wing (USFP), technocratic (Driss Jettou) or right-wing (Istiqlal), is a factor that was 
favourable to the implementation of the ENP (Senyücel, et al., 2006, p. 16). Furthermore, the 
willingness of Moroccan leadership to proceed with key reforms that were later supported by specific 
ENP programs was another element facilitating the implementation of bilateral programs, as the 
domestic actors’ agenda overlapped with ENP’s one. Under the NIP 2007-2010, of the programmed 
€654 Mil. more than the 80% was in the form of budget support, i.e. a direct and non-targeted financial 
transfer to sustain Moroccan government in the implementation of already existing policies in different 
                                                     
39 Maroc Hebdo, 22-10-1999. http://www.maghress.com/fr/marochebdo/39009 [Last Accessed June 2015]. 
40 European Commission, Press Release « L'Union européenne, par sa politique de voisinage, offre son soutien aux 
réformes au Maroc »; 5/02/2004. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-170_fr.htm [Last Accessed, June 2015].  
41 L’Opinion, 1-02-2010, « Visite officielle de M. Abbas El Fassi en Pologne ». 
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sectors. The use of budget support shows the maturity of cooperation with Morocco42 and it allows to 
support specific sectoral reforms which are the top of the country’s national agenda. It is not by chance 
that, within the above mentioned period, the 51% of the NIP programmed resources was tailored to 
sustain some of the country’s biggest socio-economic reforms launched few years before (such as the 
INDH, the reform of Education, the reform of health and insurance system, the Plan “Maroc Vert” for 
agriculture).  
In this context, the resources programmed by the NIP were allocated to bilateral cooperation 
programs defined by AAPs for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. The first step for the 
implementation of AAPs bilateral programs is the joint negotiation of a financing convention that is 
prepared by the Delegation, sent back to Brussels Headquarters for approval and eventually signed 
by Moroccan authorities. In the case of budget support, the financing convention defines the budget 
allocation and the disbursing conditions that must be met by Moroccan authorities in order to receive 
the budget support tranches. Normally, the tranches can be fixed, with a predetermined amount, or 
variable, when the tranche that is actually paid “varies” proportionally to the performance of the 
country and to the achievement of the financing convention’s conditions. For the period 2007-2010, 
Morocco’s performance was highly satisfactory with excellent levels of absorption capacity (see Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration on the base of the ENPI Overview 2007-2013 and the ENPI Statistical Annex 2015 
 
                                                     
42 This is because only the countries that respect the eligibility criteria can benefit from budget support as an aid 
modality. The eligibility criteria refers to specific elements that should be in place for budget support to be 
delivered: 1) a well-defined national policy and strategy; 2) a credible and relevant stability-oriented 
macroeconomic policy; 3) a credible and relevant programme to improve public financial management; 4) a 
transparency and oversight of the budget. See European Commission’s Budget Support Guidelines (2012). 
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If we consider that out of the 13 programs financed during this period (see Annex IV), 11 were 
budget support and only 2 were programs with project approach (of which one mainly based on 
institutional twinnings43), this means that Morocco’s very good absorption capacity between 2007 and 
2010 is related to the country’s willingness and capacity to respect the disbursement conditions, 
allowing the EU to proceed with payments and the country to receive budget support tranches. In this 
context and in line with what has been said above, the role of domestic political actors and their goals 
were a key variable to guarantee the respect of EU conditions and in turn the country’s good absorption 
capacity, for two reasons. First, their willingness to continue the traditional engagement with the EU 
in the context of the ENP; and secondly, the need for EU money in order to sustain the country’s 
ongoing reform programs which perfectly matched with the ENP’s agenda. The good policy dialogue 
with the EU confirms this point, as understandings on commitments and conditions were generally 
achieved without significant divergences for the majority of bilateral programs44. The following 
detailed analysis concerning the implementation of some of the major ENP budget support programs 
for the period 2007-2010 allows to shed more light on all these dynamics.  
 
 
3.2.1 EU Support to the «Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain» (INDH).  
 
The INDH was officially launched by King Mohamed VI in May 2005, as a global and high 
profile initiative to promote human development. In particular, in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca 
attacks, it emerged as a political answer to the country’s worrying low human development indicators 
with the purpose to fight poverty and to prevent social exclusion and growing unemployment from 
turning into terrorism and extremism (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2007a, p. 1-8; Morocco National 
Indicative Program 2007-2010, p. 4-6). In his royal discourse announcing the launch of the INDH, the 
King denounced the poverty and the marginalization of a large segment of Moroccan population and 
recognized the «problématique sociale» as the biggest challenge for the country and as the starting 
point for his new ambitious initiative (Mohamed VI, 2005b). In this regard, by giving a new importance 
to reducing poverty and vulnerability, he broke with his father’s historical legacy that gave little 
attention to social issues (World Bank, 2006) and considered any reference to poverty as a taboo 
                                                     
43 The “Programme d’ Appui aux Recommendations du IER” (AAP 2008) and the “Program P3AIII” for the 
implementation of the Action Plan (AAP 2008) are the only two project-approach programs for the period 2007-
2010, with the P3AIII mainly based on institutional twinnings with European administrations.  
44 Author’s interview with EUROPEAID officer, Brussels, 23 May 2014. 
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subject45. Moreover, by being defined as «chantier de règne, ouvert en permanence» and as a global 
project of «ingénierie sociale» (Mohamed VI, 2005c), the INDH emerged from the outset as a long-term 
initiative endowed with a strong symbolic value. This symbolic character was backed at the 
operational level by the establishment of a special trust account, i.e. a « Compte d'affectation spéciale» 
separated from the normal State Budget, of 10 mil. Dirhams (910 Mio Euros) for 5 years. In line with 
its comprehensive nature, four strategic components46 were identified for the period 2006-2010, in 
order cover the poorest urban and rural communes, as well as the most vulnerable populations, by the 
means of targeted interventions (Initiative Nationale Developpement Humain, 2011).  
In this context and alongside the aids of other international donors such as World Bank, the EU 
contributed to provide financial support to the INDH through the ENPI. The inclusion of the INDH in 
the funds programmed by the NIP 2007-2010 came directly from a request of Moroccan authorities47, 
with the purpose to secure international funding for the normal exercise of the program48. The EU, for 
its side, agreed to support the INDH through the ENPI as this directly contributed to the 
implementation of the point 2.2 “Economic and Social Reform” of EU-Morocco Action Plan, by 
addressing the goals of fight against poverty and of a better distribution of resources in the different 
regions of the country. The AAP 2007 therefore allocated €60.4 Mil. to the “Programme d’ Appui à 
l'Initiative Nationale de Developpement Humain”, which became the ENP program with the highest 
amount engaged for the budget year 2007, in comparison to the other programs of the same year.  
In terms of program’s implementation, the ENPI financing convention with the EU was signed 
in December 2007 with a sectoral budget support to sustain only one specific component of the INDH, 
i.e. its «volet rural »49. In line with the logic of budget support, specific disbursement conditions and 
performance indicators were established in the financing convention, as key criteria and results to be 
respected by Morocco’s authorities in order to receive the EU payment of the annual tranches. The 
                                                     
45 Interview with a former Moroccan Official from the Agence de Developpement Social, Rabat, 25 June 2014.  
46 The rural component, targeting 360 poorest communes and providing access to basic services and 
infrastructures; the urban component, targeting 250 urban areas with high levels of unemployment and 
promoting income-generating activities; the vulnerability program to improve welfare programs for the most 
vulnerable peoples and finally the cross-cutting program for capacity-building.  
47 5th EU-Morocco Association Council, November 2005. After having presented his country’s new initiative, the 
Moroccan delegated minister of Foreign Affairs explicitly urged the EU to include the INDH in the future EU-
Morocco financial cooperation under the ENPI (Association Council EU-Morocco, 2005).   
48 The main problem of the INDH is that the program’s expenses have an additional character and do not replace 
the State’s normal expenses in the social domain.  
49 The EU decided to focus only on one single component of the program in order to have a better channelling of 
EU funds. Moreover, the choice of the rural component was justified on the ground that rural areas were the 
most in need and that the repartition of the INDH global budget had a greater impact on the budget of rural 
governments or “Communes”.   
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main conditions and performance indicators50 were related to key elements of the INDH rural 
component, e.g. to improve access to basic social services and infrastructures in the rural areas, to 
reduce poverty through income-generating activities, i.e. “Activités Génératrices de Revenues (AGR)”, 
and to improve local governance structures (e.g. by increasing the number of women in the local 
councils in charge of INDH projects). The program’s high payment rate, equal to the 95% of the original 
commitment, indicates that Moroccan authorities were generally able to meet disbursement conditions 
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3-Morocco ENPI Payments- Programme d’Appui à l’INDH 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial Transparency System. 
 
This good performance can be analysed in light of Moroccan domestic actors and political 
system. When the King launched the INDH, it emerged as a national and global initiative involving all 
political and institutional actors. In his discourse, the King charged directly the Prime Minister with 
the task to implement the INDH and, in light of the subsequent 2007 elections, demanded political 
parties to include in their programs the elaboration of key projects, in line with the goals of the 
initiative (Mohamed VI, 2005b). The INDH therefore came to represent an overarching policy 
framework, which informed government priorities and put social issues and development at the top 
of Moroccan agenda. In this context, when Abbas El Fassi was appointed as Moroccan Prime Minister 
after 2007 elections, the support to the INDH became one key point of his governmental program. In 
his speech to the Parliament, he gave a central priority to the socio-economic development of the 
country and committed to the implementation of the INDH’s projects, with a particular attention to 
                                                     
50 Normally, the financing conventions between the EU and Moroccan authorities (as well as with any country 
receiving EU funds) are not publicly available and the procedures to demand for formal access are long and 
complicated as they require not only the authorization from EU but also from the receiving country’s authorities. 
However, specific disbursements conditions and performance indicators can be derived from the programs’ 
Action Fiches, where expected results, actions and possible indicators are defined.  
 
ENPI- Appui à 
l’INDH (AAP 2007) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 TOT Ratio 
Payments (€ Mil.) 21.4 5 21.5 9.5 57.4 95% 
Commitment (€ Mil.)  60.4 
61 
 
rural development, reorientation towards AGRs and strengthening of infrastructures51. Moreover, in 
light of his role as president of the INDH’s strategic and pilotage committees, he launched an Action 
Plan for the convergence of the INDH’s projects with the other governmental policies52. Therefore, 
quoting Kausch (2007, p. 6), El Fassi’s program giving a central role to development and to the INDH 
can be seen as a clever move to use the legitimacy and the structures of the policy initiated by the King. 
This is not surprising after all, if we consider the magnitude of the responsibility placed upon him. He 
was the first partisan actor to be again prime minister after five years of technocratic (and loyalist) 
government and he was lacking a strong popular base in light of the low voters’ electoral participation. 
In this context, he had to protect the power he had received as a royal gift and to increase his popular 
legitimacy. The INDH could be in this sense an important tool.  
Against this background, it is not surprising that the ENP program did not experience 
particular difficulties. In light of the key goals of domestic political actors, Morocco was able to achieve 
a good absorption capacity of EU funds, by meeting all the main disbursement conditions and 
performance criteria. In this sense, during El Fassi’s government, which basically covered all the first 
phase of the INDH, more than 6,000 projects were launched under the rural component, including 
both support to infrastructures and to the AGRs (Initiative Nationale Developpement Humain, 2011). 
World Bank’s Completion Report on the INDH confirms this data and suggests that satisfactory 
progresses were achieved in the access to basic services and in the inclusion of women into INDH’s 
local governance bodies (World Bank, 2012), which were also some of the EU performance indicators. 
Finally, El Fassi’s key interest in the program positively informed both the policy dialogue with the 
EU Delegation on the implementation of the ENP program and the political dialogue at the Association 
Council level53, on the base of reciprocal collaboration and of Moroccan efforts to meet EU 
requirements54.  
 
 
                                                     
51 La Gazette du Maroc, “En Présidant le Comité Stratégique INDH: El Fassi redonne un nouveau souffle au 
Chantier de Règne”, 29-12-2007.  
52 Auhourdhui.ma, “Développement humain: Le budget de l’INDH attendra 3 milliards de dirhams en 2008”, 26-
12-2007.  
53 During the 7th EU-Morocco Association Council, Morocco expressed its «pleine satisfaction pour 
l’accompagnement apporté par l’Union européenne en faveur de […] l’INDH» (Association Council EU-Morocco 
, 2008). 
54 Interview with EU Official, EU Delegation in Morocco. Rabat, 3-07-2014.  
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3.2.2 The other big “chantiers de reforme”: the EU support to Alphabetization and Education in 
Morocco 
 
Since the late 1990s, Morocco has engaged in a reform of its social sectors, by launching big 
chantiers de reforme with the purpose to address the country’s low human development indicators. One 
of the first initiatives was in the domain of alphabetization and education where, after years of stasis 
and low profile actions, the institutional willingness to improve Moroccan education system and to 
fight the country’s high rate of illiteracy was manifested in 2000 with the adoption of the National 
Chart for Education and Training (“Chart Nationale de l’Education et Formation”- CNEF) (Bougroum 
& al., 2006, p. 66). The adoption of the CNEF, which currently represents the main policy framework 
and indicates the long-term goals of the country’s education policy in both formal and non-formal 
sectors, came out as a clear result of Morocco’s pluralistic system where the language of consensus 
reigns. As shown by Kohstall (2010, p. 201-203), the education reform launched by Hassan II could not 
have been really pushed forward without securing the consensus of the entire political landscape and 
in particular of opposition and National Movement parties, which had a clear link to most student and 
teacher unions. In this sense, the creation of the Alternance government created a momentum for 
reform, insofar as the King’s concession to create the first opposition-led government allowed to 
achieve a general partisan consensus on the establishment of the COSEF, i.e. the special royal 
Commission in charge of developing the education reform. By reuniting all the representatives of 
political parties, including the leading leftist party USFP, the COSEF swiftly adopted the CNEF and 
the laws for its implementation were unanimously approved by the Parliament, where the various 
political parties were bound by the consensus their representatives had reached behind closed doors.  
Within the new policy framework defined by the CNEF, Morocco adopted two main initiatives i.e. the 
national Strategy for Alphabetization and Non-Formal Education (SANF) and the Urgency Plan to 
reform the education system. The SANF was launched by Moroccan government in 2004 with the 
purpose to reduce -and in the long term eradicate- analphabetism in the country through four specific 
programs55. Moreover, the priority given to the issue of illiteracy was further strengthened by the 
creation of a specific State Secretary (Secrétariat d’État- SE) in this domain. At the same time, the 
COSEF was replaced in 2006 by the Conseil Superior de l’Enseignement (CSE), a consultative authority 
                                                     
55 The General Program realized by the Ministry of Education and covering all the illiterate people over 15 years 
old; the Public Operators Program managed by other ministries and administrations, which carry out 
alphabetization activities in their domain of competence; the Association and NGOs Program, opened to all the 
associations involved in alphabetization activities; and the Program by Private Sector, concerning all the 
alphabetization activities realized by enterprises (Direction de la Lutte Contre l'Analphabétisme, 2012).  
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directly linked to the King and in charge of issuing an annual report on the state and the deficits of 
Moroccan education system. It is on the base of these reports that in 2008 an Urgency Plan was 
launched in order to improve and accelerate the reform of education, on the base of four axes and 27 
different projects56. 
Against this backdrop, the EU contributed to support Morocco’s education and alphabetization 
reform with two specific ENPI bilateral programs: the “Programme d’Appui à la Stratégie Nationale 
pour l’ Alphabétisation”- that was allocated €27 Mil. by the AAP 2007 and 2010 (of which €23 Mil. in 
budget support)- and the “Programme d’Appui à la Stratégie de l’Education”- that was allocated €93 
Mil.57 by the AAP 2009 (of which €89 Mil. in budget support). The inclusion of these two programs in 
the NIP 2007-2010 came not only from a request of Moroccan authorities to obtain international funds 
for their “chantiers de reforme”, but also from the EU clear interest in the social development of the 
country. “L’UE espère que le Maroc prendra de mesures concrètes pour […] la lutte contre 
l’analphabétisme” (Association Council EU-Morocco, 2005) and “encourage le Maroc à poursuivre et 
à accentuer les investissements dans les secteurs sociaux en particulier, l’éducation, la santé, la 
formation professionnelle” (Association Council EU-Morocco , 2008).  In this sense, the two programs 
directly contributed to the implementation of the point 2.6 of the EU-Moroccan AP, with reference to 
the domain of education, training and governance of the education system. Moreover, the strong EU 
willingness to proceed with these ENPI programs is also exemplified by the fact that, in the case of the 
Program to sustain Moroccan alphabetization strategy, the identification mission revealed that many 
of the preliminary criteria to approve a budget support were not in place. However, the EU decided to 
proceed anyway with the program’s formulation and to provide quick technical assistance to 
Moroccan authorities so that all the main conditions could be met by the signature of the financing 
convention (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2007b, p. 10).   
In terms of program’s implementation, the ENPI financing conventions for the two programs 
were signed in 2008 for the Alphabetization Program, and in 2009 for the Education Program. In the 
first case, the main goal of EU budget support was to sustain the institutional role of the SE and the 
implementation of the SANF. The main disbursement conditions and performance indicators were 
therefore related to the adoption of measures to strengthen the capacity of institutional and civil society 
actors and to the reduction of illiteracy rate with a decrease in the men-women gap (UE Fiche d’Action 
                                                     
56 The goals of the Plan are: 1) To make school compulsory until the age of 15 years old; 2) To improve the quality 
of the teaching system; 3) to face the transversal problems of the system; 4) to define concrete budgetary means 
for the success of the reform (Ministere de l'Education et de la Recherche, 2009) 
57 Of which €73 Mil. to be engaged in 2009 and €20 Mil. in 2010. 
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Maroc, 2007b). In the second case, instead, the purpose of EU budget support was to sustain some key 
goals of the Education Urgency Plan and in particular the reduction of the school-abandon rate, the 
strengthening of school personnel and quality teaching, and the improvement of governance. In this 
context, the main disbursement conditions and performance indicators concerned, among the other 
things, the development of a key strategy in support of the préscolaire, i.e. preschool activities, and the 
implementation of measures for teachers’ training and institutional decentralization (UE Fiche 
d’Action Maroc, 2009).  
Between 2008 and 2011, all the annual tranches foreseen by the two financing conventions were 
normally paid (see Table 4), revealing that for the indicated period the implementation of the two 
programs proceeded at a good pace and that Moroccan authorities were normally able to meet EU 
disbursement conditions and performance indicators.  
 
Table 4- Morocco ENPI Payments- Programme d’Appui à la Stratégie d’Alphabétisation and Programme 
d’Appui à la Stratégie de l’Education 
 
Payments (€ Mil.) Appui à la Stratégie 
d’Alphabétisation (AAP 2008) 
Appui à la Stratégie de 
l’Education (AAP 2009) 
2008 3.65  
2009 3.2 29 
2010 6.8 13 
2011 6 21.9 
Total Commitment for the period 2008-2013 23 89 
Ratio Payments/Commitments until 2011 85% 71% 
Source: Data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial Transparency System. 
 
This good performance in the implementation of the two ENP programs can be analysed in 
light of Morocco’s domestic actors and political system, considering two key elements. The first 
element is related to the clear political engagement of Moroccan authorities, in light of the priority that 
since the late 1990s was accorded to the reform of education and to the promotion of alphabetization 
by all political forces. In his discourses, Mohamed VI has increasingly mentioned these issues, calling 
for a national mobilization and for a collective and governmental responsibility to improve the 
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country’s performance58. In the wake of these royal orientations the fight against illiteracy and the 
promotion of education were erected “to the status of key national priorities” (Secretariat d'Etat auprès 
du Ministre de l' Education Nationale, 2004, p. 7) and the decade 2000-2009 was labelled as the 
«Décennie Nationale de l’Education et de la Formation» (Commission Spéciale Education Formation, 
1999). In this context, it is not surprising that El Fassi’s government clearly committed to push forward 
these reforms and, through a governmental declaration in October 2007, it called for the creation of a 
National Agency for the Fight against Illiteracy with the purpose to replace the SE. While the too much 
consensual nature of Morocco’s policy system is often a burden which slows the approval of reforms 
(such as the long consensus-building process for the establishment of the COSEF in the 90s), in this 
case it helped to build a general political consensus about the importance of education as a national 
issue.  
The second element is related to the country’s need of international money to support the 
implementation of the alphabetization and education strategies. Whereas the national budget for 
education has seen a rapid growth throughout the years, confirming the priority accorded to this 
sector, one of the main weaknesses of Morocco’s policy-making process is its incapability of 
programming reforms that are coherent with the means at disposal. This is reflected both in the SANF, 
where from the outset a problem of economic viability was posed by the existing gap between the 
goals of the policy and the existing available funding (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2007b, p. 10), and in 
the Urgency Plan, where the original ministerial budgetary envelop did not cover all the estimated 
costs (Tawil, et al., 2010, p. 75). In this regard, the country’s limited resources to sustain education 
reforms have contributed to the high absorption rate of EU funds and to Moroccan authorities’ efforts 
to meet EU requirements. As a Moroccan Official from the Agence Nationale Lutte Contre 
l’Analphabétisme put it to the author: “Absorption capacity of EU aid in education and alphabetization 
is really high. We have such a big shortage of financing resources that we are able to absorb EU funds 
easily, as we always need more and more”59. This was further confirmed in Brussels, where some 
official recognized that, while the Eurozone crisis affected Morocco only indirectly, paradoxically it 
contributed to foster the country’s absorption capacity by significantly impinging upon the already 
existing shortage of public resources60. Therefore, the orientation of Moroccan authorities matching the 
                                                     
58 See the Royal Speeches of 13 October 2003, 12 October 2007 and 30 July 2008.  
59 Author’s interview with a Moroccan officer, Direction of the fight against analphabetism- Agence Nationale de 
Lutte Contre l’Analphabétisme, Rabat, 25 June 2014.  
60 Author’s interview with EUROPEAID officer, Brussels, 22 May 2014.  
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ENP agenda, on the one hand, and the need of financial support, on the other, facilitated the 
implementation of the ENP programs in education and alphabetisation.  
 
 
3.3 Exclusionary Politics and Myth of Reformism: Domestic Political Actors in Tunisia 
 
Since its independence, Tunisia has been a republic with a strong and highly centralized 
presidential system dominated by a single political party. The President and his party have 
traditionally been the dominant actors of the political system, with a key control on the countries’ 
executive, legislative and judiciary powers.  
From Bourguiba (1957-1987) to Ben Ali (1987-2011), the presidential strategy has always been 
the same: to promote controlled liberalization in the first years of power with the purpose to 
consolidate legitimacy, while gradually resorting to repression in order to contain opposition and 
guarantee a tight grip on power. This is the case of Bourguiba, who promoted a vast program of socio-
economic reforms and political liberalization in the first years of his presidency. However, this process 
had a U-turn when in 1972 he declared himself president for life and when he started to counter 
opposition and unrest with repression, by jailing thousands of activists and tightening his control over 
representative institutions (Gasiorowski, 1992). By the same token, when Ben Ali became president 
with a bloodless coup in 1987, he immediately proceeded with reforms and controlled liberalization 
as a way to build legitimacy for his presidency and to distance himself from the autocratic rule of his 
predecessor. For this purpose, as shown by Sadiki (2002a, p. 125-131), Ben Ali released political 
prisoners, legalized some of the previously banned political parties and did a national pact with 
opposition forces by starting a dialogue with Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist party Ennahda 
(Renaissance Party). However, within a few years, in order to consolidate his power and stability, he 
discarded the more formidable political opponents and resorted to serious violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, as well as to harsh repression against the Islamists of Ennahda. In 
particular, the co-optation of legal opposition parties in order to develop a common effort against the 
Islamists, forced the opposition to play by the rules set by the regime in the wake of a new national 
consensus based on cooperation against the “Islamist threat” (Martin-Muñoz, 2014, p. 112). 
In the wake of Bourguiba’s legacy and then under Ben Ali’s rule, Tunisia emerged as 
“presidential monarchy” (Zartman, 1990, p. 240), i.e. a system dominated by a president who faced no 
serious institutional constraint and who directed a party which was virtually indistinguishable from 
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the organs of the state (Alexander, 2010, p. 36). The Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) -former 
Bourguiba’s NeoDestur- was in fact the sole ruling party, controlling political life with virtually no 
opposition. Ben Ali emerged therefore as Tunisia’s latest Bey in the wake of what became a pure 
absolutist rule (Murphy, 2011, p. 299). 
In this context, the country’s policy-making process was closed and completely monopolized 
by the President and the RCD, with Ben Ali as a key agenda-setter who defined alone “the pace, scope 
and spheres of reform” (Murphy, 1999, p. 223) and pushed for reform through a top-down 
management where only marginal resistance was tolerated (Murphy, 2013, p. 37). The presidential 
autonomy in policy-making was further strengthened by a centralized decision-making through the 
control over executive and legislative institutions. Whereas according to the original Tunisian 
Constitution of 1959 the parliament had the legislative initiative and the power to censure the 
government, in practice it never had the chance to fully carry out its functions, as until 2011 it was 
always dominated by the RCD. The presidential party managed to obtain a stunning majority in each 
parliamentary election held between the country’s independence and 2011, limiting therefore the role 
of the parliament to a mere arena for debate on national policy and to a mere bureaucratic body in 
charge of passing the bills presented by the executive. Similarly, while the policy-making profile of 
consultative bodies composed of civil society experts, such as the Economic and Social Council, was 
raised, their effective power over policy remained insubstantial (Penner Angrist, 1999). Ben Ali’s 
entourage emerged as the sole hegemon in policy-making and as the only actor in charge of value 
allocation and execution of public demands (Sadiki, 2002b, p. 507).  
The President was clearly an “institutional” veto player, i.e. an actor whose agreement is 
required to promote policy change in light of his institutional role. Specifically, his institutional 
prerogatives derived directly from the Constitution and- above all- from its constant being amended 
and re-amended. Bourghiba’s decision to establish the title of presidency for life through a 
constitutional amendment (later nullified in the late 80s), as well as Ben Ali’s successful maneuver to 
abolish the limits to presidency terms as established by the Constitution are a case in point (Gana, 2013, 
p. 4). In all these cases, the president pursued specific “process-related goals” (Dente 2011, p.42), as he 
aimed to guarantee his exclusive grip on power in the relations with the other actors of the political 
system. 
Furthermore, the presidential party emerged as a “partisan” veto player in light of the partisan 
prerogatives which directly derived from the rules of the political game and which made impossible 
for opposition parties to replace the dominant role of the RCD (Alexander, 2010, p. 36). As already 
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mentioned, in all the parliamentary elections held since 1959, the presidential party was always able 
to win more than the 80% of popular consensus, which owed it a stable overreaching majority in the 
national assembly. Similarly, in presidential elections, Bourguiba and Ben Ali stood basically 
unopposed several times and, even when competing with other candidates, they were always able to 
obtain more than the 90% of votes. While these results can partly be explained in light of the RCD’s 
historical popularity and its role at the forefront of the independence movement, they were mainly 
achieved through harassment of oppositional forces, repression and censorship. Many political parties 
were banned and prospective presidential candidates were diverted from candidature by establishing 
burdensome and politically controlled procedures61. In light of the presidential exclusionary politics, 
Tunisian political parties were essentially weak and unable to exercise their legislative and 
representative functions. Therefore, in contrast to Morocco where manipulated pluralism still paves 
the way to a competitive authoritarianism and a multiparty system, Tunisia resembles a “hegemonic 
electoral” authoritarianism (Grassi, 2008), where there is no room for competitive elections and the 
system is dominated by a single hegemonic party.  
The promotion of key reforms was the master strategy adopted by the regime to secure its 
stability and authoritarian nature. In particular, the promotion of neo-liberal market oriented policies 
and the creation of a business friendly environment were the main “content-related goals” at the top 
of Ben Ali’s agenda, with the purpose to use economic success as a mean for stability (Cavatorta & 
Haugbølle, 2012, p. 183-185). Through five-year development plans, which were Ben Ali’s main 
programming tool, the regime committed to a process of economic reform to boost growth and it 
developed a governmental narrative supporting the idea of Tunisia as an “economic miracle” 
(Tsourapas, 2013) or as a “model student of market capitalism” (Hibou et al. 2011, p. 12). In this sense, 
under Ben Ali, Tunisia experienced all the benefits of middle-class economic expansion while being 
denied political pluralism and empowerment of the less advantaged majority (Hubert Lewis, 2001, p. 
36), in the wake of an integration of capitalism and authoritarian rule (Camau, 2008). Tunisia’s good 
economic results and the success of the government’s broad social policy became two major policy 
assets for containing popular criticism towards political repression, while the narrative of the “Islamic 
Threat” became a justification for the lack of rapid political liberalization that was thus postponed to 
some later future (Martin-Muñoz, 2014, p. 113).     
                                                     
61 In order to run for the presidency, each potential candidate had to get the approval of at least 30 political 
figures. However, as the RCD was dominating the Tunisian political life, it was very difficult to meet this 
requirement.  
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More generally, the regime embraced the theme of an incremental reform process or 
modernization of both economic and socio-political nature (Tsourapas, 2013, p. 11). The idea of 
“reformism”, i.e. the willingness of Tunisian government to show itself on being, and on being thought 
of, as reformist became therefore the backbone of official discourses (Hibou, 2011, p. 213). The 
underlying rationale was to promote the idea of a permanent gradual Changement with the purpose to 
ensure the survival of the regime (Tsourapas, 2013, p. 11) and to use the reforms as a tool for the 
reproduction of hegemonic political practices (Sadiki, 2002c). To the eyes of Tunisian people, the idea 
of a slow but incremental change was justified on the ground that Tunisia’s society was ready only for 
gradual mutations, in line with the logic “small steps, small gains”62. As Erdle (2010, p. 421) shows, the 
ultimate aim of Tunisian reformist discourse was not to reform the country but “to preserve and 
perpetuate the decisional and distributive monopoly of the established political order”. This is why 
reformism resulted from a multiplicity of objectives, often in contradiction to each other: to build the 
state and contribute to the centralization of power while simultaneously limiting state power; to 
rationalize the state and discipline society while striving for the horizon of freedom (Hibou, 2012, p. 
305). In this regard, if in Morocco the dualism between tradition and modernity informs the ideology 
of the regime, in Tunisia this role was played by the myth of reformism as a mode of the exercise of 
power (Hibou, 2011, p. 213).  
 
 
3.4 The Implementation of ENP Programs in Tunisia: the role of domestic political actors 
 
After an initial diffidence toward the perceived European bias of the ENP proposal (Bicchi, 
2010b, p. 214), the EU-Tunisia AP was adopted in July 2005 and the EU committed more than €500 Mil. 
for the period 2007-2010. From the outset, Tunisia emerged as an ambivalent country with a hybrid 
performance in the context of the ENP. If in the domain of economic reforms the implementation of 
the ENP programs was very satisfactory, in the sectors of governance, human rights or justice no 
bilateral cooperation program was negotiated and the dialogue in this sense remained barely absent. 
As stated by the ENP Tunisia Country Strategy Paper, “in contrast to the performance of the Tunisian 
economic and social model, progress on the political aspects has been slow” (EU- Tunisia Country 
                                                     
62 Intervention of Mr. Zouhaier Mdhaffar, Minister for the Public Function and administrative development, 
Ministerial Round Table, May 2004. 
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Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 4). Tunisia was thus particularly able to separate the economic dimension 
of the ENP from the political one (Bicchi, 2010b, p. 216). 
All this considered, it is not surprising that in terms of programs implementation and funds 
absorption Tunisia registered good results with a high payment-to-commitments ratio (90%) for the 
period 2007-2010, insofar as the NIP included only programs of economic development. Economic 
governance and competitiveness, employability and sustainable development were in fact the only 
NIP’s priority areas. In this sense, the ENP Progress Reports for 2007 and 2008 praised the country for 
its progresses in the domain of economic reforms and for its good absorption capacity of EU funds 
(ENP-Morocco Progress Report 2007, p.2; 2008, p.20), as reflected by the payment rate for 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010 (see figure 6 below). Moreover, the fact that in the NIP 2007-2010 the 50% of  programs 
was in budget support suggests «une certaine maturité de la coopération fondée sur une longue 
expérience de programmes jugés satisfaisants et une appropriation certaine des réformes» (UE Fiche 
d'Action Tunisie, 2008a). 
The goals of Tunisian political actors and their ambivalence towards the neighbourhood policy 
by prioritising economic development over political reforms have inevitably influenced the policy 
dialogue with the EU and the implementation of the ENP bilateral programs. When Ben Ali came to 
power, he maintained the same close and cordial relations with Europe that Bourguiba had fostered 
for decades (Ritter, 2015, p. 47). Therefore, since the early 90s, Tunisia has set itself among the 
Mediterranean countries with the oldest and intense cooperation with the EU and it was the first 
country to sign an Association Agreement in the domain of the EMP.  Tunisia was defined by the EU 
as a key supporter of the Barcelona Process (EU Memo, 2001) and was one of the first countries to 
embark on the ENP. “The Tunisia of President Ben Ali is persuaded that the European Neighbourhood 
Policy will be beneficial and useful” in light of the country’s ambition “to join the group of developed 
countries”, as expressed by Ben Ali in his discourse to the nation for the anniversary of independence 
63 in June 2007. 
However, while giving importance to the EU and its policy initiatives, Ben Ali still framed them 
in a delicate balance between international relations and domestic politics (Ritter, 2015). Therefore, in 
line with its agenda, Tunisia explicitly embraced the economic commitments of the Association 
Agreement and opened its internal market to Europe with an ambitious program of tariff dismantling. 
Nevertheless, at the same time it “decided to embark on cooperation in the areas of good governance 
                                                     
63 Intervention of the RCD Ministry of Higher Teaching, Education and Research Mr. Bououny Lazhar at the 
Third Conference on “La politique européenne de voisinage et le Maghreb”, Hammamet, June 2007. 
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and justice and home affairs on a very gradual basis only” (ENP- Tunisia Country Report, 2004, p. 4). 
For the ENP AP, Ben Ali called more for trade and economic reforms than political dialogue in sensitive 
areas such as justice or governance. In this sense, in the case of the ENP Tunisia experienced a “process 
of Europeanization without adherence, a light and à la carte version of Copenhagen criteria”, buying in 
the principles concerning the development of a competitive market economy and bypassing those of 
human rights and rule of law (Camau, 2008).   
Overall, Ben Ali’s agenda and its key control on the country’s priorities and policy-making 
affected the implementation of the ENP for the period 2007-2010 in three ways. First, the priority given 
to economic reforms in line with the governmental narrative of a Tunisian economic miracle 
contributed to the country’s good absorption capacity for the period 2007-2010 (see figure 6).  
 
Figure 6 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration on the base of the ENPI Overview 2007-2013 
 
While not as good as Morocco, for the period 2007-2010 Tunisia maintained a good absorption capacity 
equal to 90% in terms of payments-to-commitments ratio. The willingness of Tunisian authorities to 
proceed with key economic reforms that were supported by the ENP, as well as to show to Europe the 
Tunisian miracle in terms of modernization and opening, facilitated the implementation of bilateral 
programs, insofar as the domestic actors’ agenda overlapped with ENP’s one. The main priorities of 
the NIP in terms of competitiveness, employability and innovation were in fact perfectly in line with 
Tunisian economic narrative and top issues: trade, investments, convergence with the EU, and the 
“mise à niveau” as a form of state voluntarism in the name of modernization and international 
economic opening (Hibou, 2005; Murphy, 2006). Tunisian authorities were thus willing and able to 
respect EU disbursement conditions (in case of budget support) and to implement relevant projects (in 
case of decentralized approach), allowing the EU to proceed with payments. Moreover, the policy 
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dialogue was informed by the very similar understanding of economic priorities for the country on the 
part of the EU and of the Tunisian regime (Bicchi, 2010b, p. 216). 
Secondly, the fact that the NIP was focused only on economic reform was a major asset able to 
guarantee Tunisia’s good absorption capacity, insofar as the country would have delayed or even 
cancelled the implementation of programs in sensitive political domains, with a consequence reduction 
of EU payments rate. The choice to bypass different kinds of programs came not only from a request 
of Tunisian authorities in light of their key priorities, but also from a choice of the EU, in view of the 
serious difficulties already experienced in the past for the implementation of the MEDA projects on 
justice and media. As an EU Official from the EEAS said in an interview, in these two domains the 
projects were respectively delayed and canceled and the dialogue with Tunisian authorities remained 
really hard and full of misunderstandings. For example, while the EU wanted to push for a real reform 
of justice, the government argued that the aim of the project was merely to install new PCs in the 
ministry of justice; or while the EU wanted to push for independent media, the government prepared 
a list of pro-regime journalists that could participate to the EU program. Moreover, whereas the EU 
Delegation on the ground was resolute to stop the negotiation of the financing convention in light of 
these misunderstandings, Brussels insisted to continue with the process, in line with the principle that 
“it is always better to do something”64. Against this background, even if the Tunisia Country Strategy 
Paper prepared by the Commission included many key reform objectives in different domains, the EU 
decided to avoid the inclusions in the NIP of sensible programs that would have not matched with the 
Tunisian agenda. Rather, it decided to support gradual economic reforms, by accepting that reforms 
in sensitive areas would necessarily be limited: “in view of the serious difficulties in implementing 
third-generation MEDA projects and the problems surrounding the recent launch of the justice support 
programme, the Commission takes the view that efforts over the first period of the CSP should focus 
on good economic governance” (Tunisia National Indicative Program 2007-2010).  
Third, Ben Ali’s commitment to fight terrorism and Islamic extremism became his trump card 
to obtain a dominant position in the negotiation of the NIP priorities, as well as to get EU blind eye to 
the application of conditionality. Ben Ali appeared in fact to be a key regional ally in the battles both 
to defeat Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist militancy and to promote liberalizing economic reforms (Murphy, 
2011, p. 299). In this sense, Tunisia’s good absorption capacity was influenced not only by the goals of 
Tunisian authorities, which matched with the ENP’s agenda, but also by the EU softness in the 
assessment of performance criteria and indicators. Following the guidelines from Brussels, people 
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from the Delegation could not help but managing misunderstandings and dialogue on reforms with a 
very diplomatic attitude: “c’est très bon, mais on voudrais seulement vous faire comprendre que la 
perception qu’on a en Europe c’est un peut different”65. 
Overall, the role of domestic political actors, their goals and rhetoric were a key variable for the 
implementation of the ENP on the ground, as better illustrated by the following paragraphs.  
 
 
3.4.1 Tunisian reformism and the “syndrome of the bon élève”: the EU Programs to sustain economic 
integration and competitiveness 
 
Since the late 1990s, Tunisia has embarked on a process of economic liberalization and 
integration in the world economy, by developing an outward driven model of economic development 
and a reformist policy inspired to western modernity (Chena, 2012). In this context, it adopted many 
reforms to improve the country’s economic performance in terms of growth and macro-economic 
equilibrium, as well as in terms of budget management. The government’s priorities for the period 
2007-2010 were set out in the XI Plan for Development, which identified the national strategy to boost 
Tunisian economy in the name of integration, liberalization, growth and productivity (Tunisia XI Plan 
2007-2010).  
In this regard, the EU contributed to support Tunisia’s economic reforms with the ENPI 
“Programme d’Appui à l’integration” (PAI) - that was allocated €70 Mil. by the AAP 2008 and 2010 (of 
which €69 Mil. in budget support) and that directly contributed to the implementation of the point 2.2 
“Economic and Social Reform and Development” of EU-Tunisia Action Plan. In terms of program’s 
implementation, the ENPI financing convention was signed in July 2009 and the main goal of EU 
budget support was to sustain Tunisia’s national strategy for growth and development by 
strengthening the integration of the country in the world economy and improving its business climate, 
including easier access to finance. The main disbursement conditions and performance indicators were 
therefore related to the acceleration of growth; the adoption of measures to ensure the coherence and 
coordination of macro-economic policies; the reduction of public deficit, the promotion of economic 
integration and regulatory convergence, as well as the strengthening of competitiveness for enterprises 
(UE Fiche d’Action Tunisie, 2008b) .  
                                                     
65 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015.  
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Between 2008 and 2010, the tranches foreseen by the financing convention were normally paid 
(see Table 5), revealing that for the indicated period the implementation of the program proceeded at 
a good pace and that Tunisian authorities were normally able to meet EU disbursement conditions and 
performance indicators.  
 
 Table 5- Tunisia ENPI Payments- PAI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data retrieved through the IATI Register and the EU-Tunisia cooperation Report 2013. 
 
The good performance in implementation and absorption of EU funds can be analysed in light of 
Tunisia’s domestic actors and political system, considering two key elements. The first element is 
related to the clear political engagement of Tunisian authorities in light of the high priority accorded 
to the reform of Tunisian economy in terms of liberalization and international economic integration. 
The second element is related to Tunisian myth of reformism and the need to present itself as “le 
meilleur élève maghrébin” (Chena, 2012) to the eyes of international financial institutions and in 
particular to the EU.  
Both in the XI and XII Development Plans, Tunisia clearly committed to ambitious goals of 
reform that were all oriented to the rapprochement with the EU and to meet its high regulatory and 
economic standards. In this sense, the Plans announced reforms that were axed on the AP and the 
deepening of the partnership with the EU in order to achieve the level of the "homologues 
européennes”.  In particular, in the domains supported by the PAI, Ben Ali’s Plans called all the 
economic operators “to multiply their efforts” with the purpose to accelerate growth in view of the 
economic relation with the EU; proposed reforms to boost the competitiveness of national enterprises 
and to ensure their access “au marché européen à des conditions équivalentes à celles imposées aux 
entreprises européennes”; and announced a regulatory convergence towards EU legislation (Tunisia 
XI Plan 2007-2010; Tunisia XII Plan 2010-2014).  
ENPI- PAI (AAP 
2008) 
2008 2009 2010 TOT Ratio 
Payments (€ Mil.) 24 18 24,1 66,1 95% 
Commitment (€ 
Mil.) 
24 (tranche fixe) 21 24 69 
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Tunisian government proceeded with structural reforms in the framework of the PAI (UE Fiche 
d’Action Tunisie, 2010) and was particularly active to meet EU conditions and performance indicators 
for tranches disbursement. Without entering into too much technical details, between 2009 and 2010 
several laws and decrees were adopted to align Tunisian norms with European and international 
standards, and key measures were approved to revise the customs’ tariff regime, to improve the 
business environment and to reform the microcredit access. Moreover, in the domain of coordination 
for macro-economic policies, the number of meetings annually organized among ministries and 
stakeholders doubled (World Bank, 2012; African Development Bank, 2011). The positive 
implementation of the program and Tunisia’s good absorption capacity were a direct consequence of 
Ben Ali’s centralized decision-making and of the State’s pervasive control over economic operators to 
make sure that reforms could be working. In this sense, the implementation of PAI’s reforms was not 
only an economic matter, but also a political and state affair to obtain international legitimacy. This is 
also why the regime aimed not only at respecting the performance indicators set by international 
donors, but also at demonstrating that the country had achieved outstanding performances, often also 
through an artificial construction of data and indicators66 (Hibou et al. 2011, p. 12). 
These same dynamics are also interestingly illustrated by the EU “Programme de 
Modernisation Industrielle” (PMI). This program is not part of the NIP 2007-2013 and it was 
implemented few years before. Still, it has an analytical value for the purpose of this thesis, insofar as 
it is the direct predecessor of the new Programme d’Appui à la Compétitivité des Entreprises et au 
Access au Marché (PCAM) programmed by the AAP 2008 (and later analysed here), as well as it is an 
illuminating case of the Tunisian “syndrome of the bon élève” at the international level. As a project 
approach implemented between 2002 and 2007, the goal of the PMI was to sustain the upgrading (i.e. 
the “mise à niveau”) and the modernization of Tunisian enterprises through a support of €50 Mil. Even 
in this case Tunisian absorption capacity was good with the 94% of the original budget effectively 
spent and 1221 enterprises involved67. However, this success should not be interpreted merely in terms 
of Tunisian economic priorities, but above all in light of the political value attached to the good 
performance of the program and to the will to demonstrate to Europe that “everything in Tunisia was 
working well”68. For this purpose, Tunisian authorities decided that the highest possible number of 
                                                     
66 For example to show that foreign investments in the country have increased, for the construction of the 
indicator the number of actual realized investments and the number of merely agreed projects are merged. See 
Hibou et al. (2011).   
67 Final Evaluation Report of the PMI, April 2011. 
68 Interview with EU Official, EU Delegation in Tunisia, Tunis, February 2015.  
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enterprises had to be involved in the program and fixed in this sense a quantitative goal to be attained. 
The Ministry of Industry was then charged to make sure that the established number of enterprises 
would be involved in the PMI, “whether they wanted it or not, whether they needed it or not”69. 
Therefore, while the rationale of the PMI was to help Tunisian enterprises according to their specific 
needs and requests, the government’s approach was merely addressed “to make numbers” to the eyes 
of the EU. With this goal in mind, the big enterprises mainly based in Tunis geographical area, as well 
as those linked to the state, were the main beneficiaries as it was easier to obtain their participation 
into the program. In other cases, the government itself pushed for the creation from scratch of new 
enterprises by directly contacting young graduates: “you have to become an entrepreneur, you have 
to open a company”.70 The PMI was therefore a success insofar as a big number of enterprises was 
effectively involved in the program, yet this result came from the state pervasive control and pressure 
obliging them to participate71. In this sense, the implementation of the PMI was affected by the same 
internal dynamics, which concerned the execution of the corresponding Programme National de Mise 
à Niveau, where the government was much more interested than enterprises in the success of 
implementation (Hibou, 2005). 
 
 
3.5.2 Reformism and Environment: the ENP Program Environment and Energy 
 
Under Ben Ali’s regime, environmental policy was given a prioritized position in both 
presidential programs and national development plans, and few years after seizing power a Ministry 
of Environment and the National Agency for Protection of the Environment was created. However, 
Ben Ali’s eco-friendly gestures were aimed in part to please the EU (Goldstein, 2014) in line with a 
political discourse that was constantly shaped according to the themes dear to international donors 
(Laroussi, 2009). 
The EU decided to support Tunisia in the environmental sector with the ENP “Programme 
Environnement et Energie” (PEE) that reflected the “concrete willingness of the CE to sustain the 
efforts of Tunisian government in the implementation of an efficient policy of development” (UE Fiche 
d’Action Tunisie, 2007). Included in the AAP 2007, the main goals of the PEE were to sustain the 
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institutions in charge of the elaboration and implementation of environmental and energy policy, to 
reduce the environmental impact of industrial enterprises and to improve the energy management. 
In terms of program implementation, the PEE adopted a project-approach with a decentralized 
management and its financing convention entered into force the 1st January 2009. While the 
implementation of the program was accelerated only after 2012, two main elements influenced the 
execution of the program during Ben Ali’s regime. The first is again related to the State’s control on 
enterprises and its willingness to “faire du chiffre”. In this sense, the implementation of the PEE 
component related to the energy management was one of the first to start at the operational level, 
insofar as it concerned the adoption of ISO certifications by enterprises and the acquisition of devices 
to improve the energy control. While this component became fully operational after the revolution, 
from the outset its implementation was influenced by Ben Ali’s state apparatus “that directly knocked 
at the door of enterprises demanding to adopt this or that certification, this or that device, and everyone 
could not help but execute the orders coming from above”72.  
The second element is related to Ben Ali’s full control of the organs of the state and, in 
particular, of the Ministry of Environment, which was massively infiltrated by the RCD. More 
specifically, the state budget for environment was used to feed the myth of reformism, i.e. to convey 
the idea of a constant change, of a constant reform and improvement in the domain of environment. 
The money was therefore mainly used to improve the “green look” of Tunisia, by renovating public 
gardens or improving the green areas of urban quarters. The proliferation of the “boulevards de 
l’environnement” in each Tunisian city contributed as well to build “the façade that in environmental 
affairs Tunisia is working well, even when public enterprises are the main polluters”73. All this 
considered, in the context of the PEE, the EU explicitly required that the unity in charge of managing 
the program (the “Unité d’Appui au Programme (UAP), in the jargon of technical cooperation) could 
be an independent and impartial unit, completely detached from the Ministry of Environment and 
with an independent national responsible, in order to avoid infiltrations from the RCD74. While this 
unit was created in mid-July 2009, its activity at the operational level was very slow and there was a 
time gap between the identification of the PEE and the real implementation75. This was also because 
the management unit met serious difficulties in light of the obstruction from the Ministry of 
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Environment and the National Agencies, which felt to have received a serious blow to their centralized 
control and power and which therefore acquired a detached attitude towards the PEE: “it’s not our 
project, it’s the UAP’s project”76.  While the program could achieve a good absorption capacity (around 
85-90%), yet the legacy of these complex relations posed many obstacles to the activity of the 
management unit.  
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Chapter IV 
 
The Arab Spring and domestic political actors: what impact on the 
implementation of the ENP? 
 
 
From Morocco to the Gulf, the Arab Spring has affected all Arab-majority countries in the 
Mediterranean region (Haynes, 2013, p. 170), with a big impact on their political order and systems. 
Domestic political actors were the first to bear the costs of political upheavals, as the events altered the 
fundamental relationship between people and their governments, presenting leaders throughout the 
region with pressures for reform (James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy , 2014). This is also the 
case of Morocco and Tunisia, where the uprisings inevitably shaped the political arena and domestic 
actors. Even if with different degrees of intensity, with Morocco maintaining the key features of its 
political system while Tunisia experiencing a regime change, in these two countries popular pressures 
triggered both leadership changes, with new elections and the removal of the incumbent rulers, and 
renegotiations of the rules of game, with institutional and constitutional reforms. Moreover, they 
allowed the emergence of relatively new political actors, i.e. the rise of Islamist parties, which, with 
their victory in the elections held after 2011, became one of the main features of the post-Arab spring 
political landscape (Al-Anani, 2012, p. 466). In this context, the Arab Spring ultimately affected the 
implementation of the ENP programs in Morocco and Tunisia, insofar as it differently shaped domestic 
political actors’ key goals and resources in the two countries. 
 
 
4.1 The effect of the Arab Spring in Morocco: change or immunity? 
 
Inspired by the upheavals in nearby Tunisia and Egypt, protests spread to Morocco with 
thousands of people taking the streets and demonstrating on 20th February 2011. In this context, the 
20 February Movement became soon the Moroccan offshoot of the upheavals in the Arab world and 
emerged as a composite movement which, while not being comparable to the broad-based popular 
uprisings that ousted presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali, was able to pressure for reforms and to 
mobilize several segments of Moroccan society (Hoffmann & König, 2013, p. 1-5). Amongst the 
demands voiced by protesters, some were related to the socioeconomic conditions of the population 
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in terms of poverty, unemployment and education, while others were explicitly political by 
demanding deep constitutional reforms and political changes in the name of a parliamentary 
monarchy (Fernandez-Molina, 2011, p. 436-37). The regime tried to address these demands swiftly, 
with Prime Minister El-Fassi holding problematic consultations with political parties and key civil 
society stakeholders, while preparing a program of socio-economic measures and political reforms 
(ibid. p.437-438).  
In such a context, the King seized the moment and, by playing his traditional role of arbiter and 
conflict manager, announced a big constitutional reform in an official speech on March 9th 2011. For 
this purpose, he followed the traditional practice of appointing a Commission ad hoc composed of 
experts and key stakeholders directly chosen by him. Moreover, by launching vast consultations with 
several actors across the nation, he pursued the key strategy of fostering countless versions of the 
needed reform, leaving therefore to the palace the hard task of summarizing all the different 
propositions (Benchemsi, 2012a). The results of the constitutional revision were merely cosmetic: while 
the head of government would now come from the biggest party in the Parliament, the King remained 
the main holder of political power’s reins and still endowed with “inviolable” characteristics 
(Fernandez-Molina, 2011; Arieff, 2013a). 2011 Constitution can be thus seen as the embodiment of the 
King’s traditional strategy of “political dualism” to respond to societal demands, i.e. his tendency to 
develop public consultations and political pluralism, on the one hand, while resorting to royal 
arbitration and deciding on overarching issues in order to preserve the monarchy’s prerogatives, on 
the other (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998). In this regard, it is not surprising that the rush referendum 
called to approve the new 2011 constitutional amendments drew a turnout of 73 percent and passed 
with a near-unanimous 98.5 percent majority, a result that was stunning even for Moroccan long 
history of constitutional referendums (Benchemsi, 2012b, p. 57). This success can also be explained in 
light of the King’s traditional legitimacy that has remained almost untouched during the 
demonstrations with protesters essentially campaigning against the makhzen and the incumbent El 
Fassi’s government, while never questioning Mohamed VI’s role or calling for his deposition (Bank, 
2012). Therefore, in comparison to other countries in the region, Moroccan regime was able to skillfully 
manage protests by the means of top-down reforms and by using carrots more than sticks (Fernandez-
Molina, 2011, p. 438).  
Political parties had a limited role in both protests and constitutional debates. Only small left 
political parties participated in the 20 February Movement, with the major opposition parties such as 
the USFP and the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PDJ) remaining outside the fray of 
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demonstrations (Hoffmann & König, 2013, p. 7-8). At the same time, the process of constitutional 
reform was a paramount example of parties’ domestication by the monarchy (Maghraoui, 2011, p. 686). 
Rather than seizing the moment of change and trying to shape political debates by taking the initiative, 
political parties preferred to stick with consensus and to leave to the Palace the full control of the 
political game (ibid.). As a consequence, the constitutional reform obtained the almost unanimous 
backing of the parliamentary parties (Fernandez-Molina, 2011, p. 439). 
The renegotiation of the rules of the game with the revision of the Constitution was not the only 
consequence of the “Moroccan Spring”. Rather, the King decided to boost the ongoing reform process 
by calling for new parliamentary elections in November 2011. Against to what many observers would 
have predicted, the electoral results were unprecedented for the country insofar as the King’s loyalist 
Party of Modernity and Authenticity did not win the elections (Dalmasso, 2012, p. 218-219) while the 
Islamist PJD emerged as the electoral winner with a plurality of 107 seats in the parliament (27%). Since 
2002, the PJD had been the only Islamist party ever allowed to contest parliamentary elections in 
Morocco, in light of its willingness to seek regime’s co-optation and to show that it was a systemic 
actor willing to play according to the established rules77 (Storm, 2007, p. 86-88). However, it had never 
managed to win. The creation in 2011 of the first Islamist cabinet in Morocco with PJD’s Abdelilah 
Benkirane as Prime Minister was a remarkable novelty (Benchemsi, 2012a), which stemmed directly 
from the Arab Spring demonstrations insofar as the new constitutional reform required the King to 
select a prime minister from the largest party in the parliament. At the same time, the PJD’s victory is 
rooted in the general trend that in many Arab Spring countries78 saw Islamists moving at the forefront 
of politics as power holders (Al-Anani, 2012, p. 466). In this sense, for some observer Benkirane’s party, 
which had steadfastly refused to endorse the February 20 movement, eventually became its greatest 
beneficiary (Daragahi, 2013). 
To the eyes of many, Morocco remains a country that escaped the Arab Spring and bypassed 
its consequences (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012), insofar as it was able to keep stability in comparison to 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, which saw instead a sharp rise in political instability and social unrest 
(Tawil, 2013). However, the events which followed 2011 elections in Morocco show that the country 
was not so immune to the consequences of the Arab Spring, with political instability and social unrest 
ensuing slightly quicker than otherwise predicted. As the PJD did not win an overwhelming majority 
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78 For an interesting analysis on how the Arab Spring drastically reshaped Islamist politics in the Middle East see 
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and rather controlled only the 27% of the Parliament, in early 2012 it was forced to create a coalition 
government with the Istiqlal and other two small secular parties, i.e. the Popular Movement and the 
Party of Progress and Socialism. However, in mid-2013, the Istiqlal’s decision to withdraw from the 
government and to join the political opposition was a major blow to PJD-led government, which not 
only lost the second most powerful ally of the coalition but also fell short of majority (Arieff, 2013a). 
The Istiqlal’s decision was mainly moved by disputes over policy direction and by the party’s 
increasing dissatisfaction with the Head of the government Benkirane, who was criticized for his 
inability to lead the government, his unilateral policy-making unwilling to share power with the 
coalition partners, and his inefficiency to address the country’s economic and social problems79. In this 
context, Morocco’s political landscape plunged into instability and crisis, with the PJD struggling to 
find a new coalition partner and embarking on long negotiations under the King’s arbitrage.  
Two main factors influenced the PJD’s attitude to swiftly find a compromise so to come out of 
the crisis: the fear of anticipated elections as an option often mourned within the royal circles, and the 
ousting of Egypt’s Islamist President Mohammed Morsi, which contributed to aliment anti-Islamist 
movements across the region and in Morocco (Sakthivel, 2013). In October 2013, there was finally a 
government reshuffle with the center-right National Rally of Independents (RNI), a party close to the 
Palace, joining the new governmental coalition. Benkirane remained the Prime Minister but its party 
lost many key cabinet seats and ministerial posts, which were given to the RNI.  
Finally, governmental instability was not the only feature of Moroccan political landscape after 
the Arab Spring, with social unrest rising in the aftermath of 2011 elections. The country’s first protests 
under the PJD government, with riots breaking in early 2012 because of unemployment (Dalmasso, 
2012) and the thousands of Moroccans taking the streets to protest against the Islamist government in 
2013 are a case in point.  
 
 
4.2 The implementation of ENP Programs in Morocco after 2011: the role of domestic 
political actors 
 
The political landscape as redesigned by 2011 protests considerably affected the 
implementation of the ENP in Morocco and its general performance. Whereas the country had 
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remarkable results in terms of absorption of EU funds between 2007 and 2010, in the following four 
years between 2011 and 2013 it worsened its performance and absorption capacity of ENPI funds. Of 
the €708.5 Mil. committed for the period 2011-2013 less than the half was actually disbursed (see figure 
7) and payments were often delayed.  
 
Figure 7   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the ENPI Overview 2007-2013 (European Commission, 2014a). 
 
This reduced performance and absorption capacity can be explained in light of the changes 
brought by the Arab Spring. The previous paragraphs demonstrated the first hypothesis of this work, 
i.e. that domestic actors and their agenda have a key role in determining the implementation of the 
ENP on the ground and the absorption capacity of EU funds. Therefore, if Morocco’s performance and 
absorption capacity worsened after 2011, this is because the Arab Spring altered the value of the 
variable “domestic political actors” and, in turn, shaped the implementation of the ENP on the ground. 
Given these considerations, the poor results after 2011 can be adduced to two main processes. The first 
is related to the emergence of the PJD as an actor that, while not being a freshman of Moroccan political 
scenario, gained power for the first time and shaped policy processes with new content-related goals 
not always in line with the royal guidelines. The second is the institutional deadlock, which stemmed 
from the process of constitutional renewal in 2011 and from the governmental crisis in 2013. All these 
processes contributed to divert attention and energies away from sectoral reforms, making it harder 
for Morocco to meet ENP programs’ requirements for tranches payment80. Moreover, if before 2011 the 
EU was generally compliant and not particularly rigid in the application of conditionality (Baracani, 
2006), the Arab Spring marked a shift in EU approach, by paving the way to an increase in 
                                                     
80 Author’s interview with EUROPEAID Official from Morocco Desk, Brussels, 24 May 2014. 
0
500
1000
2007-2010 2011-2013
Morocco- ENPI Payments to Commitments Ratio 
2007-2010 vs. 2011-2013 (€ Mil.) 
Commitments Payments
84 
 
conditionality and in the number and type of conditions attached to the disbursement of funds (Bicchi, 
2014a, p. 329). Henceforth, the country’s developments on the ground and EU discretional assessment 
of the payment dossiers, through which Moroccan authorities justify their progresses and demand EU 
payments, explain Morocco’s reduced absorption capacity after 2011. This is further confirmed by the 
interviews held with Moroccan Officials from the department of EU Relations within the Ministry of 
Finance, who said that while the quality of policy dialogue with the EU has remained unchanged after 
2011, disagreements often emerged on whether budget support conditions could be considered 
fulfilled or not81. The following analysis on the implementation of some key ENP programs after 2011 
can better illustrate the dynamics here discussed.   
 
 
4.2.1 When the agenda and the expertise change: the PJD and the implementation of the ENP Programs.  
 
The ENP «Programme d’Appui à la Stratégie de l’Education», which was financed under the 
AAP 2009 to sustain the implementation of the government’s Urgency Plan for the reform of education, 
was one the ENP programs whose performance was directly affected by Moroccan political changes 
after 2011. As already mentioned, before 2011 the program recorded a good performance in terms of 
tranches’ payments and Moroccan authorities’ capacity to meet EU requirements. By contrast, after the 
Moroccan Spring, and in particular between 2012 and 2013, the program’s performance in terms of 
fund absorption was interestingly reduced (see Figure 8):  
Figure 8 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial 
Transparency System. 
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Whereas the annual payment of the budget support’s tranches continued to be processed, the 
decrease in the payments for 2012 and 2013 reveals that the EU decided to apply its conditionality, i.e. 
it decided to reduce the amount of the variable tranches in light of the non-fulfilment of some specific 
conditions and indicators. The variable tranches are in fact determined according to a performance 
score82 that is used to identify the percentage of the tranche that will disbursed. Therefore, if the 
receiving country is not well performing in some of the conditions and indicators attached to 
disbursement, the EU may still proceed with the payment but reduce its amount. In the case of the 
ENP bilateral program for education, the EU decision can be explained on the ground that Benkirane’s 
cabinet decided to put an end to the efforts for guaranteeing a public preschool support. As one of the 
key pillar of the Urgency Plan for education, the implementation of a sound governmental strategy in 
the domain of the préscolaire was one of the key conditions defined by the EU for tranche release. 
Therefore, the governmental decision not to proceed in this sense was one of the causes behind the 
decrease in the ENP program’s performance and payments83. Interestingly enough, in his royal 
discourse of August 2013 the King harshly criticized the new governmental education policy, blaming 
Benkirane for having hampered the reform of Moroccan education system and for having 
marginalized El Fassi’s Urgency Plan, by unilaterally questioning some of its essential components like 
the préscolaire (Mohamed VI, 2013). Therefore, the rise of the PJD and the change in the government’s 
agenda with a partial degree of misfit vis-à-vis the ENP supported-reforms hindered the smooth 
implementation of the program.  
By the same token, the EU support to gender equality in Morocco was another ENP program 
which inevitably suffered from the country’s renewed political landscape after 2011 elections. 
Programmed by the AAP 2011, the «Appui à la promotion de l'équité et de l'égalité entre les femmes et les 
hommes» was allocated €45 Mil. to sustain the National Gender Equality Strategy adopted in 2006 and 
the implementation of its Action Plan 2010-2015. Whereas the Program’s financing convention with 
the EU had been already negotiated by the previous El Fassi’s government and was ready to be signed, 
when the Islamists came to power the PJD minister for women and solidarity Bassima Hakkaoui 
refused to sign84. As a major consequence, the financing convention was retarded and it took more 
                                                     
82 Specifically, there are two different scores. The first is the “individual performance score” that is based on the 
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than one year to find a common understanding on the wordings of the document, delaying the 
payment of the first fixed tranche of budget support. 
  Similarly, the negotiation of the “Programme d’ Appui au Statut Avancé” programmed by the 
AAP 2011 took long time as the new government was reluctant to proceed with regulatory 
convergence to the EU acquis85. Moreover, when the EU decided to adopt a SPRING initiative of €3 Mil. 
to support the House of Representatives in the exercise of its new responsibilities after the 
Constitutional reform, the PJD questioned the utility of this initiative and criticized it as a direct threat 
to the independence of the legislative institution86.  
In all these cases, the implementation of ENP programs was influenced by the quality and the 
difficulties of policy dialogue between the EU and the PJD, as well as by the degree of (mis)fit between 
the latter’s agenda and the ENP’s envisaged reforms. At Brussel level the perception was that, at least 
after the immediate creation of the new Islamist-led government, the PJD was not so prone to deal 
with the EU and to proceed with the reforms supported by the ENP, even when these reforms had 
already been initiated by the previous government87. This is the case of the above mentioned ENP 
programs for education and women’s rights. In particular, the fact that Minister Bassima Hakkaoui 
retarded the financing convention with the EU only to change a word in the title appears to have been 
dictated more by a matter of principle and ideology than by the substantive content of the convention. 
In this sense, she conveyed the idea that her Ministry of Social Development, Solidarity and Family 
was not in need of EU money88.  
This attitude would be reflective of the traditional PJD’s position towards the cooperation with 
the EU. The domestic “consensus by default” on EU-Morocco relations has normally included also the 
PJD, with Benkirane being conscious of his country’s international interests (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 209-
210) and in favor of economic and trade cooperation with the EU (Fernandez Molina, 2007, p. 58). 
However, Islamists have generally been skeptic of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of the 
ENP, by questioning often their utility for the country and believing that the EU would impose its 
cultural and social values through the funding of certain development projects, especially those that 
promote women (Glennie & Mepham, 2007, p. 13; Ammor, 2005, p. 151). The PJD’s opposition to the 
reform of the family code that in 2004 was aimed at ensuring the respect of women’s rights is a case in 
point. While the party said that the criticism was addressed not to the content of the reform but to its 
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method that excluded the PJD from the reform-centered debates (Cavatorta & Dalmasso, 2013, p. 237), 
some party members criticized the revision as being imposed according to a European liberal view 
(Glennie & Mepham, 2007, p. 11).   
If for someone the PJD’s ideology and agenda were the main factors affecting the dialogue with 
the EU on the ENP reforms, according to other interviewees the inexperience of the new political elites 
who were not familiar with the already existing policy programs89 was another element that further 
constrained the pace of ENP implementation. In this regard, the PJD’s lack of expertise confirms that 
long-time cooptation does not automatically imply professionalization (Boubekeur & Amghar, 2006, 
p. 10). Even if the party had been well entrenched in Moroccan politics since 1997 legislative elections, 
in previous governments it had never played a role other than opposition. Therefore, while the 2003-
2009 municipal mandate boosted PJD’s political participation and fostered its apprenticeship into the 
realm of local politics (Catusse & Zaki, 2010), the party was not sufficiently experienced when it 
entered the domain of national politics from a privileged position. Some Officials at EU Delegation in 
Rabat identified the lack of expertise as one of the main issues which affected policy dialogue and the 
possibility to achieve common understandings on ENP bilateral cooperation programs: “the problem 
is not the PJD as such, but its expertise and the people not used to assume ministerial responsibilities”90. 
In particular, from the EU Delegation’s standpoint, the need to deal for the first time with PJD political 
actors who were not used to cooperation with the EU was the main change and difficulty of the post 
Arab-Spring context, especially in comparison to the past Istiqlal-led government whose victory in 2007 
elections basically meant political and technical continuity in terms of “more of the same” (Kausch, 
2009, p. 169). In this sense, the cabinet reshuffle of mid 2013 facilitated dialogue insofar as the RNI 
ministers, who replaced some of the previous PJD’s posts, were more experienced in the domain of 
bilateral relations and knew very well Europe91.  
 
 
4.2.2 The impact of the constitutional reform and of the cabinet reshuffle on the implementation of the 
ENP 
 
Whereas the adoption of the new Constitution was an input to push for many otherwise 
blocked reforms, the institutional deadlock provoked by the approval of the new document, the 
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installation of the new government and the long legislative processes to adopt the laws for the 
implementation of the Constitution constrained Morocco’s capability to meet EU conditions for budget 
support and amplified the already endemic slowness of the system to proceed with reforms. This is 
the case of the ENP “Programme d'appui sectoriel à la réforme du système de santé”, i.e. a budget 
support program of €86 Mil. that was defined by the AAP 2008 to sustain the governmental strategy 
2008-2012 for the reform of the health system. While the program had been well-performing until the 
Moroccan Spring, the payments decreased until zero in 2011 (see figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the base of the data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial 
Transparency System 
 
The main reason is that one preliminary disbursement condition defined by the financing 
convention of the program was not met, with the consequence that the payment therefore could not 
be processed. This is mainly due to the process of constitutional reform that momentarily diverted 
attention and energies away from the health system reform, with long delays in the implementation of 
the legislative and regulatory framework conditionally required by the EU program. This was further 
induced by the fact that the draft version of the Loi de finances for 2011, which had been deposed by the 
previous government, was withdrawn by the PJD-led government (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2012). 
By contrast, in 2012 and 2013 the payments could be processed in light of the progresses realized by 
Morocco in the domain of the health reform. In particular, two factors were relevant for the pace of the 
reform and for the implementation of the ENP program. The first is the new Constitution, which gave 
an important input to the reform of the health system by establishing the fundamental rights to life 
(art.20), health and access to basic health services (arts. 21,31,34). The second is the new Health Minister 
who, unlike his predecessor who failed to give real impulse to the reform, was increasingly active, by 
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being well cooperative with the EU and by extending in March 2012the basic medical coverage, which 
allowed to unlock one of the EU conditions for payment92. In this new context, the EU had also the 
possibility to work jointly with the Ministry on the elaboration of a National Sanitary Chart. 
However, the rhythm of the reform continued to be quiet, also because, in line with the endemic 
sluggishness of Moroccan political system, the progresses in the implementation of the new 
Constitution have generally been very slow. While in 2012 a clear calendar for implementation was 
still missing and only one organic law was adopted (ENP-Morocco Progress Report, 2012), in 2013 the 
implementation of reforms continued to remain limited (ENP-Morocco Progress Report , 2013), with a 
consequent impact on the implementation of the ENP.  
The EU program to support the governmental strategy for the equality between men and 
woman is again a case in point. While the financing convention of the program was finally signed in 
July 2012, the EU decided to reduce the amount of the first fixed tranche on the ground that the 
preliminary conditions on the establishment of the institutional framework for the implementation of 
the strategy were not yet met93. In fact, at the time of the signature of the ENPI financing convention, 
the laws for the establishment of an Authority for parity and fight against discrimination, as well as 
the law on violence against women and its articulation with the reform of the Penal Code, were still 
not adopted (ENP-Morocco Progress Report, 2012). Even if the new Constitution gave an important 
input for the review of existing penal procedures, the approval of the reform was extremely long. 
Against this background, the normal implementation of the ENP program was partly hampered, as it 
was necessary to wait for the new legislative developments.  
Similarly, even if the NIP 2011-2013 had programmed a specific program to support Morocco’s 
reform of justice, EU money could be committed only in 2014, in light of the country’s years of stasis 
and lack of a clear operational strategy that could be effectively supported by the EU (ENP-Morocco 
Progress Report, 2011). Again, whereas the new Constitution gave an important input in this domain, 
the High Instance on national dialogue for the reform of justice was created only in May 2012 and the 
National Chart for justice could only be adopted in mid-2013. Therefore, even if the EU was ready to 
support Morocco in the reform of the justice sector, the ENP program was long delayed as its launch 
was conditional to the establishment of a clear operational strategy by Moroccan authorities.  
Overall, between 2011 and 2013 the retards in the approval of reforms, as well as in the set-up of the 
new institutional bodies charged with policy implementation, contributed to delays in the 
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implementation of ENP programs94 and to low absorption rates insofar as budget support conditions 
could not always be met. In this context, the governmental instability of mid-2013 and the consequent 
cabinet reshuffle further distracted from reform efforts and contributed to boost the endemic slowness 
of the system, as well as to reduce the country’s absorption capacity of EU funds. As confirmed by the 
ENP Progress Report 2013: «Si en 2013 les engagements ont connu un montant sans précédent, 
traduisant le dynamisme imprimé dans la conception de nouvelles stratégies et politiques, un certain 
ralentissement des décaissements de l’assistance financière a été constaté, qui témoigne des retards 
dans la mise en oeuvre de certaines politiques sectorielles». 
 
 
4.2.3 The INDH: the outlier above the fray of events 
 
If after the Arab Spring the implementation of ENP programs was influenced by the quality 
and the difficulties of policy dialogue between the EU and the PJD, as well as by the slowness 
embedded in the process of constitutional reform, in other cases implementation dynamics reflected 
the internal complexity of Moroccan politics in its variety of actors and interests. In this regard, the 
ENP program to support to the INDH is again a case in point as it was the only bilateral program 
which maintained full absorption capacity and remained completely immune to the political changes 
of 2011 and their consequences. As already mentioned, the INDH is something more than a mere 
initiative to promote human development, insofar as it is a “chantier de reign” directly sponsored by 
the King. It is not by chance that the INDH is the only public policy in Morocco to have an anniversary, 
a slogan and a logo exhibited at every event celebrating the national cause (Bono, 2011 quoted in Bergh, 
2012 p.413). The INDH emerges as a highly visible and unquestionable public agenda which no 
political party is supposed to put in question (Bergh, 2012, p. 413) and it reflects the palace’s increasing 
awareness that legitimacy cannot rest entirely on religious or historical authority, but that it also 
depends on the living conditions of the people (Martín, 2006). In this sense, Mohamed VI’s promise 
that the INDH would be “ni un projet ponctuel, ni un programme conjoncturel de circonstance” 
(Mohamed VI, 2005c) was in fact kept and the INDH was renovated in 2011 with the launch of its 
second phase. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the INDH was completely immune to 2011 changing political 
landscape, with the PJD expressing its complete and total support for the initiative95, in line with the 
INDH’s essence as a “national pact for human development” (Initiative Nationale Developpement 
Humain, 2011). If the King is normally above political changes and partisan politics (Daadaoui, 2010a), 
in the same way his royal “shelter” elevated the INDH above the fray of every day politics and, in turn, 
ensured a smooth absorption of EU funds.   
 
 
4.2.4 Domestic contrasting interests and the implementation of the ENP 
 
While the INDH is an “uncontested” policy, in other cases conflicting interests between the 
government and the palace take the reins of ordinary policy-making. The reform of the subsidy system 
(“Caisse de Compensation”) is an example. In this case, the EU is not directly engaged with a specific 
bilateral program, but the reform is assessed as central for the realization of other programs, namely 
the Advanced Status and the “Hakama-Governance” which was programmed by the AAP 2012 to 
promote the good management and the transparency of the financial system. The subsidy fund absorbs 
the 18% of the State General Budget (European Commission, 2011) as it provides subsidies for basic 
necessities (from cereals to gas). From the EU standpoint, the reform of this system is central to ensure 
the viability of public finances (ibid) by the means of a direct targeted financial transfer to the 
populations in need96.  In this context, while the approach adopted by the PJD Minister of Governance 
Najib Boulif was perfectly in line with the EU’s one, and it envisaged to gradually substitute the 
subsidies through direct cash transfers to poor families, the royal circles were highly reluctant 
(Masbah, 2014, p. 4). The reasons behind the resistance were mainly related to the economic interests 
of the Makhzen and to the fear that the PJD government would increase its popularity by cash transfers 
to millions of Moroccans (ibid). As a direct consequence, the Makhzen invalidated three PJD 
parliamentary nominations to warn that the reform had to be shelved (ibid). Therefore, in this case 
contrasting interests constrain the pace of the reform and impinge upon the execution of the above 
mentioned ENP programs.  
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4.3 The Jasmine Revolution and the regime change in Tunisia 
 
The Tunisian or “Jasmine” Revolution was the first spark that fueled the Arab Spring, by 
indirectly igniting further revolts across the region (Pinfari, 2012). In late December 2010, the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi against police’s corruption and bribery triggered general unrest and 
popular demonstrations. In few weeks, the spread of the uprisings across the entire country 
culminated with the departure of Ben Ali and the subsequent collapse of his regime after almost 23 
years. As for all the other Arab Spring countries, Tunisian protests originated from a complex mix of 
political and socio-economic demands97. The situation of economic stagnation exacerbated by the high 
level of unemployment among young graduates, the growing socio-economic inequalities as a direct 
detrimental effect of economic liberalization measures, as well as the political corruption and the 
repression of fundamental freedoms were all among the main causes (Pollack, 2011; Roccu, 2012). In 
this regard, as Penner Angrist (1999) had already well predicted in the late 1990s, “as long as [Tunisian] 
economy performs reasonably well, regime stability is assured. But in the event of a downturn, the 
lack of peaceful mechanisms for public, popular articulation of dissent means that over the medium to 
long term instability could loom on Tunisia’s horizon”.  
Tunisian revolution led to paramount shifts in the country’s political landscape, insofar as it 
caused the collapse of a regime that was deemed to be one of the most stable in the Arab World 
(Cavatorta & Haugbølle, 2012, p. 179) despite (or just due to) its authoritarian traits. The first Arab 
Spring’s consequence for Tunisia was a leadership change with the removal of the incumbent rulers. 
Unlike Morocco, where the top-down reforms promised by the King were sufficient to quell the 
protests and to stabilize the situation, Ben Ali’s discourse announcing that he would not run for 
another term in 2014 and pledging political and economic reforms was not enough to discourage the 
demonstrations, which continued to demand his resignation. Therefore, he was forced to resign and 
to leave the country in mid-January 2011. In the aftermath of Ben Ali’s ousting, three interim cabinets 
were created. The former Ben Ali’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Ghannouchi, headed the first two 
cabinets, which followed each other in only ten days. Even if the second cabinet included only three 
members of the RCD who were relegated to minor positions, protests against the government as a 
symbol of the former regime forced Ghannouchi to step down (Arieff, 2011). Caïd Essebsi was 
therefore appointed new Prime Minister and he remained in office until new elections. Moreover, the 
ex-ruling party RCD was soon banned, the political police disbanded and more than one hundred 
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parties were legalized, including the Islamist party Ennahda, which had been outlawed by Ben Ali in 
1991.  
The first free and fair elections were held in October 2011 to elect the members of the 
Constitutional Assembly in charge of drafting the new constitution. As for Morocco, the Arab Spring 
opened the doors of power for Islamists and, after decades of brutal repression and exclusion, Ennahda 
won a plurality of seats (41%) in the National Assembly (Al-Anani, 2012, p. 466). The winning party 
formed a governing coalition (the “Troika”) with other two (secularist) parties of the historical 
opposition, i.e. the Ettakatol and the Congress for the Republic (CPR)98. In this context, Ennahda’s 
Secretary General Jebali became Prime Minister, while CPR’s leader Marzouki was elected President 
of the Republic. As for the PJD in Morocco, even if Ennahda had not participated to the early 
demonstrations still it reaped the benefits of the Arab awakening (Cavatorta & Dalmasso, 2013) and 
after decades of exile, it had the possibility to lead its first cabinet in Tunisian history. While being an 
Islamist party, from the outset Ennahda’s leaders portrayed themselves as moderates in favor of 
democratic participation, the separation of religion and state, and women’s freedoms (Arieff, 2013b, p. 
6). Throughout their electoral campaign, they vehemently opposed anything that could sound like and 
Islamic state and emphasized their support for a civil democratic state based on good governance and 
human rights (Hidde Donker, 2013, p. 212). 
Nevertheless, Ennahda government was affected by two major political crises sparked by the 
murders of two opposition leaders in only six months, which fed rumors on the Ennahda alleged 
involvement in the killings. The first crisis, which occurred in February 2013 when the left-secular 
leader Chrokri Belaid was killed, led to Jebali’s resignation after that Ennahda refused his proposal to 
address the crisis by forming a non-partisan cabinet of technocrats (Arieff, 2013b). A new cabinet led 
by Ennahda Prime Minister Laarayedh was therefore created. However, it has to be noticed that, unlike 
Morocco’s 2013 cabinet reshuffle, in the case of Tunisia’s new cabinet of mid 2013 the Troika still held 
together and did not expand beyond the original parties of the coalition. The second crisis, sparked by 
the assassination of the politician Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013, led to major consequences insofar as 
it provoked a real political deadlock. After months of negotiations under the guidance of a National 
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Dialogue, both opposition parties and Ennahda agreed with the creation of a technocratic government 
led by Prime Minister Jomaa, who remained in office until early February 2015. Like for Morocco’s 
PJD, to the eyes of many Ennahda’s decision to finally give in and pave the way to a technocratic 
government was influenced by the decreasing popularity of the party as well as by the fear following 
the deposition of President Morsi in Egypt (Cesari, 2014, p. 224). 
As in Morocco, the removal of the incumbent rulers was not the only effect of the Arab Spring 
in Tunisia, as the country undertook a fundamental process of renegotiation of the rules of the game. 
The replacement of the old constitution, which was largely identified with authoritarianism, and the 
drafting of a new constitution became a national priority at the top of the agenda (Cavatorta & 
Dalmasso, 2013). Unlike Morocco, where the constitutional reform occurred within the closed doors of 
the royal committee, in Tunisia the reform process was handed to a democratically elected national 
assembly. However, the process proceeded at a very slow pace and, whereas the new constitution was 
supposed to be drafted in one year, in fact it took much longer in light of several difficulties that 
impinged upon the work of the assembly. The lack of preparation of the new elites, important 
cleavages on sensitive issues (such as the freedom of belief and gender equality) and –above all- the 
political deadlock of mid 2013 complicated the negotiations on the new document. Nevertheless, the 
new constitution was finally adopted in January 2014. While recognizing that the people are the source 
of all powers (art. 3) and extending the bill of freedoms and rights, the new document established a 
hybrid form of government with the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister sharing power 
within a complex system of check and balances with the Parliament.  
 
 
4.4 The implementation of ENP Programs in Tunisia after 2011: the role of domestic 
political actors 
 
The political landscape as redesigned by 2011 protests considerably affected the 
implementation of the ENP in Tunisia and its general performance. Between 2010 and 2011, EU 
financial aid doubled, passing from a commitment of €330 Mil. for the period 2007-2010 to a 
commitment of €614 Mil. for the period 2011-2014. Moreover, Tunisia was the first beneficiary of the 
new EU umbrella instrument SPRING. In contrast to Morocco, in the years after the Arab Spring, 
Tunisia had a good absorption capacity of EU funds and it was able to maintain a high payment-to-
commitment ratio. This is particularly interesting if we consider that, in a context of uncertainty where 
all the EU southern neighbours were confronted with reduced absorption capacity, Tunisia was the 
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only country able to maintain a high payment rate (84%) and to be the first in the rank of Mediterranean 
countries (see table 2, chapter 1). Tunisia, therefore, was not only able to absorb EU’s funds in spite of 
the prevailing uncertainty and its huge ongoing political transformations, but it also fared better than 
other neighbours that were apparently less affected by the Arab Spring, such as Morocco. Moreover, 
if after the Arab Spring the EU increased its commitments in many ENP countries but in practice it 
spent much less than before, Tunisia was instead able to improve its absorption capacity 
proportionally to the increase in EU funds, maintaining a good ratio between payments and 
commitments (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration on the data retrieved from the ENPI Overview 2007-2013, and ENPI Statistical 
Annex 2015. 
 
 
This good performance and absorption capacity can be explained in light of the changes 
brought by the Arab Spring and more specifically by the way it altered the variable “domestic political 
actors” in Tunisia, shaping in turn the implementation of the ENP on the ground. The key broad goal 
for all the transition governments that followed Ben Ali’s ousting was to have a clean break with the 
past and to introduce political and economic reforms that could tackle the people’s democratic 
aspirations. In this sense, the country’s political agenda clearly changed vis-à-vis the past, including for 
the first time sensitive political reforms. Against this context marked by a (potentially democratic) 
regime transition and a new political agenda, the EU could focus on different programs other than 
traditional economic reforms. For the first time governance issues were established among the 
conditions for budget support, the reform of justice was included in the AAP 2012, as well as a specific 
program for the support to civil society was implemented. Moreover, in 2015 the first Human Rights 
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and Democracy Committee after 5 years was finally planned. Tunisia’s good absorption capacity was 
therefore influenced by the launch of new programs that perfectly matched the country’s emerging 
post-revolutionary priorities.  
The political and policy dialogue with the EU also changed, insofar as it became much easier 
and more transparent vis-à-vis Ben Ali’s period. As an EU Official of the Delegation in Tunis put it 
during an interview: “during Ben Ali, there was a clear gap between reality and official discourses, 
which forced us [the EU] to answer with a very filtered and diplomatic language. After 2011 everything 
has changed, also the discourse and the language used by our Tunisian counterparts”. Moreover, 
before the revolution it was simply unthinkable that a representative of the Ministry of International 
Cooperation could come to EU Delegation, as there was a tight control on anything Tunisian Officials 
could say or do. Similarly, when an EU representative used to go to the Ministry it was impossible to 
have bilateral meetings with a single ministerial Official, as there was always someone else 
meticulously recording the conversation to verify what the other colleague would say99. EU Officials 
themselves were often controlled by political police and put on file100. By contrast, after the revolution 
relations on the ground became much easier, insofar as there was a constant, more open and direct 
dialogue between Tunisian representatives (not only high level Officials, but also General Directors) 
and members of the EU Delegation. Finally, after the revolution the general perception both in Brussels 
and in the Delegation was that the new ministers of the Troika government were very well disposed 
towards cooperation with EU101, in line also with Ennahda’s attitude to “seek closer tie with the 
European Union”102 and “to achieve the advanced partner status”103. As a matter of fact, in October 
2013 Ennahda-led government organized an inter-ministerial council to analyse all the international 
donors’ cooperation programs in order to point out their difficulties on the ground and to improve 
their implementation104.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
99 Interview with EU Official from EU Delegation in Tunis, Tunis, February 2015.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Interview with EU Officials from EU Delegation in Tunis, February 2015 and EUROPEAID in Brussels, May 
2014. 
102 Alarabiya, Tunisia’s Ennahda says it is ‘natural’ for Islamists to lead the country, 26 October 2011 
103 Rachid Gannouchi, A day to inspire all Tunisians – whether Islamic or secular, The Guardian, 17 October 2011.  
104 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015.  
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4.4.1 “Breaking with the past”: the ENP Programs PAR I, PAR II and PAR III 
 
In the aftermath of the revolution, the interim government was faced with a turbulent context 
where political and macro-economic stability were the major priorities. On the one hand, it was 
necessary to tackle quickly the country’s precarious economic situation, as worsened by the war in 
Libya105, the reduction in international investments and tourism, and the rapid decrease in banks’ 
deposits. On the other hand, there was the need to address people’s democratic aspirations and 
growing socio-economic demands.  
In this context, the EU (together with the World Bank and the African Development Bank) 
decided to support the interim government with an urgency program, in order to guarantee the 
country’s macroeconomic stability and to make sure that the state could continue to deliver its basic 
services as well as to keep the administration going. The AAP 2011 and the SPRING, therefore, 
allocated €99 Mil.  to the budget support “Programme d’Appui à la Relance” (PAR I). The launch of 
this program came directly from a request of Essebsi’s interim government that demanded 
international support for a program of immediate emergency measures which would signal a “clear 
break with the past” and which would focus on governance, employment and regional disparities, 
financial sector and social services (World Bank, 2012). In this sense, the PAR I really broke with the 
past, insofar as it included for the first time governance and transparency measures, together with 
economic and social actions. The program’s financing convention was signed in September 2011 with 
the first budget support tranche disbursed the following December (Ecorys, 2013).   
In terms of program implementation, even if Tunisia was facing one of the most delicate 
moments of the transition, EU conditions were all implemented as planned, with the consequence that 
for the PAR I the country had an excellent absorption capacity of the ENP funds (see table 6). This 
outstanding performance in spite of the ongoing critical conditions can be explained in light of two 
elements. The first is that all the EU envisaged measures were calibrated to meet the interim 
government’s limited mandate, which could not go beyond the adoption of a medium-term package 
of reforms. The second is related to Tunisian’s new political agenda, informed by the post-
revolutionary priorities. In this sense, the early transition period came to represent a major window of 
opportunity for both the country and the EU, paving the way to the adoption of pivotal governance 
measures that would have been simply unthinkable few months before. Therefore, even if the PAR 
                                                     
105 The exportations towards Libya were an important component of Tunisian total exportations of goods. 
Moreover, more than 65.000 Tunisian working in Libya were forced to get back to Tunisia.  
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supported very sensitive reforms, Essebsi’s government was highly committed to the implementation 
of the program, as a way to signal to the population the much awaited and discussed “break with the 
past” (World Bank, 2012). In particular, the government proceeded to improve transparency by giving 
citizens the right to information with the adoption of a law decree that removed all the main constraints 
to document access, as well as it finally allowed the publication of the reports of the Court of Audit. 
Moreover, a new law on the right of association was approved106.   
When Ennahda-led government came to power in early 2012 it continued along the same lines 
of the previous interim government, by focusing on immediate priorities and adopting a detailed 
package of short and medium term measures, which were presented to the parliament in April 2012. 
In particular, the package included a set of economic reforms to boost growth and employment, as 
well as governance measures in the name of transparency, administration and reform of justice. The 
EU confirmed its support to the new governmental program by launching the second phase of the 
PAR, which was allocated a budget support of €63 Mil. by the AAP 2012. The overall goal of the 
program was not only to support the country’s socio economic stability, but to explicitly sustain its 
political transition (Ecorys, 2013). Therefore, while the other joint donors, such as World Bank and 
African Development Bank, mainly focused on growth and regional development, the EU 
strengthened the measures on the governance pillar with key actions on the reform of public finance 
and justice. 
In terms of program implementation, PAR II was designed as a single-tranche budget support 
operation to allow a substantial quick-disbursing of financial resources, given the peculiar country’s 
conditions and the limited mandate of Troika’s government. Despite the moment of political 
uncertainty and the tensions heating the debates on the reform of the constitution, all EU envisaged 
measures were implemented by the Ennahda-led government, with an excellent absorption capacity 
of PAR II’s funds (see table 6). The first reason for this good absorption capacity was that the new 
government was very cooperative with the EU and continued along the line of its predecessor, 
committing to the need of a rupture avec le passé. The second reason is that the EU program was 
explicitly designed to meet the government’s limited capacity and its lack of expertise, in order to make 
the payment conditions feasible and to have a good chance to disburse the funds. “The reforms we 
pushed were quite modest but they were all done”107. This is particularly interesting if we think that, 
by contrast, the World Bank’s version of the PAR II met serious difficulties, insofar as the proposed 
                                                     
106 Interview with EU Official from the EU Delegation, Tunis, February 2015. 
107 Note above 
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conditions in the domain of economic reforms were simply too much ambitious for the country’s 
capacity. In the wake of the need to act quickly, the Ennahda’s representative accepted unconditionally 
all the World Bank’s proposed measures. Yet, the way the program had been designed and Ennahda’s 
lack of expertise that impeded it to figure out the real feasibility of program before accepting it, made 
it hard to respect the initial conditions108.  
The success in the implementation of governance measures was also confirmed in the third 
version of the PAR. Financed under the AAP 2013 and the SPRING with €110 Mil., the PAR III focused 
explicitly on the organization of new elections and the development of democratic institutions. These 
priorities were established in the wake of Tunisian first political assassination of February 2013, as well 
as under Brussels’s impulse to respect the goals of the new ENP and of the Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity. The second Ennahda cabinet led by Prime Minister Laarayedh laid the ground 
for the disbursement of the first EU tranche, by reiterating the break with the past and the need “to put 
the country on the path to democracy and a state of law”109. The «Haute autorité indépendante de la 
communication audiovisuelle» was established in May 2013, as well as the organic laws on the 
prevention of torture and on transitional justice were adopted at the end of 2013. Finally, the following 
Jomaa’s technocratic government was able to lead the country on the path of new elections in 2014, 
which allowed to unlock the payment of the PAR III biggest variable tranche. “The organization of 
elections was the main condition attached to the disbursement of EU funds. In this sense, the 
technocratic government adopted a very concrete approach, and it did exactly what it was supposed 
to do”110.  
 
Table 6- Tunisia- ENPI Payments Programme d’Appui à la Relance (PAR) 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the EU-Tunisia Cooperation Report 2013.  
                                                     
108 Ibid.  
109 EuroAsia News, Tunisia Lawmakers Approve New Government, March 2013.  
110 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 Tot 
Payments 
Payments-to 
Commitments 
Ratio 
PAR I  €55 Mil. €44 Mil.   €89 Mil. 100% 
PAR II  €63 Mil.   €63 Mil. 100% 
PAR III   €10 Mil. €100 Mil. €110 Mil. 100% 
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Unlike for Morocco, the willingness of the new Tunisian authorities to break with the past and to act 
quickly, as well as their interests in ENP Programs that matched their priorities contributed to the good 
absorption capacity of the PAR(s).  
 
 
4.4.2 “Breaking with the past”: discarding old issues and reducing control 
 
Whereas the logic of “breaking with the past” was a fertile land for the implementation of ENP 
after the revolution, in other cases it represented a challenge, insofar as it questioned some goals of the 
EU Programs that had been identified and signed under the ancient regime. The “Programme d’Appui 
à l’Education, la Formation Professionnelle, l’Enseignement Superieur et l’Employabilité” (PEFESE) is 
a case in point. Programmed as a budget support of €61.3 Mil. by the AAP 2009, the goal of the PEFESE 
was to support the objectives of the XI Development Plan in terms of efficiency and quality of the 
education system, as well as employability of young graduates. Whereas the program was identified 
in 2009 and its financing convention was signed in December 2010, in practice its implementation 
began after the revolution. In this context, Ennahda-led government was particularly cooperative with 
the EU, insofar as it accepted the financing convention and wanted to advance quickly the 
implementation of the program111. However, in the renewed post-revolutionary context Tunisian 
authorities called into question some PEFESE measures that directly reflected the former axes of Ben 
Ali’s presidential program. One of them was the orientation of a high percentage of young students 
towards the so-called “filieres techniques”, i.e. institutes of vocational training to improve 
employability and match the needs of the job market. Whereas this action per se was not particularly 
controversial and the EU still today believes in its usefulness, Tunisian authorities refused to 
implement it as it was associated with the past112. Moreover, in light of Ben Ali’s obsession “to make 
numbers”, the action in question was simply considered by the new authorities as an “imaginary 
goal”113 that could have never been achieved according to the high standards envisaged by the 
presidential program. Henceforth, they preferred to give up the EU money attached to this condition 
rather than implementing a goal of Ben Ali’s regime.  
                                                     
111 Ibid. 
112 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, January 2015.  
113 Interview with Tunisian Official, from the Ministry of International Cooperation, February 2015. 
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Similarly, the PEFESE included an indicator concerning the number of Tunisian universities 
endowed with a framework-contract within the process of university financial and administrative 
autonomy. In the wake of 2011 transformations, also university governance was affected by several 
changes and for the first time Deans and Departments Directors were elected by their university rather 
than being appointed by the Ministry. The major consequence was that once this new governance was 
installed, universities’ heads explicitly refused to recognize the validity of the existing framework-
contracts as something that was related to the past and to old authorities. Therefore, even if the PEFESE 
had a good absorption capacity, the amount of some of the variable tranches was partially reduced 
every time EU measures regarded some action, law or goal belonging to the ancient regime.     
In some other cases, the “break with past” resulted in a clear rupture with the previous state’s 
centralized and pervasive control. If in the long term this could imply a step ahead toward the reform 
of the country, in the short term it resulted in a general laxity and lack of discipline. The ENP Program 
PCAM is a case in point. Launched by the AAP 2008, it allocated €23 Mil. to sustain the competitiveness 
of Tunisian enterprises and their access to international market. The financing convention of the 
program was signed in 2009, but in practice it started to be operational in 2013, also in light of retards 
due to the occurring of the revolution. The program was designed to address the needs of enterprises 
by providing experts and technical assistance. For this purpose, the so-called “Centres d’Assistance 
Techniques” (CAT) were in charge of visiting the enterprises and advertise the program as a key 
operational tool that could allow enterprises’ requests to tackled. However, if under Ben Ali’s regime 
the CATs were embedded in a tightly controlled system and enterprises were forced to participate in 
governmental and international programs (as already seen with the PMI), after the revolution this top-
down pressure came to be lacking. In particular, Ennahda Ministry of Industry under Jebali’s cabinet 
was missing enough expertise and he was not able to ensure a tight control on the state services, with 
people stopping going work in the CATs and a total lack of discipline between 2011 and 2012114. As a 
major consequence, no CATs visited the enterprises and gave visibility to the EU program, which 
therefore could not be really operative. Whereas the PCAM was later able to accelerate its performance, 
which resulted also in a good absorption capacity of EU funds, in the short term it suffered from the 
lack of the same top-down pressure that under the ancient regime had guaranteed the success of its 
predecessor PMI. 
 
                                                     
114 Ibid.  
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4.4.3 “Breaking with the past”: a new policy window to support the reform of justice 
 
Another important consequence of the “breaking with the past” narrative was that for the first 
time the EU could launch an important program to support the reform of justice. Launched by the 
AAP 2012 and financed with a SPRING contribution of €25 Mil., the “Programme d’Appui à la Reforme 
de la Justice” (PARJ) aimed at promoting the independence and the effectiveness of Tunisian justice. 
Despite the general moment of instability, the program was quickly negotiated with the Ennahda-led 
government and its implementation started only few months after the signature of the financing 
convention. Again, the country’s new political priorities and the eagerness to act were a major asset 
for the implementation of the PARJ, whose budget was absorbed very quickly (already around the 
70% in February 2015). If during the previous MEDA Justice Program there were many obstacles and 
the old regime blocked the implementation of key sensitive actions, in the new post-revolutionary 
context the government’s approach changed completely in the name of an almost over-do attitude: 
“Everything was a priority for them, and it was even difficult to narrow their huge shopping list of 
actions”115. In this regard, the dialogue with EU was very easy insofar as Ennahda Ministry of Justice 
was very cooperative and open to all the proposals116.  
The reform of justice system during Ennahda’s government was eventually not easy and 
characterized by several stop and goes, as exemplified by the government’s unilateral decision to 
dismiss 80 judges or by the long and controversial question of transitional justice. Yet, the 
government’s agenda matching the goals of the (new) ENP allowed to lay the ground for a quick 
implementation of the PARJ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
115 Interview with EU Delegation Official in charge of justice programs, Tunis, February 2015.    
116 Ibid. 
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Chapter V 
The implementation of ENP programs in Morocco and Tunisia: 
the role of administration and its capacity 
 
 
Whereas it is for the political level to make key choices about sectoral reforms, it is up to the 
administration to undertake actions correctly (Milio, 2007, p. 40). Administration is extremely 
important as it carries out a work that is often less visible but crucial for making things happen in 
government, for translating laws made by politicians into action, as well as for delivering public 
programs to citizens (Guy Peters & Pierre, 2012, p.1). As such, the administration is key for  
implementation and its capacity to carry out specific actions and to meet policy goals is therefore 
extremely relevant insofar as it shapes considerably policy implementation processes (Héritier, 2001). 
The lack of administrative capacity in performing actions cannot be replaced by the willingness of 
political class to do well (Milio, 2007, p.40), as the feasibility of reforms could be constrained by a 
limited administrative capacity to execute them. The demand for performance as a core element of 
public management (Heinrich, 2012, p. 32) and the importance of capacity in administration have been 
a recurrent theme in the study of administrative structures and policy implementation (May, 2012, 
p.288; Meyers & Lehmann Nielsen, 2012, p. 316). A strong and capable bureacracy is one which swiftly 
can deliver a wide-variety of public services (Guy Peters & Pierre, 2012, p.6) and concrectly execute 
reforms and pursue public purposes (Lynn, 2001; Meyers  & Lehmann Nielsen, 2012), by transposing 
political preferences (Lodge, 2012, p.545). The capacity of administration is dependent on its internal 
degree of cooperation and coordination (O’Toole, 2012, p.295-296) but also on its structures, size and 
autonomy (Egeberg, 2012).  
These considerations do have a resonance in the case of the ENP. Even though the interests and 
the agenda of local domestic actors fit with the reforms supported by the ENP programs, the lack of 
administrative capacity could nevertheless generate implementation gaps, through the non-fulfillment 
of EU’s conditions and performance indicators. The ability of administrative structures in the recipient 
country to implement specific reforms is therefore extremely relevant insofar as the sound 
implementation of the ENP bilateral programs and the absorption of EU funds are conditional on the 
capacity of the administration to carry out specific actions and to meet the reforms goals. 
Moreover, administrative systems are not isolated from the institutional framework –both 
political and constitutional- in which they operate, with the major consequence that all the major 
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changes affecting that framework inevitably reverberate on the administrative structures (Rugge, 2012, 
p. 228). The institutional volatility brought by the Arab Spring and the constitutional and political 
changes which suddenly came up from the wave of protests affected administrations in many MENA 
countries, and in turn their capacity to implement ENP Programs.  
Administrative capacity is here defined as the ability of the relevant structures (such as 
ministers, agencies and departments) to oversee the correct implementation of a policy/reform 
program in terms of being able to carry out the required functions, to coordinate with other actors and 
of having available resources such as information (clarity of goals and roles) and sufficient 
administrative personnel. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the role of administration and its 
capacity in Morocco and Tunisia and how it affects the implementation of the ENP programs on the 
ground before and after 2011. For this purpose, a general analysis of Moroccan and Tunisian 
administrative capacity is firstly carried out.  
 
 
5.1 Bottlenecks and Over-Centralization: Administration in Morocco 
 
As already described in chapter 3, Morocco is a dual political system rooted in a mix of tradition 
and modernity. In the first sphere, the world of legitimacy is based on the King’s leadership and on 
privileges due to ancestry blood ties; in the second sphere, the King is the head of a modern state with 
the rise of administrative institutions and a modern bureaucracy concerned with means-end efficiency, 
policy implementation and legal rational legitimacy (Sater, 2009a, p. 2-3; Daadaoui, 2011, p. 55).  In this 
context, since the late 1990s there was a strong political engagement for the reform of public 
administration as expressed in royal discourses and governmental declarations117. A white book on 
administrative reform was published in 2000, while a comprehensive reform program was launched 
in 2002. 
Morocco has a very centralized administration and numerous administrative structures (El 
Yaagoubi, 1998), whose administrative capacity is generally defined as weak, in light of a too much 
centralised and hierarchical civil service based more on seniority than on meritocracy or skills 
(Baracani, 2006, p. 62). In particular, in terms of administrative structures, in many policy sectors they 
are inadequate or too small for the kind of tasks assigned to them, with a lack of human or financial 
                                                     
117 E.g. the General Political Declaration of the First Minister and his Letters of political development in 2004 and 
2006. 
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resources and a gap between resources and needs that make it difficult to implement or enforce 
legislation (EU-Morocco Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013). Moreover, in terms of coordination and 
clarity of roles, there is often an overlapping of competence, with too many hierarchical levels and 
departments, as well as the use of more structures at one time within the same Ministry (Ben Osmane, 
2014). Finally, in terms of human resources, there is a growing discrepancy between the skills required 
and the competences of the staff, while the remuneration system is badly managed. Effective human 
resource management is constrained by a system that lacks appropriate recruitment strategies and 
adequate information systems, as well as provides inadequate training budgets (World Bank, 2009). 
Overall, the shortcomings of Moroccan administration are rooted in complex administrative processes 
and procedures, administrative bottlenecks and bureaucracy, an unwieldy decision-making process, 
and chaotic management of human resources (African Development Bank, 2007b). 
These problems are even bigger at the regional or local level and coordination between 
authorities, especially between central and local levels, is a major challenge. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the logic of centralization has always prevailed over the logic de-concentration. In the French 
tradition118, the process of administrative de-concentration refers to the redistribution of 
responsibilities by the central government to local representatives of the central government, i.e. local 
branch offices of a given Ministry or territorial actors such as provincial or prefectoral heads (World 
Bank, 2009). In this sense, the 1996 Constitution defined local administrative delegations as «services 
locaux des administrations centrales » (art. 102), i.e. as a mere tool at disposal of the structures 
concentrated at the central level. As shown by a World Bank report (2009), this ancillary role is reflected 
by the fact that normally local de-concentrated administrations do not have financial autonomy, with 
the line Ministries in charge of preparing their budgets in a centralized manner and with little input of 
the local level. Moreover, the de-concentrated services of most line Ministries have little influence on 
the recruitment and management of their staff, with significant capacity gaps between the central and 
local level. The main consequence is an excessive concentration of services, decision-making and 
resources at central level, weak de-concentration processes and poor territorial coverage of the sectoral 
Ministries in the different provinces of the Kingdom (Ben Osmane, 2014; African Development Bank, 
2006). Against this background, the circulation of information on goals and roles is highly difficult.  
Similarly, the process of decentralization experiences the same difficulties. In the French 
tradition119, the concept of decentralization implies a transfer of responsibilities by the central 
                                                     
118 In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, this is often referred to as “administrative decentralization”. 
119 In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, this process is often referred to as “devolution” or “political decentralization. 
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government to sub-nationally elected authorities, as regions, provinces, prefectures, or municipalities 
(World Bank, 2009). Since the 1990s, several royal initiatives pushed for an intensification of the powers 
of regional governors (Ben Osmane, 2014) and in 2008 a national plan was adopted for this purpose. 
This kind of territorial policy gave birth to a territorial decoupage organized around the communal, 
provincial and regional level, with 16 regions headed by a regional governor (the wali). While the 
process of decentralization is predominantly political, yet it is extremely important for administrative 
capacity, insofar as it is complementary to the administrative de-concentration, improves the 
management of resources and allows a better focus on local problems and needs (Zyani, 2002). 
However, even if a process of decentralization was gradually implemented, yet it suffers from the same 
difficulties of the de-concentration process, in light of the too much-centralized nature of Moroccan 
administration (ibid.). In particular, central government representatives and line ministries have a 
dominant role, with the prefectural and provincial level still tightly controlled by the state and 
endowed with a limited power and budgetary autonomy (Bergh, 2013).  
Moroccan authorities have embarked on a big reform process mainly focused on the 
modernisation of administration, efficiency and transparency in the management of budget resources, 
as well as on the management of human resources and the simplification of procedures through e-
government. However, whereas some important efforts were made, still it is a long and sensitive 
reform, which proceeds at a slow pace. Moreover, de-concentration has lagged behind the 
decentralization process, with reforms occurring in a limited and fragmented manner (World Bank, 
2009).  
 
 
5.2 The impact of the Arab Spring on Morocco’s administration and its capacity 
 
The adoption of the new Constitution in 2011 gave a new input to the improvement of public 
governance and to the reform of administration, with the PJD government placing administrative 
reform and transparency at the core of its program, as a privileged axe of governmental action and a 
key element of socio-economic development (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2012). In particular, in the 
domain of decentralization, the new Constitution provided a new framework for regionalization, by 
recognizing that “the territorial organization of the kingdom is decentralized” and “based on an 
advanced regionalization”. This process could promote an improvement of administrative capacities 
in terms of a better coordination between central and decentralized levels, yet progresses in the domain 
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of regionalization have been so far very slow and only in 2014 three organic laws on regions and 
provinces were adopted (ENP-Morocco Progress Report, 2012; 2013; 2014).  
If the adoption of the new Constitution provided a positive input that in the long term could 
lead to better administrative capacities, in the short-term Morocco’s administration was negatively 
affected by the Arab Spring. First, the Moroccan Spring generated institutional volatility and officials’ 
turnover, in light of the instability provoked by the constitutional review and governments’ changes 
in 2011 and 2013. Government stability is in fact a key element to ensure continuity and coherence 
within the administration. By contrast, instability and cabinet’s changes allow for an administrative 
paralysis and a turnover of administrative officials in terms of a change in the civil servants who are 
responsible for specific programs. Against this background, implementation is negatively affected 
insofar as it is difficult to proceed with the execution of reforms under these peculiar conditions, with 
delays and discontinuities (Milio, 2007). In the case of Morocco, therefore, the two cabinet changes in 
less than two years affected Morocco’s already weak administrative capacity to execute reforms.  
Secondly, the PJD’s lack of expertise further contributed to delays and paralysis in Moroccan 
administration. As a Europeaid Official put it in during an interview, “the PJD was not ready to take 
power as it did not have any experience in managing administration and it took months to appoint the 
new administration”120. 
 
 
5.3 Moroccan administrative capacity and the implementation of ENP programs 
 
Even if Morocco has always had a generally weak administration capacity, yet the experience 
of some bodies and the good organization of some of its structures contributed to the good 
implementation of the ENP programs before 2011, such as in the case of the program for 
alphabetization or the support to the INDH. By contrast, in other cases such the ENP program to 
support the health system, the weakness of administration affected the general performance of the 
Program. After 2011, the impact of the Arab Spring on the already weak capacity of administration 
contributed to reduce the absorption of EU funds.  
 
 
                                                     
120 Interview with EUROPEAID Official from Morocco Desk, Brussels, 24 May 2014 
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5.3.1 When political willingness is not enough: the role of administrative capacity in the ENP Program 
for Alphabetization  
 
The ENP budget support to sustain alphabetization strategy is again a case in point.  As already 
mentioned in the paragraph 3.3.2, this EU program was launched in 2008 to sustain the implementation 
of Morocco’s National Alphabetization Strategy. Until 2011, its performance was considered very 
positive (UE Fiche d'Action Maroc, 2010), in light of political actors’ matching agenda and strong 
engagement. However, political actors’ support was not the only reason behind the program’s good 
performance. As one of the goals and indicators of the program was the strengthening of institutional 
and administrative capacity in a logic of de-concentration (ibid.), the capacity of the administrations 
involved contributed as well to the program’s good implementation and absorption of EU funds.  
In particular, whilst waiting for the creation of an agency ad hoc in the domain of 
alphabetization, the EU main interlocutor was the Direction Lutte Contre l’ Analphabetisme (DLCA) that, 
within the Ministry of National Education, was in charge of the implementation of the national 
strategy. The DLCA assumed this task in 2007 when it replaced the former SE, which had been 
established in 2002 to transform political engagement into an institution able to coordinate for the first 
time121 all the public actors in charge of alphabetization (Bougroum & al., 2006). However, following 
2007 elections, El Fassi’s government decided to unexpectedly dissolve the SE with the purpose to 
create a specialized agency in this domain with an ambitious feuille de route122. Since then, the DLCA 
became the chef de file in the transitionary period until the creation of the new body (that in fact did not 
occur before July 2011).  
All this considered, the fact that EU financing convention was signed in September 2008, i.e. 
when the SE was no more in place, was a big advantage for the subsequent implementation of the ENP 
program for three reasons. First, the creation of the SE reflected Moroccan administration’s traditional 
trend to multiply its structures at the expense of rational management and, in this sense, while giving 
visibility to alphabetization issues, the SE posed more additional institutional complications at the 
central and local level than what it resolved (World Bank, 2008). Second, in this way the ENP program 
could bypass the institutional volatility provoked by the sudden elimination of the SE. Third, the fact 
                                                     
121 Until the 1990s, the fight against illiteracy was not an explicit political goal. Therefore, there was no strategic 
plan or coordination among the actions carried by the different public actors.  
122 Interview with a Moroccan Official from the Agence Nationale Lutte contre l’Analphabetisme. Rabat, June 
2014. 
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that the DLCA, by replacing the SE, became the EU major interlocutor was another major asset, as it 
was much older and with more experience than the young and still institutionally weak SE.  
The DLCE had a key role in the coordination of the different public, private and civil society 
actors involved into the program, as well as in the monitoring of the activities. In particular, it was able 
to ensure a close collaboration with all the other ministries123 implied in the implementation of the 
National strategy. While its structure was limited for the tasks it had to carry out and the pilotage over 
other actors was difficult (UE Fiche d'Action Maroc, 2010), it had a well-qualified team with expertise 
for implementation and monitoring124 and the technical assistance provided by the EU allowed a 
further institutional strengthening. Moreover, the DLCA was able to guarantee a good daily 
coordination with the other donors, by avoiding duplication in the interventions and by organizing ad 
hoc meetings with all the technical and international partners. In this sense, it fulfilled one of the general 
conditions for disbursement required by the ENP program (ibid.).   
Finally, the DLCA developed its de-concentrated structures at the local level with the Académies 
Régionales de l’Education et Formation (AREF), which are structures in charge of carrying out 
alphabetization activities within their jurisdiction at the local level, by elaborating regional action plans 
and by managing the subventions for the local NGOs. Even if they were only recent structures with 
problems in terms of human resources and management responsibilities, the ENP program’s 
performance indicators (such as the measures concerning the strengthening of institutional capacities, 
the monitoring of the AREFs’ regional plans and the reduction of analphabetism in the 11 AREF with 
the highest rate), could still be respected with a good payment rate (as already shown by Table 6). 
Moreover, the AREFs’ difficulties in terms of monitoring and evaluation of the projects implemented 
on the ground, could be offset through the combined use of external monitoring by a bureau d’études 
and the internal monitoring managed at the central level by the DLCA125. 
Against this background, the Arab Spring had a major impact on the implementation of the 
program, insofar as it altered Morocco’s administrative capacity in the domain of alphabetization. If 
until 2011, the disbursement of the tranches could normally be processed, in 2012 the payments of the 
program decreased until zero (see figure 11):  
 
 
                                                     
123 Among the others, the Ministry of Economic, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Youth. 
124 Interview, note 96 
125 Ibid 
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Figure 11 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial 
Transparency System. 
 
The main reason behind the lack of tranche release in 2012 is related to the institutional 
volatility in the wake of the Arab Spring. The new Constitution gave a new input to alphabetization 
and recognized education as a human right (Conseil Superieur de l'Education, 2014). Moreover, it 
pushed for the creation of the much-awaited specialized body in the domain of fight against illiteracy. 
The law for the creation of the Agence Nationale Lutte Contre l’Analphabetisme was finally adopted in 
mid-July 2011 and the DLCA was dissolved. However, the creation of the new body and the 
dissolution of the DLCA provoked a complete paralysis, insofar as the administrative council of the 
DLCA formally concluded its activity and stopped to meet, in spite of the fact that the new Agence 
Nationale was not yet operational. Therefore, the implementation of the ENP program was 
momentarily affected by an institutional deadlock, by the lack of a clear interlocutor and by staff turn-
over for key positions that led to insufficient capacity for administration126.   
Interestingly enough, in spite of the changes of 2011, the political commitment in the fight 
against illiteracy remained unchanged. In this domain, the new PJD government accelerated the 
creation of the Agency and adopted a strategy of continuity vis-à-vis the previous government, by 
maintaining its commitments at both national level and international level127. This political 
engagement is further confirmed by the fact that the new Agency emerged as an autonomous body 
                                                     
126 Interview with an EU Official, EU Delegation Rabat. July 2014.  
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directly linked to the head of the government and that political parties were represented in its 
Administrative Council128. However, this engagement at the political level was not enough to 
guarantee the respect of EU’s conditions and indicators. Henceforth, the performance of the ENP 
Program for Alphabetization in 2012 confirms that the lack of administrative capacity in performing 
actions cannot be replaced by the willingness of political class to do well. 
 
 
5.3.2 Morocco’s weak administrative capacity and the ENP Program for the reform of the health system 
 
The ENP program to support the reform of Moroccan Health System is another example that 
demonstrates the importance of administrative capacity for implementation. It was launched in 2009 
to sustain the Ministry of health in the implementation of its program of action, with the purpose to 
improve the care package and the quality of the services offered by Moroccan health system. As 
already said in the previous chapter (paragraph 4.2.2), the tranches’ payments were processed 
annually with the exception of 2011, when the general institutional deadlock turned energies and 
attention away from sectoral reforms. However, whereas the low performance of 2011 was contingent 
upon the peculiar circumstances of period, the general performance of the program was also affected 
by Morocco’s weak administrative capacity. The fact that under this program the EU could disburse 
only €69.5 Mil. out of the €82 Mil. originally committed (see Figure 12) was also a consequence of the 
weaknesses of Morocco’s administration, which made it difficult to respect EU indicators. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the base of the data retrieved through a formal request to the EU Financial 
Transparency System. 
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The country’s ability to respect these indicators is dependent both on the capacity of the 
administration as well as on the indicators’ nature and the degree of difficulty. In the case of the above 
mentioned program, the most problematic indicator was the one concerning the repartition of the 
medical personnel on the ground. The repartition of human resources on the territory is in fact a big 
problem, which creates inequalities in the medical cover and in the access to basic services. This is 
mainly due to the limited capacity of the Ministry of Health and of local administrations to ensure the 
presence and the availability of medical personnel in the rural world129. Moreover, the capacity of the 
Ministry of Health to enforce legislation and to translate its political orientations into concrete strategic 
planning and implementation is extremely limited (UE Fiche d'Action Maroc, 2008a). The lack of an 
integrated system to monitor performance and the use of different and fragmented systems is another 
major weakness, insofar as any sectoral body is in charge of data collection and statistical analysis in 
order to critically assess the progresses of the sector (UE Fiche d'Action Maroc, 2014). These problems 
are even bigger at the deconcentrated levels, in light of the Ministry’s difficulties to coordinate all its 
other delegations at a lower level. This is also why the EU tried to push for the sensitive reform of 
regionalization, as a mean for political decentralization and for a better distribution of resources. 
Finally, there is often an overlapping of roles with more Directions intervening on the reform, while 
dispersing and duplicating the efforts on the ground.  
The post 2011 political landscape was a major asset for the advancement of the health system’s 
reform and of its administrative capacities, insofar as the new administrative nominations allowed a 
change of the Ministry’s administrative personnel, with a new director who particularly pushed for 
efficiency and transparency in the reform processes130. Therefore, unlike the ENP program for 
alphabetization, in this case the personnel turnover was more a facilitating condition to improve 
administrative capacities than a constraining element. The recognition by the new Constitution of 
regionalization processes, the adoption in 2011 of the law-decree on the organization of hospitals and 
the Ministry of Health’s internal decision about the organization of its deconcentrated services 
contributed to this trend. Moreover, the establishment of the SROS, i.e. the regional schemes for health 
services, was also another positive step insofar as it was conceived to help the planning and the 
organization of health services at the regional level, in order to coordinate efforts and to facilitate 
responsibility sharing between the central level and the decentralized territorial units131.  
                                                     
129 Interview with EU Officials in charge of the ENP Health Programs, EU Delegation, Rabat, July 2014 
130 Interview, note 100 
131 See the “Décret n° 2-14 du 5-62 relatif à l'organisation de l'offre de soins, à la carte sanitaire et aux schémas 
régionaux de l'offre de soins”.  
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However, while this new context laid the foundations for a potential improvement of 
administrative capacities in the long term, the rhythm of the reform and the implementation of the 
Constitution and new laws were very slow both at the political and administrative level. Therefore, as 
the ENP program finished in 2014, its implementation could not benefit from the potential 
improvements in the administrative capacities of Morocco’s health sector, and the ratio 
commitments/payments did not progress much in the short term after 2011. In this sense, it would be 
interesting to observe the new ENP Program “Santé II”, which was launched by the AAP 2014 and 
whose implementation could theoretically be facilitated by the administrative developments of the 
past four years, and by the launch in 2015 of a reform of human resources in the health sector to 
improve the distribution of personnel in the rural areas132.        
 
 
5.3.3 When administrative capacity is low and EU procedures are strict: the ENP Program IER II 
 
The ENP "Programme d’accompagnement aux Recommandations de l’Instance Equité et 
Réconciliation en matière d'Histoire et de mémoire» (IER II) was programmed by the AAP 2008 to 
allocate 8€ Mil. for the implementation of the IER recommendations. The IER was launched in 2004 by 
Mohamed VI to investigate the human rights' abuses of the past and to break the mould of silence that 
had traditionally characterized the regime of his father (Malka & Alterman, 2006). In particular, the 
mission of the IER was to expose the truth about the violation of human rights made by Moroccan 
regime between 1956 and 1999 and to allow the rehabilitation of the victims with the purpose to 
preserve the memory and guarantee the non-repetition of these violations. After having held public 
consultations with the victims and having analysed more than 20000 dossiers, the IER elaborated a set 
of recommendations about the actions to be taken. The Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme (CCDH) 
was given the task by Mohamed VI to implement these recommendations. 
  In this context, the goal of the ENP program was to support the implementation of three key 
IER recommendations: the adoption of a modern law on archives; the creation of a research institute 
on Morocco’s history and the diffusion of historical knowledge to the great public (UE Fiche d'Action 
Maroc, 2008b). Unlike all the other programs of the NIP 2007-2010 which were budget supports, the 
                                                     
132 In this regard, 2015 was labeled as the year of “Santé Rural”.  
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ENP program IER II was the only one to adopt a project approach. The implementation of the program 
was therefore decentralized and assigned to the CCDH as implementing authority.  
The implementation of this ENP program is another example which shows that political 
willingness cannot replace administrative capacity. Out of the 8€ Mil. committed less than the half was 
actually paid by the EU and spent by the CCDH, with many of the of the originally foreseen activities 
being cancelled. “Political willingness was there and there was not political obstruction whatsoever, 
but the program was affected by a number of operational issues and administrative deficiencies”133.  In 
particular, two factors affected the capacity of the CCDH to spend EU money and to carry out the 
required activities: its administrative capacity and the strictness of EU contracting procedures. 
Created by Hassan II to improve the international image of the country, the CCDH was 
characterized by a complete lack of autonomy and authority (Vairel, 2004). It emerged as a mere 
advisory body placed under the King, whose members were appointed by royal decree and whose 
main function was merely to formulate opinions or proposals (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998). In this 
context, it is not surprising that from the outset the capacity of the CCDH to implement IER’s 
recommendations was not adequate for the size of the task. Moreover, it was a small structure with 
few human resources and as such it took very long to put in place the team that was in charge of 
implementing the EU program. As said by some interviewees, probably the fact the financial 
agreement with the EU had not established in advance the list of activities to be carried out, further 
contributed to lengthen implementation. The CCDH in fact had to undertake a long process of 
consultations with the major stakeholders from each relevant area supported by the ENP program 
(archives, history and memory) in order to collect recommendations on what had to be done. While 
this consultation process was very participative, it came out with a plan of activity that was very 
fragmented and with a huge list of items, due also to the fact that the existence of a public policy in the 
domain of archives, memory and history was something completely new for Morocco.  
In this regard, when finally the CCDH had finally decided upon its action plan to implement 
the ENP program (two years after the signature of the financing convention), the Moroccan Spring 
happened and the implementation of the program was suddenly further affected. In particular, in the 
wake of the new climate and constitutional changes, the CCDH was transformed into the Conseil 
National de Droits de l’Homme (CNDH), i.e. it was transformed from being a consultative body into 
a national institution in charge of the protection of human rights. The CNDH therefore acquired much 
more power and a greater mandate, which was reflected at the administrative level in the development 
                                                     
133 Interview with EU Officials from EU Delegation in Morocco, June 2015. 
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of its structures, in the increase of human resources and in the appointment of a new director who was 
very charismatic and proactive. However, while this renewed context would have laid the basis for 
accelerating the implementation of the ENP program, the new CNDH director was also appointed as 
head of the commission in charge of drafting the new Constitution, with the main consequence that 
the EU program came in second rank. “The program was affected by the fact the after the Arab Spring 
the institutions in the field of governance were very busy with the ongoing political changes, so they 
were just unavailable to fulfil their obligations in terms of cooperation with the EU”134.   
The EU strict rules to spend ENP money (all the contracts and the money must be respectively 
signed and engaged within three years after the signature of the financing convention) further 
contributed to hamper the implementation of the program, insofar as the CNDH was not in the 
condition to cope with the EU tight timetable. Therefore, only the half of the budget could be spent 
and many of the original activities were cancelled. Even though much smaller than what originally 
foreseen, there were anyway interesting achievements and the program contributed to increase the 
visibility of sensitive issues in the domain of archives and memory. However, the combination of the 
CNDH reduced capacities and the EU strict procedure contributed to the program’s low absorption 
capacity.   
 
 
5.3.4 When administrative capacity is good: the ENP support to the INDH, again 
 
The ENP program to support the INDH has already been analysed as a successful program that 
enjoyed a big political support and that under the King’s shelter was put above the fray of ordinary 
politics and above the changes of 2011. As already said, political willingness is not a guarantee for 
good performance insofar as administrative capacity is also needed to correctly execute actions. What 
was crucial for the very good performance of the INDH was not only its political value and high 
visibility, but also the administrative capacity of the structures in charge of its implementation.  The 
symbolic value and patriotic discourse of the INDH was in fact displayed also in the way it was 
planned and managed. Rather than being entrusted to the Ministry of Social Development, which 
suffers from considerable institutional and administrative fragilities, the INDH implementation was 
assigned to the Ministry of Interior (Martin, 2007, p. 435) as the only actor able to ensure a broad 
                                                     
134 Ibid.  
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territorial scope across the whole country in terms of control and human resources135. Moreover, 
strategic supervision and coordination at the national level was entrusted to a committee chaired 
directly by the prime minister. In this way, the INDH was able to bypass the most recurrent problem 
of Morocco’s administration: the incapacity of the line ministries to cover all the areas of the Kingdom 
with their deconcentrated structures. The program’s clear implementation responsibilities allowed a 
good coordination between the central, provincial and local levels and avoided duplications of roles 
and initiatives. The implementation mechanisms were in this sense adequately engineered, with the 
definition of local and provincial development committees in charge of avoiding overlapping with line 
ministry programs. Against this background, the general institutional volatility and administrative 
turnover of the Arab Spring was completely avoided, by ensuring continuity at the administrative 
level within the INDH National Coordination Unit.  
 
 
5.4 Strong Bureaucracy and Tight Top-Down Management: Administrative Capacity in 
Tunisia 
 
The development of administration in Tunisia can be dated back to the colonial period, when 
the persistent growth of a modern centralized and bureaucratic state allowed for the emergence of a 
stable administration (Anderson, 2014). Since then, a good public administration was built on the 
tradition established by President Bourguiba in the 1960s and on key governmental reforms (World 
Bank, 2014). Under Ben Ali’s regime and in the wake of the country’s efforts towards the “economic 
miracle”, public administration’s reform and modernization became a governmental priority and a 
permanent goal, on the idea that public sector could be the motor of development for the country 
(Brockmeyer et al., 2015). Especially between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the pace of reform was 
accelerated and a “Plan de Mise a Niveau de l’Administration” was designed in order to renew 
administration and create adequate administrative structures to support the implementation of 
economic reform. 
As in Morocco, Tunisian administration emerged from a very centralized and closed system 
where administrative structures had strong links to the leading party and strong discretionary powers 
(ENP- Tunisia Country Report, 2004). However, unlike Morocco where over-centralisation implied the 
                                                     
135 Interview with a former Moroccan Official of the Agence de Developpement Social, Rabat, June 2014.  
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development of fossilized, too-much hierarchical and slow administrative structures, in Tunisia the 
capacity of administration was positively and directly influenced by the State’s tight control that 
guaranteed a continuous and efficient work by the administration, according to the established reforms 
priorities. In this sense, Tunisian administration recalls the notion of a “strong bureaucracy” intended 
as a self-serving and self-referential bureaucracy (Guy Peters & Pierre, 2012, p.6). Even if it emerged 
as an administration at the service of the state rather than of the citizen, international observers and 
donors have always deemed administration in Tunisia as good and competent in the execution of 
reforms, in light of its quality and remarkable progress in terms of legal and institutional organization 
vis-à-vis other MENA countries (EU- Tunisia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013; Zardi, 2004; African 
Development Bank, 2007a). In particular, the fact that Tunisia began its modernization process even 
before the end of the colonial period in 1956 was a major asset for the development of its 
administration, insofar as the following adjustment process of the 1980s and 1990s became less 
traumatic for administrative structures. The well-established acceptance of juridical positivism and 
secularism and the long experience of the state administration in fact allowed Tunisia to tackle 
administrative modernization more successfully than other Maghreb countries, such as Morocco 
(CAIMED, 2003).  
In terms of administrative structures, while often proliferating with an elephantiasis syndrome, 
in many policy sectors they have always been adequate, efficient and well-tailored to the kind of tasks 
assigned to them. The five-year Development Plans contributed to this result, by including structural 
re-organization and better definition of responsibilities according to the envisaged reforms and 
priority goals. Moreover, the simplification of administrative procedures and the adoption of IT tools 
contributed to improve the efficiency of administrative structures. A State Secretariat in charge of 
Computers and Internet was attached to the Prime Ministry, with the purpose to enhance the 
computerization of state institutions and to develop a synergy in this domain between the different 
ministerial departments (Zardi, 2004).  
In terms of coordination, roles overlapping was often a direct consequence of structures’ 
proliferation, with the multiplication of administrative units belonging to different generations and in 
charge of the same issues (CAIMED, 2003). However, this problem was gradually tackled with a 
structural reorganization of public services and the adoption of organizational charts for ministries. 
More generally, the country’s centralized and top-down management was able to guarantee a good 
coordination among administrative structures. 
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Finally, in terms of human resources, Tunisian civil service was run by a staff that was generally 
qualified and relatively efficient, especially at central level (ENP- Tunisia Country Report, 2004). 
Moreover, unlike Morocco, the management of the state human resources was done through an 
efficient administrative and payroll management computer system (Zardi, 2004).  
These positive features of Tunisian administration were less developed at the local level. The 
Tunisian territory is divided into 24 Governorates, which are in turn divided into delegations. Whereas 
a policy of administrative decentralization began in 1989 and increasing pressures for administrative 
de-concentration emerged in the last decade, still the process proceeded at a slow pace. This was 
mainly due to historical reasons insofar as during colonial period decentralization was introduced only 
in a limited manner. Moreover, in Ben Ali’s highly centralized system, governmental authorities 
mainly concentrated control and power at the central level to avoid any erosion of their autonomy. In 
this context, regional Officials felt obliged to address any issue to the competent ministry at the central 
level, even if the law would allow them some margin of maneuver (ARLEM, 2014). Therefore, 
historically strong central control coupled with limited resources and inefficiency on the local and 
regional levels (Fedtke, 2013), with the main consequence that there was a neglect of public services in 
the hinterlands (African Development Bank, 2012). 
 
 
5.5 The impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisian administration and its capacity 
 
The reform efforts carried out by Tunisia in the latest years to modernise its public 
administration were intensified in the aftermath of the Revolution. The adoption of the new 
Constitution in 2014 gave a new input to the improvement of public governance and administrative 
reform, by establishing that “public administration serves citizens and public interest, its organization 
and operations are according to principles of impartiality, equity, public service continuity and 
according to rules of transparency, integrity, effectiveness and accountability”(art.15). Similarly, 
Ennahda placed administrative reform at the core of its program, as a key component of the republican 
system and of the new Tunisia136. In the wake of regime transition, decentralization became a priority 
goal for the interim government, which published a white book on regional development with the 
purpose to decentralize and deconcentrate responsibilities to lower administrations in different 
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domains (OECD, 2015). Similarly, the new Constitution represented an important achievement in this 
sense, insofar as it devoted an entire chapter to the issue of decentralization as the very base of local 
power (art. 131) and as the first step for a more efficient administration. Finally, in the domain of 
human resources Tunisian transitional government presented itself as an employer of last resort and, 
in order to address social demands, it significantly increased the size of the public sector with 90.000 
new employees between 2011 and 2012 (Brockmeyer et al., 2015).  
If the regime transition and the adoption of the new Constitution provided a new input to 
reinforce Tunisian administrative efforts in the long term, in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s 
ousting Tunisian administration suffered from a big instability and institutional volatility. The 
dramatic and fast turn of events in January 2011, the rapid succession of transition governments and 
the high degree of officials’ turnover affected the capacity of administration to carry out its basic 
functions and the coordination among the different departments. Especially during the first months 
after the revolution and before 2011 elections “people were not really focused on their work”137 and 
there was a “lack of discipline in the administration”138 as the traditional tight control from the state 
was lacking. Moreover, there was a high turnover of people with general directors and administrative 
officials changing quickly and frequently.  
However, despite this initial instability, Tunisian administration was able to recover quickly 
and after the establishment of the first troika cabinet, the situation was gradually stabilized in 2013 
with the administration getting back to its normal functioning139. The main reason for this continuity 
is that the administration was already well-established and experienced and this allowed it to be in the 
long term resilient to the troubles that accompanied the revolution in its first months (OECD, 2015). 
However, this resilience is not only related to Tunisian administration’s history and to its good 
capacities, but also to the mentality of people within administration, insofar as many of them were 
attached to past and worried of changes, as well as to lose their posts140. In this sense, post-
revolutionary administration in Tunisia continued to reflect the logic behind the traditional notion of 
reformism and its contradictory goals (Hibou, 2012), by reforming itself while still continuing to be the 
same.   
 
 
                                                     
137 Interview with Tunisian Officials, APAL, Tunis, February 2015.  
138 Interview with EU official, EU Delegation in Tunisia, Tunis, February 2015. 
139 Interview with Tunisian Official, Ministry of International Cooperation, Tunis, February 2015 
140 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015 
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5.6. Tunisian administrative capacity and the implementation of ENP programs 
 
 
In light of what has been said, Tunisian administration played a key role in the execution of 
reforms and governmental programs, as well as in the implementation of the ENP and absorption of 
EU funds. Under Ben Ali’s regime, a skilled administration coupled with the State’s tight control 
allowed a good administrative capacity for the implementation of EU programs. This is  for example 
the case of the PAI, where the good absorption capacity was not only related to Tunisia’s economic 
priorities and to the “syndrome of the bon élève”, but also to the Ministry of Development and 
International Cooperation (MDCI)  which was able to guarantee an efficient coordination among the 
sectoral ministries; as well as to the quality of the administration that committed with the goals of the 
program and was able to implement difficult technical measures (African Development Bank, 2011). 
Tunisian administration was even more important after the Arab Spring. In spite of the important 
political changes and a long period of instability, unlike Morocco it was able to quickly restore its 
capacity and guarantee the implementation of ENP programs on the ground (UE Fiche d’Action 
Tunisie, 2012).  
 
 
5.6.1 When the program is too much ambitious, but administration is still there: the implementation of 
the PAGBO  
 
 
The ENP “Programme d’Appui à la Gestion Budgétaire par Objectifs” (PAGBO) is a clear 
example of the ambiguous role played by Tunisian administration and its unstable balance between 
change and resilience. Launched by the AAP 2007, the PAGBO allocated €30 Mil. in budget support to 
sustain Tunisian government in the implementation of an effective GBO, i.e. a reform aimed at 
improving the quality of public finance management system with a better organization of public 
resources. Whereas the PAGBO suffered from the reticence of some segments of Tunisian 
administration to execute it, at the same time its implementation reaped the benefits of a competent 
and proactive administration without which the GBO would have not really taken off.  
For its intrinsic characteristics the reform was extremely complex and it proceed at a slow pace, 
as shown also by the fact that it had been stagnating since 2004. In particular, the administrative 
reticence about some key components of the GBO was really hard to overcome. The question of 
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budgetary control was one of them, as a very sensitive issue that involved more than six interlocutors, 
all unwilling to give up their prerogatives and blocking the reform141. Similarly, the question of IT 
systems and the adoption of a specific software for the GBO was another key problem, insofar as 
Tunisian administration was proud of its own system and was reluctant to change it. Finally, the 
PAGBO was incredibly ambitious142, as it was designed according to the French model of GBO, which 
did not really match with Tunisian reality. Consequently, it was really difficult for Tunisian authorities 
to meet EU payment conditions.  
Nevertheless, the administration unit in charge of the PAGBO had a key role in the execution 
of the program, insofar as it was gradually able to implement some pilot experiences in five ministries 
where GBO units were created. In this way, even if with some retard (no payment in 2009), it was still 
able to meet EU conditionality and guarantee the disbursement of the two first tranches of the PAGBO 
(see figure 13).  
Figure 13 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. Data retrieved from the EU-Tunisia cooperation report 2013, as well as from 
interviews. Please note that the value for 2015 is only indicative, as at the time of the interviews the payment 
dossier was still being processed.  
 
 
The role of the GBO unit was even more important after the revolution. Between 2011 and 2014 
the payments of the PAGBO decreased until zero, in light of the unstable context that made it even 
harder to cope with EU too much ambitious conditions and performance criteria. The lack of payments 
was related to the general process of transition and to the lack of an appropriate juridical framework, 
which slowed the pace of implementation. As a matter of fact, it took years to draft the new organic 
                                                     
141 Interview with former director of the GBO Unit, Tunis, February 2015.  
142 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015.  
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law on budget, with all the energies of the national assembly mainly devoted to the review of the 
constitution. In this context, Tunisian administration within the GBO unit played a key role to push 
for the reform under the post-2011 new political conditions. When Ennahda-led government came to 
power, it did not have much expertise in budgetary domains and the GBO was not at the top of its 
priorities143. However, the qualified people within the GBO unit were able to revamp the interest in 
the reform and to push for a political commitment in this sense: “En fait, c’était une reforme portée par 
l’administration144”. Consequently, an entire inter-ministerial meeting was devoted to the GBO, 
increasing the latter’s visibility and position on the political agenda. Whereas the complexity of the 
reform and the ambition of the EU program coupled with a moment of uncertainty, the administration 
“was still there” by pushing the GBO at the political level, committing to its goals and overcoming 
some internal reticence. This is further exemplified by the fact that, even if no payment was processed 
for four years, the absorption capacity of the program was still good, with about €25 Mil. disbursed145 
out of the originally committed €30 Mil (83%).  
 
 
 
5.6.2 Between change and momentarily instability: the implementation of the PEFESE 
 
The ENP Program PEFESE, launched to improve the employability and the quality of Tunisian 
education system, directly suffered from the post-revolutionary uncertainty and in 2012 the payments 
of the program decreased until zero (see figure 14).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
143 Interview with EU Delegation Officials, Tunis, February 2015; Interview with the Tunisian Official from the 
GBO unit.  
144 Ibid.  
145 Indicative data. At the time of the interviews the payment dossier was still to be processed. However, 
according to the GBO Unit, the payment of the variable tranche would be between the 60% and the 80% of the 
original amount.  
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Figure 14 
 
Source: Author’s Elaboration on the data from the EU-Tunisia Cooperation Report 2013 
 
The weak performance of 2012 was contingent on the difficulties of the moment, which reduced 
administrative capacity, generated many retards in the implementation of the activities and in the 
definition of the operational responsibilities, in terms of delays in monitoring and dysfunctions in the 
services charged with implementation. Against this background, it was difficult to respect EU 
conditions and to proceed with the preparation of a dossier for the request of payment. These 
challenges were amplified by the fact that the program involves five different Ministries (the three 
ministries of education, the ministry of international cooperation and the ministry of finances). As an 
EU Official put it during an interview: “Our biggest difficulty in the aftermath of the revolution was 
to put everyone around the table and to make the steering committee in the conditions of being able 
to start working”146.   
In this sense, two major factors impinged upon the performance of PEFESE in 2012. The first is 
related to the institutional changes in the structure of the Ministry of Development and International 
Cooperation (MDCI), which exacerbated the lack of clear responsibility for coordinating the program. 
Prior to the revolution, the Ministry was organized into a department for international cooperation 
and into a department of planning, which had the authority to oversee the government’s development 
agenda, by preparing the five-year plans and translating into action Ben Ali’s programs147. After the 
revolution, the name of the Ministry and its functions were changed twice148, weakening its structure 
                                                     
146 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, January 2015. 
147 The original name of the Ministry was in fact “Ministry for International Cooperation and Planning”.  
148 After 2011 elections, it was divided into two Ministries: the Ministry of Investment and International 
cooperation and the Ministry of Regional Development and Planning. Later, its name was further changed into 
Ministry of Development and International Cooperation. 
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and reducing its role as a coordinator. “Given the role played by the MDCI during Ben Ali’s regime, 
after the revolution all the Ministries did not want to work with it in the same manner as before and 
refused to comply with its general guidelines. For the first time, they started to address their demands 
directly to us [the EU] and no more through the MDCI”149. The program’s coordination was therefore 
initially weakened insofar as there was not a clear responsibility for coordinating actors and for 
launching the activities at the level of each ministry.    
The second element is related to the institutional turnover that affected the program, as many 
of the people who had started PEFESE in 2009-2010 changed after the revolution. In particular, the 
Ministry of Higher Teaching was the one with highest volatility, with General Directors changing 
every 5-6 months between 2011 and 2012: “as soon as they started to understand PEFESE, they left”150.  
Moreover, the changing officials within the Ministry of Higher Teaching were the ones that often 
resisted the implementation of the program because “they were asked to give importance to a program 
to which they had not participated since the beginning”151. In the already difficult context of transition, 
“they could not accept that their efforts for the respect of EU conditions would go for a budget support 
that directly swelled the coffers of the Ministry of Finance”152.  
However, despite the momentarily instability of 2012, the implementation of the PEFESE could 
get back to its normal functioning in 2013, as exemplified by the fact that the tranches payments could 
restart as normally foreseen and remained almost constant in 2013 and 2014. “It was an exceptional 
context and just a matter of time. After the initial uncertainty, we were able to settle the situation”153. 
This is further confirmed by the fact that despite the lack of payments in 2012 the general absorption 
capacity of the program was good, with €55.8 Mil actually disbursed out of the €61.3 Mil originally 
committed (equal to 91% in terms of payments-to-commitments ratio). The stability in the ministries 
of education and employment was essential in this sense, as they were able to set a team that did not 
change between the formulation of the program and its execution154. Moreover, the Officials from these 
ministries truly committed to the goals of the program, as it provided a strategic framework in a 
moment in which, in light of the political changes, an overall national strategy was still lacking. In this 
                                                     
149 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, January 2015.  
150 Interview with a Tunisian Official from the Ministry of International Cooperation, member of the PEFESE 
Steering Committee.  
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Interview with a Tunisian Official in charge of Education and Employability, MDCI, Tunis, February 2015. 
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way, it was easier to restore an adequate administrative capacity and to offset the volatility within the 
Ministry of Higher Teaching.  
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Chapter VI 
The role of civil society in Morocco and Tunisia: the implementation of the 
ENP 
 
 
The literature on policy-making and foreign aid pays much attention to the role of civil society 
and its presumed ability to foster change and implement policy reforms. Civil society is seen as both a 
policy advocate and dialogue promoter, as well as a service deliverer and a policy implementer. In this 
sense, the notion of civil society is not limited to the autonomous space of the NGOs and organizations 
(CSOs) that are created on a voluntary base and are independent from the state. In its broadest 
meaning, civil society is a public sphere i.e. an arena of argument and deliberation, where demands 
are developed, issues discussed and activities organized (Dimitrovova, 2009; Sater, 2007; Cavatorta, 
2006).  
Civil society is a fundamental actor for the implementation of ENP goals, together with political 
authorities and administration. In ENP documents, civil society has a valuable role in the identification 
and execution of priorities of action (European Commission, 2007c), and its relevance is noted with 
reference to different policy sectors. In terms of implementation, the importance attached to civil 
society applies not only to project approach, where non-state actors are the direct receiver of EU 
funds155 and contribute to implement through projects the priorities of a given ENP program, but also 
to budget support. In this case, in fact, civil society participation is crucial for the policy targeting and 
for the implementation of the national strategies that are supported by the ENP. Whereas the 
government is the main actor that directly manages EU funds, still civil society can act both as an 
advocate and dialogue promoter to pressure the government for the respect of EU conditions, as well 
as a service deliverer for the implementation of national policies. The implementation of a given ENP 
program is therefore likely to reflect the same goals and difficulties that characterize the role of civil 
society in the country’s normal policy process.  
  The importance of non-state actors for the implementation of the ENP is even bigger after the 
Arab Spring, insofar as the events shaped the traditional state-civil society relations by fostering CSOs’ 
empowerment and transforming the space reserved to civil society in light of constitutional 
renovations and new elections. The ENP as renewed after 2011 therefore emphasized the need to 
                                                     
155 This may happen when: a) the EU Delegation manages a call for proposal under centralized management b) 
when the call for proposal is managed in decentralized way by a local authority.   
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strengthen and promote the role of civil society actors in the reforms and changes taking place in the 
neighborhood. As stated by EU Commissioner Füle: "I attach great importance to the partnership with 
civil society in the ENP […]. We have significantly enhanced our engagement with civil society of 
partner countries to maximise public support for reforms” (European Commission, 2013b). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of civil society in Morocco and Tunisia and how 
it affected the implementation of ENP programs on the ground. Drawing from the work of Riley & 
Fernández (2014) and readapting it to the purpose of this thesis and to the study of implementation, 
civil society is here analyzed considering three main dimensions. The first is referred to the 
organizational strength of civil society, in terms of the number of CSOs existing in a given policy area 
as influenced by the existing legal framework, administrative procedures and freedom of association 
(Riley & Fernández, 2014, p. 440). The second dimension is civil society’s autonomy and “space” in 
terms of the qualitative relationships between the state and non-state organizations. In this context, 
civil society can be autonomous, when it is independent from the state and able to influence policy 
formulation and to have a control on its space of activity, or heteronomous, when the state dominates 
the sphere of voluntary organizations and it is able to shape their agenda and activities (ibid.). Finally, 
the third dimension is civil society’s capacity to implement projects, in terms of expertise, human and 
financial resources.  
In this context, international donors share the idea that the strength, the capacity and the 
autonomy of civil society to influence national policies and carry out actions and projects is extremely 
relevant for policy implementation. In the case of the ENP, the EU states that the policy “works when 
the willingness to reform is there and society plays an active part in the process” (European 
Commission, 2013a). In line with these considerations, the hypothesis here is that the implementation 
of bilateral programs and the absorption of EU funds is more likely when civil society is 
organizationally strong, capable and autonomous.  
 
 
6.1 Spaces of Freedom and Boundaries of co-optation: Civil Society in Morocco 
 
Civil society in Morocco is often described as among the most diverse and vibrant of the MENA 
region (Kausch, 2008). Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Moroccan civil society experienced a 
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considerable development156, which was the result of the opening up of public liberties as well as of 
state disengagement from public services with a concomitant increase in the population’s needs 
(Civicus, 2011).  
In terms of public liberties, freedom of association has been a constitutional right since 1968 
while the 2002 association law introduced considerable measures of liberalisation (Kausch, 2008). 
Under Mohamed VI, civil society enjoyed a degree of freedom never experienced before, with a 
reduction of controls (Dalmasso, 2012). In order to be legally registered, associations must inform 
authorities of their foundation and must be issued a formal receipt to confirm their status. The legal 
recognition allows associations to have access to public and international subventions and to carry out 
their activities. Moreover, NGOs can also apply for the status of public utility, which is acknowledged 
under royal discretion to the associations that pursue a goal of general interest and allows to enjoy 
financial advantages in terms of donations, public subventions and tax exemptions. Yet, many 
associations criticize the unclearness and lack of transparency in the criteria adopted to grant the public 
utility status, which appears to be limited to a small number of “favourites” and not related to the 
importance of the social contribution of organisations (Civicus, 2011). The few that are granted the 
status of public utility in practice are said to be mostly GONGOs, i.e. non governmental organizations 
that are not independent from the government and very close to the palace (Kausch, 2008). 
The peculiar economic context of the early 1990s had an important effect on the development 
of civil society, insofar as Moroccan adoption of World Bank’s program of structural adjustment made 
the state unable to address daily needs and fostered the spreading of new associations to carry out 
basic services157. In this context, new organizations spontaneously emerged in the domain of 
development as service deliverers to offset the state’s lack of agency and to assume responsibility for 
socio-economic matters (Dimitrovova, 2009).  
The relations between civil society and the state are embedded in the key features of Moroccan 
political system, which have shaped the arena for civil society’s action between bottom-up initiatives 
and top-down processes of political co-optation. More specifically, the control of the palace over the 
political party system persists into the state-civil society relations. As well illustrated by James Sater 
(2007), in the three decades after independence Moroccan civil society developed as an actor 
                                                     
156 The data about the number of civil society’s organizations in Morocco are different according to the source. 
According to the CIVICUS Index (2011) there are between 30.000 and 50.000 associations, whereas Kausch (2008) 
mentions an estimated number between 30.000 and 80.0000. According to the latest 2014 report of the Interior 
Ministry, there are 116.836 associations.  
157 Interview with one of the founding members of Moroccan Association for Solidarity and Development 
(AMSED).  
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entrenched in the dominant modes of power, with the first-emerging associations closely tied to the 
political process and serving political parties’ presence in the population (such as the Moroccan League 
for Human Rights that was closed to the Istiqlal, or the Moroccan Association of Human Rights led by 
the political orientations of the USFP). In this sense, there was not so much room for autonomous action 
and the public sphere was unable to transform social demands into public issues (Sater, 2007, p. 
chapter 3). Only by the late 1980s/early 1990s the already mentioned development of civil society 
corresponded to a process of disentanglement between power structures and civil society, with an 
increase in the number of the associations able to intervene in the public sphere, as well as to discuss 
and criticize public issues (Sater, 2007, chapters 4-5). The mobilization for the reform of women’s rights 
and the consequent renewal of the Personal Status Code, as well as the recognition of Berber identity 
(Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998) or the increasing call for human rights are all rooted in civil society’s 
action as a promoter and a policy advocate with a stake in policy formulation.  
However, the increasing role of civil society in policy formulation and the King’s reaction to 
civil society’s demands with the creation of the IER and the reform of the Family Code should be seen 
not only in terms of bottom-up pressures but also in terms of top-down co-optation (Dalmasso, 2012). 
The state acceptance of civil society’s expression of dissent was in fact a way to strengthen the regime’s 
consensual nature, channelling grievances in appropriate state controlled arenas (Sater, 2007). On their 
side, Moroccan associations accepted to be co-opted and to play by the rules of the game, i.e. to 
promote single and narrow issues or immediate interests that would not touch upon the very nature 
of the system, with large parts of Moroccan civil society becoming overtly apolitical (Dalmasso, 2012). 
This means that while critical NGOs are not forbidden they are in practice kept “on a long leash” 
(Kausch, 2008).  
Overall, it is possible to say that the gradual process of political opening allowed for the 
development of an organizationally strong civil society as exemplified by the extensive diffusion of 
spontaneous CSOs. However, organizational strength remains a necessary -but not sufficient- 
condition for being autonomous and enjoying an independent space for activity. Therefore, whereas 
some associations attempt to remain autonomous actors, others are state sponsored organizations, 
without an independent agenda and a real autonomous space for action. Moreover, whereas bottom-
up initiatives were often relevant to shape policy-making, they remain always embedded in the co-
optation dynamics of the political system and within the “système d’encadrement makhzenien de la 
société marocaine” (Lacroix, 2006). 
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Finally, in terms of associations’ capacities, lack of professionalism, poor self-financing and 
dependence on the state, as well as unpaid volunteering which leads to members’ volatility are the 
main weaknesses and challenges (Civicus, 2011). These problems affect the already weak ability to 
influence the reform process and are even more constraining in the case of small associations, insofar 
as the latter can hardly survive when faced with a lack of human and economic resources. In this sense, 
authorities can often limit NGOs organizational and financial autonomy by blocking the authorization 
and registration process and by favouring selected associations closed to power circles.    
 
 
6.2 The implementation of the ENP in Morocco and the role of civil society before 2011 
 
The configuration of Moroccan civil society influenced the implementation of the ENP. The NIP 
2007-2010 does not include initiatives directly addressed to civil society, insofar as the greatest part of 
programs is in budget support. However, many of these programs relied upon associations for the 
execution of the corresponding national strategies, or targeted the inclusion and the reinforcement of 
associations among the attended results (Bono, 2007). As already shown in chapter 3, Morocco has 
traditionally been at the forefront of the ENP and between 2007 and 2010 it had a very good absorption 
capacity, with a high payments-to commitments ratio. This good performance is related not only to 
the authorities’ willingness and capacity to respect EU disbursement conditions, but also to the role 
played by civil society. 
First, the development of an organizationally strong civil society based on the extensive 
diffusion of CSOs facilitated the implementation of the national strategies supported by the ENP 
programs. Especially in development sector, Moroccan NGOs emerged as important service delivers 
and implementers of national policies on the ground. In this sense, they became a key tool to facilitate 
policy execution and achieve the results required by EU indicators. Second, Morocco has often 
managed to impose its preferred CSOs as beneficiaries of EU programs (Darbouche & Colombo, 2011, 
p. 140) and this has facilitated the exploitation of the associative sector as “un instrument de captation 
de l’argent de la cooperation” (Lacroix, 2006). The prevalent use of budget support programs under 
the ENPI 2007-2010 contributed to strengthen these dynamics, insofar as most of the EU money was 
channelled through government bodies and ended up in the same pro-government circles of civil 
society (Dimitrovova, 2009, p. 7). The ENP Programs to support the National Alphabetization Strategy 
and the INDH are significant in this sense.  
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6.2.1 When civil society is organizationally strong: the implementation of the ENP Program on 
Alphabetization 
 
The EU supported Morocco’s alphabetization reform with a specific budget support program 
of €23 Mil. to sustain the implementation of the country’s  National Alphabetization Strategy and to 
strengthen institutional and civil society actors’ capacities in the fight against illiteracy. The relevant 
ENPI Action Fiche states that the success of the program would be dependent not only on the 
willingness of Moroccan authorities to implement the National Strategy, but also on the “effective 
action of civil society” and on the presence of an extensive number of non-state actors able to develop 
their capacities and implement the national policy (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2007b). Indeed, in light 
of the high and growing number of CSOs in this domain, civil society “represents a key player upon 
which the very success of Moroccan alphabetization policy depends” (Cerbelle & Bougroum, 2011). 
With the exception of 2012 when there were no disbursements due to administrative weakness 
and volatility (see Figure 11), in absolute terms the program’s performance was very good with €24.1 
Mil. disbursed out of the original commitment. This positive result was favoured by the strength of 
Moroccan civil society as a service deliver in the domain of alphabetization. Since the early 2000s, in 
the context of civil society’s general development and voluntary mobilization, many NGOs imposed 
themselves as major actors in the fight against illiteracy, exploiting presence on the ground and 
proximity to better address people’s needs (Cerbelle & Bougroum, 2011). This extensive associative 
tissue became soon the base for service delivering, with the NGOs managing activities on the ground 
on the behalf of the AREFs and accompanying the socio-economic insertion of beneficiaries (European 
Commission, 2014a). Against this background, the implementation of the ENP program was facilitated 
by the presence of a good associative milieu that supported the execution of the national policy and 
contributed with its activities to the reduction of illiteracy rate (which was one of the program’s 
indicators). As put it by a Moroccan official during an interview: “in the implementation of 
alphabetization policies, associations represent the 50% of the actors involved. If we had so many 
beneficiaries of literacy programs, this is mainly thanks to civil society engagement”158. The National 
Alphabetization Strategy supported by the EU Program included an operational component managed 
exclusively by civil society and only in 2010-2011 more than 940 conventions were concluded with 
CSOs for the alphabetization of over 340.000 people (Moroccan Education Ministry, 2011). Moreover, 
                                                     
158 Interview with Moroccan Official from the Agence Lutte Contre L’Analphabetisme. Rabat, July 2014.  
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an ambitious training program was realized by the DLCA to strengthen the capacity of associations in 
the domain of projects management (ibid.).  
Obviously, the long-time and quantitative establishment of civil society in the domains of 
literacy and education does not automatically imply that NGOs are free of weaknesses. The low 
amount of the subventions, the high turnover and the lack of professionalization, as well as the lack of 
proper coordination with institutional actors jeopardize the work of associations on the ground 
(Cerbelle & Bougroum, 2011; Moroccan Education Ministry, 2011). However, these challenges remain 
contained in the case of the GONGOs created under the state’s impulse (such as the very powerful 
Mohamed V Foundation), and which exploit all the legal, financial and administrative benefits that 
derive from their peculiar character (Bougroum & al., 2006). In this regard, all the interviewees 
recognized the key role played by NGOs in the implementation of the National Strategy159, insofar as 
“they went where the state was not able to arrive”160, and in a context in which the state acts as the 
initiator and civil society as the implementing agent (Dimitrovova, 2009). Overall, the implementation 
of the corresponding ENP program and the relative absorption of EU funds was positively influenced 
by the organizationally strong nature of Moroccan society in the domain of alphabetization, as 
reinforced also by the impulse of the state-penetrated associations.  
 
 
6.2.2 Between Participative Spaces and Boundary Setting: the implementation of the ENP Program to 
support the INDH 
 
The role of state-penetrated civil society in policy implementation is even more evident in the 
case of the INDH. Launched by the King to promote the country’s human development, from the 
outset the INDH emerged as an initiative built upon «une participation des populations pour une 
meilleure appropriation et viabilité des projets et des interventions» (Mohamed VI, 2005c). The 
rationale was to develop a participative approach in both the identification and implementation of 
projects, by allowing people to express their needs through participatory planning, increased 
delegation of responsibility to elected local governments and involvement of civil society through 
NGOs (World Bank, 2012a). Therefore, in a context where the participatory sphere is promoted, the 
                                                     
159 Interview with Moroccan Civil Society Activist from Zakoura Foundation for Education; Casablanca, July 
2014; Interview with Moroccan Official from the Agence Lutte Contre l’Analphabetisme, Rabat, July 2014.  
160 Ibid.  
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NGOs emerged as a central element of the INDH’s implementation process (Berriane, 2010). More 
specifically, in the INDH’s complex implementation structure161, civil society -and in particular NGOs’ 
leaders- have a key role in the elaboration and execution of projects, as well as in the deliberative 
process within the established provincial and local committees, in close collaboration with 
representatives of the state and local elected members (Initiative Nationale pour le Developpement 
Humain, 2006).  
The ENP sustained the rural component of the INDH, with a budget support that targeted the 
fight against rural poverty, the promotion of AGRs and the reinforcement of local governance. As EU 
contribution was mediated by the Ministry of the Interior, which was the chef de file, the ENP provided 
only indirect support to Moroccan associations. Yet, the latter had a fundamental role for the 
implementation of the EU Program, insofar as the activities were “those already foreseen by the [rural] 
volet of the INDH” (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2007a). Therefore, for its execution the ENP Program 
depended on the INDH participatory implementation structure and on the work of NGOs for the 
promotion of projects and AGRs. The good performance of the program, exemplified by the high 
absorption of EU funds (95% payments-to commitments ratio; see paragraph 3.2.1), is rooted in the 
regime’s attempt to design new spaces of participation, while setting key boundaries for the 
involvement of civil society in the INDH.  
From the outset, the INDH fostered the rapid growth of civil society and an impressive increase 
in the number of local associations, which were often created for the sole purpose of submitting a 
project proposal (Bergh, 2012; Bono, 2010). In this sense, the “INDH effect” contributed to the booming 
of Moroccan associations in the early 2000s, and it allowed for the empowerment of new actors and 
for the redistribution of resources at the local level. However, the growing number of NGOs enabled 
to achieve a greater control over society by the state, which controlled the implementation of the INDH 
by defining who could participate or not (Berriane, 2010). As the INDH resources were regulated by 
representatives of the central authority, only the associations linked to local governors or wishing to 
cooperate with the Ministry of Interior were likely to gain access to INDH resources (Bergh, 2012). This 
implied the exclusion of critical associations that had a politicized agenda in terms of rights-based 
claims162 and that were independent from the regime’s control (Dimitrovova, 2009). Similarly, the lack 
of clear and transparent criteria for the selection of the members within the INDH’s local committees 
                                                     
161 The INDH is based on a pyramidal structure that starts from the “équipes d’animation communale”, and goes 
through a “Comité Local de Développement Humain” (CLDH) and a “Comité Provincial de Développement 
Humain” (CPDH).  
162 Interview with a Moroccan civil society activism from the Espace Associatif, Casablanca, July 2014 
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allowed for the selection of actors who were already well known to local authorities and far from 
political engagement (Berriane, 2010). Moreover, the implementation of the INDH seemed to neglect 
the actors already rooted, active and experienced, by favouring instead weak organizations, whose 
mission had been formulated only around the policy (Bono, 2007). As shown by Bono, the alleged 
participatory mechanisms of the INDH were used to keep control and distribute funds in a selective 
way, by favouring the civil society actors that lacked the capabilities to control autonomously their 
space of activities (2007). In this sense, more than being a catalyst for participative action, Moroccan 
associations accepted to be mere service deliverers, while national authorities assumed the role of a 
transmission belt between international donors and civil society. The regime’s control was particularly 
easy in light of its yearly experience in encouraging a controlled development of civil society. 
Moreover, especially in the local areas where civil society was organizationally weak and lacking 
capacities, “the local councillors have invaded and come to dominate this sector as presidents or 
members of associations, eager to influence the allocation of INDH resources” (Bergh , 2012).  This 
allowed the regime to maintain a key control on the implementation of the INDH and its actors, in 
order to make sure that the highly prioritized “chantier royal” could live up to its name, by being a 
success and a showcase of national legitimacy and international visibility.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the ENP program did not experience particular difficulties, 
meeting all the main disbursement conditions and performance criteria. Between 2005 and 2012, 9626 
projects were realized in the rural areas and the 90% were implemented by NGOs and communities 
(World Bank, 2012a; Initiative Nationale pour le Developpement Humain, 2013). Even if the 
implementation of the INDH was more an opportunity to mobilize financial resources through a 
controlled development of civil society rather than an approach to stimulate real participatory 
governance (Bergh, 2012), to the eyes of international donors the program “was fully implemented in 
terms of geographical coverage and disbursement targets were met” (World Bank, 2012a, p. 6). In fact, 
even though within specific boundaries, in terms of data there was an effective increase in the 
percentage of targeted population who reported having participated in the participatory process, with 
more than 700 participatory diagnostics for the rural and urban component. In this context, where 
“much reporting was essentially oriented towards donor requirements as well as to government’s 
needs to oversee implementation and disbursement progress”, the ENP program had a very good 
payment rate.  
Overall, the good performance of the ENP programme was influenced by both the strength of 
civil society in terms of the high number of associations participating to implementation on the ground; 
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and by the heteronomous character of Moroccan civil society, which was easily co-opted in the INDH 
structures. Moreover, the analysis of the program’s implementation revealed the difficulty for the EU 
(and more generally for international donors) to surpass the omnipresence of state-sponsored 
organizations and to alter the structural setting of civil society activity (Darbouche & Colombo, 2011).  
 
 
6.3 Tunisia: A Stifled Civil Society between Repression and Legislative Restrictions 
 
Unlike Morocco, where the opening up of freedom and liberties allowed for the considerable 
development of civil associations, in Tunisia until 2011 civil society had a very limited space and 
independency to operate, with a systematic control that was established already in the early years after 
independence. Thanks to repression and to legislative restrictions, the regime was not only successful 
in preventing the development of civil society through a progressive removal of the areas of freedom, 
but it was also able to infiltrate society and to exploit it for the regime’s purposes. In particular, after 
an initial controlled liberalization, Ben Ali tried to ensure that civil society could remain an unavailable 
political weapon (Alexander, 1997) and already in the early 1990s he proceeded with a shut-down of 
civil society in order to neutralize the grassroots (Coupe & Redisse, 2013; Hochman Rand, 2013, p. 54).  
In terms of legal framework, although the freedom of association was enshrined in the 
constitution, a restrictive legislation (and in particular the 1959 association law) posed several obstacles 
to the development of an independent civil society, by erecting entry barriers and restricting 
manoeuvre for action. The creation of new associations was under the control of authorities and subject 
to an authorization issued by the Ministry of Interior, which disposed of full discretion with regard to 
the approval or dissolution of CSOs. Moreover, the members and the leaders of associations could be 
sued or imprisoned for any violation of the regulatory provisions in force or for operating within an 
unlicensed organization (Foundation for the Future, 2013). Foreign associations faced additional 
constraints, insofar as they needed authorization also from the Minister for Foreign Affairs while the 
routine contacts between foreign governments and local NGOs were subjected to strict restrictions and 
could incur imprisonment and criminal penalties (NCVO, 2013). In such a context, it was very difficult 
and risky for international donors to establish contacts with (human rights) activists inside the country 
(Feliu, 2010). Finally, the regime restricted the financial autonomy of CSOs. Contributions could come 
only from members’ subscriptions or from funding approved by the Ministry of Interior, and foreign 
funding faced even stricter controls, with governmental monitoring, freezing and confiscation.  
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Thanks to this climate of fear and intimidation, Ben Ali managed to create a profound strategic 
malaise for the organizations that could constitute the bedrock of associational life (Alexander, 1997), 
and fostered popular disenchantment and lack of interests towards politics (European Union, 2012). 
All these limitations hindered the development of CSOs, with only an average of 75 associations 
created per year between 1980 and 1987, and only an annual average of 191 in the years 2000s 
(Foundation for the Future, 2013). Moreover, associations were allowed to operate only in specific 
uncontroversial categories of action, such as public interest, culture, development or charity. 
Therefore, of the 9969 associations registered at the end of 2010, only 1% included human rights 
advocacy groups (ibid).  
In official discourses, Ben Ali justified these restrictions on the ground that “the state fixes the 
fundamental framework, creates the climate and provides the necessities for competition and 
dialogue,” and that “civil society should accept these and oppose any act that goes against the national 
consensus”163. However, dialogue with civil society was not really an option insofar as consultation 
mechanisms with public authorities were almost inexistent, with low possibility for an effective 
collaboration and involvement of civil society in decision-making (Foundation for the Future, 2013; 
European Union, 2012). The main consequence is that most associations were service-oriented and co-
opted by the regime, with little room for citizen action (Freedom House, 2012).  
Over all, under Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisian civil society was organizationally weak as 
exemplified by the limited diffusion of spontaneous CSOs in the wake of a highly constrained context. 
Moreover, with the exception of a minority of human rights associations164 that struggled to maintain 
their autonomy, the greatest bulk of existing associations could not operate independently, with the 
state dominating the agenda of CSOs and using them as a tool at the service of government. In this 
sense, civil society activism prior to the revolution was relatively limited and strictly regulated by the 
state (Behr & Siitonen, 2013).  
Finally, in terms of capacities, many CSOs lacked experience insofar as their action was limited 
to few activities on the ground, and they did not have expertise and competences in terms of projects 
writing165. Moreover, the lack of financial resources further contributed to hamper CSOs and 
jeopardize their activities. 
                                                     
163 Ben Ali’s discourse at a symposium on democratic transitions in November 1990. Quoted in NCVO (2013).  
164 Under Ben Ali there was only a minority of ten independent associations, including the Tunisian League for 
Human Rights, the Association against Torture in Tunisia, the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia, feminist 
organizations such as TANF and AFTURD. See the Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia by the 
Foundation for Future (2013).  
165 Interview with Tunisian civil society activist, Tunis, February 2015.  
137 
 
6.4 The implementation of the ENP in Tunisia and the role of civil society before the Arab 
Spring 
 
 
The implementation of ENP bilateral programs in Tunisia was directly influenced by the 
configuration of Tunisian civil society. For the period 2007-2010 Tunisia emerged as an ambivalent 
country able to separate the economic dimension of the ENP from the political one. In the domain of 
governance, human rights or justice, a weak civil society stifled by the pervasive control of the state 
made it impossible to formulate and implement ENP programs in these sectors. The Country Strategy 
Paper, which translated into strategic priorities the goals of the Action Plan, originally included among 
its objectives “political reforms concerning democracy and human rights, the rule of law and sound 
institutional governance” (EU- Tunisia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013). However, no ENPI funding 
could be programmed and committed in this sector. This is not only because political reforms were not 
part of the authorities’ agenda (as already shown in chapter 3), but also because civil society was too 
weak and controlled to proceed in this sense, making the formulation and the potential 
implementation of relevant ENP programs extremely difficult. As an Official of the EU Delegation in 
Tunis put it: “A [budget support] program to sustain political and institutional reforms was simply 
unthinkable because Tunisian authorities would have never accepted it. Moreover, whereas civil 
society could have been our major ally in this sense, it was basically too weak and too much state 
penetrated to be even minimally able to exert pressure on the government for political reforms and for 
the respect of potential conditionalities”. The same problems apply to project approach programs 
insofar as Tunisian CSOs had low capacities for absorption of EU funds due to the obstacles erected 
by the regime (such as funds blockage or strict control of activities), low experience and lack of human 
and financial resources. The main difficulty was giving money to NGOs on Tunisian territory without 
consulting the Tunisian government (Mouhib, 2014, p. 366); and if the money passed through the 
state’s coffers, they would end up in regime’s controlled associations.  
These dynamics within the ENPI are further confirmed by other budget lines, such as the 
problems met in the implementation-or better in the “non-implementation”- of the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights or in the freezing of EU subventions to the Tunisian 
League for Human Rights (see Mouhib, 2014 and Lacroix 2006).  
Overall, the lack of a strong, autonomous and capable civil society hindered the 
implementation of the ENP in Tunisia for the period 2007-2010 and contributed to impede the 
commitment and absorption of EU funds in the sector of political reforms. However, in the domain of 
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economic reforms the picture is slightly different. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, between 2007 
and 2010 Tunisia had a very good absorption capacity of ENPI funds, insofar as the NIP included only 
programs of economic development. In this context, Tunisia’s good performance was due not only to 
the willingness of Tunisian authorities and to their agenda. The implementation of EU programs was 
ensured also thanks to a pervasive control over private civil sector, enterprises166, and environmental 
NGOs. 
 
 
6.4.1 Between heteronomy and the”syndrome of the bon élève”: civil society and ENP implementation 
 
In the implementation of ENP programs in economic or environmental domains (such as the 
already mentioned PAI or PEE), Ben Ali’s control of enterprises and civil private sector was key to 
ensure that the reforms envisaged by the ENP could be working, at least in terms of numbers. In the 
wake of the syndrome of the “bon élève” and in line with the obsession to “faire des chiffres”, the 
regime exploited private sector as a tool at the state’s disposal. In this context, new enterprises and 
organizations were created from scratch and they were forced to be involved in specific programs or 
to adopt key measures and regulations, irrespectively of their nature, goals or willingness. The 
regime’s pressure was particularly easy in a context where civil private sector, as the greatest part of 
civil society, was mainly partisan and heavily infiltrated by political power (European Union, 2012). 
In this sense, the regime could use civil society as an artifice to preserve the appearances (Foundation 
for the Future, 2013). As said by some entrepreneurs interviewed by Beatrice Hibou (2005), Ben Ali’s 
regime was seen by private sector at the same time as a burden and as a protection, in line with the 
idea that a « système  qui contrôle est celui qui donne ». Therefore in this case, the success in the 
implementation of the ENP economic/environment programs directly stemmed from the 
heteronomous character of Tunisian civil private sector, which was subjected to the state pressure and 
easily obliged to certain behaviours.  
 
 
 
                                                     
166 Whereas civil society is often conceptualized as including only no-profit NGOs, in its broadest meaning civil 
society is a broader space of citizenry that encompasses the associative sphere and the private sector. For a 
detailed analysis of the debate on this point, see Van Rooy (2013), chapter three. 
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6.5 The “Awakening” of Civil Society and the Implementation of the ENP after 2011  
 
The Arab Spring is very much rooted in the “awakening” of civil society that sparked massive 
protests against the incumbent regimes. At the same time, in a process of mutual influence, the political 
context as redefined by the Arab Spring shaped the space for civil society and altered the existing 
relationships between the people and their governments. In Tunisia, the uprisings transformed 
completely the arena for civil society, which became much more autonomous and independent from 
the state, as well as organizationally stronger with a booming in the number of associations. In 
Morocco, where the key authoritarian elements of the political system remained in place, the post Arab 
Spring landscape shaped state-civil society relations in terms of an increased polarization, with a 
constitutionally strengthened civil society striving for more autonomy, and a new government 
attempting instead to stifle autonomous associations and to deepen heteronomy and state-penetration. 
Henceforth, the Arab Spring ultimately affected the implementation of the ENP programs in Morocco 
and Tunisia, insofar as it differently shaped civil society’s space and its relations with the state in the 
two countries. 
 
 
6.5.1 Civil society and the “Moroccan Spring”: increased autonomy or deeper heteronomy? 
 
Echoing the anti-regime protests of the other countries in the region, the response of Moroccan 
population appeared fairly quickly. The 20th February Movement was soon at the forefront of the 
protests, as a broad coalition of activists and a horizontally organized, non-hierarchic “movement of 
movements” that launched a joint call for a large national mobilization in the name of political changes 
and constitutional reforms (Fernandez-Molina, 2011; Hoffmann & König, 2013). The 20th February 
Movement was mainly composed of civil society activists, human rights associations, leftists and 
banned Islamists (Hashas, 2013), and in light of its nature and composition it represented one of the 
new spaces of activism that were prompted by the Arab Spring and that were much more audacious 
than the traditional existing opposition organizations (Cavatorta, 2012; Fernandez-Molina, 2011). 
Faced with a popular mobilization across 53 cities, the King directly reacted to the political demands 
of the 20th February Movement, by announcing the launch of constitutional reforms that would 
address the call “the people want a new constitution” which was resonating in the streets (Maghraoui, 
2011). In this sense, the Movement was able to challenge the regime and to put pressure for deep 
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political reforms, by calling also for a rejection of the new constitution in light of its cosmetic changes 
and of the top-led reform process.  
However, the fact that the referendum on the new constitution passed with an overwhelming 
majority despite the Movement’s pressure for a boycott, and that the regime was able to quell quickly 
the protests, is a litmus test for the traditional relations between the state and civil society, as influenced 
by the key features of Moroccan political system. As suggested by Dalmasso (2012), Moroccan civil 
society has been gradually depoliticized in its interactions with the regime, dissociating itself from the 
traditional forms of politics and focusing on narrow interests, which do not question the political 
system as a whole. This explains why Moroccan civil society as a category did not participate to any 
significant extent in the protests and why it soon abandoned the role of mobilizing the Moroccan street 
(Dalmasso, 2012 p. 217-218). In fact, even if the 20th February Movement was joined by thousands of 
young Moroccans and was able to act as a regime challenger, still the protests were not as massive as 
in the other MENA countries. Moreover, when the Movement denounced the constitutional reforms 
as a “Makhzen’s masquerade”, to the eyes of the majority of people all the Movement’s most important 
demands had already been met with no need of more protests (Benchemsi, 2013). As a major 
consequence, in public discourses there was a gradual shift from the reference to the 20th February 
Movement to the royal 9th March speech (Maghraoui, 2011), while the participation of civil society to 
the constitutional review process was more a “façade of involvement” (Kausch, 2008). 
Despite its limits, the activism of Moroccan civil society actors between bottom-up pressures 
and top-down co-optation was relevant to shape the political landscape, by sparking protests and 
paving the way to new elections and constitutional reforms. At the same time, in a process of mutual 
influence, the political context as redefined after 2011 shaped the space for civil society and its relations 
with the regime, through the adoption of a new constitution and the rise of the PJD-led government.  
Formally, the new constitution enlarged the legal space for civil society and marked an improvement 
of its role in policy-making and public sphere, by establishing a framework for participative democracy 
and social dialogue in “the enactment, the implementation and the evaluation of [..] the initiatives of 
the elected institutions and of the public powers”(art.12;13). However, this preponderant role remains 
marginal at the level of implementation, in line with the long and slow process for the execution of the 
new Constitution (ENP-Morocco Progress Report 2011;2012).  
The conversation about the role of civil society was even more influenced by the Islamist 
government, which directly impinged upon the already difficult state-civil society relations. The first 
critical step in this regard came only few months after the installation of the new cabinet, when in 
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March 2012 the PJD Minister for the Relations with Civil Society Lahbib Choubani unexpectedly 
denounced the Moroccan NGOs that were receiving foreign aids and reported them for lack of 
transparency by publishing a small list with their names. Moreover, in two years all the state funding 
for the major (autonomous) NGOs were blocked167. The tough reaction from civil society appeared 
fairly quickly, condemning the governmental declaration as a direct and explicit attack against some 
specific associations which were considered as troubling for the state and the government (i.e. the big 
NGOs touching upon sensitive issues). To the eyes of civil society’s organizations, the PJD’s move was 
an attempt to “museler les ONGs par le bias de la carotte du financement public” (El Azizi, 2012) and 
to strengthen the associations close to the party and to its ideology168, while blocking those pursuing a 
different agenda169. Civil society responded in April 2012 with the launch of the “Appel de Rabat”, a 
vast platform of 400 NGOs that was created as a direct reaction to the declarations of the government 
and as a call for a national debate on the prerogatives of civil society after the adoption of the new 
constitution. 
  Mr. Choubani launched a National Dialogue on Civil Society and the New Constitutional 
Prerogatives and formed a Committee to lead this dialogue. For this purpose, he presented a 
governmental strategy to “veiller à la gouvernance de la société civile” and to reform the “arsenal 
juridique qui encadre l’action associative”170, as well as adopted a draft decree on the creation of an 
inter-ministerial committee to coordinate public policies on civil society171. However, the associations 
of the “Appel de Rabat” boycotted the official national dialogue on the ground that the Committee 
included only small-unknown associations that were not truly representative of Moroccan civil society. 
This is why all along 2013 the “Appel de Rabat” sparked a long process of non-governmental public 
debate, which became in all respects a second national dialogue, parallel to the official one, with more 
than 20 regional meetings, over 5000 militants and more than 3500 associations involved172. The main 
rationale was to react against the unilateral manoeuvres of the PJD Minister, which were seen as an 
                                                     
167 Interview with one of the founding members of the Espace Associatif and the Forum des Alternatives 
Marocaine.  
168 Only with the advent of the PJD-led government, some Islamist oriented associations (such as the “Association 
Musulmane de Bienfaisance”) received after several years the green light for the recognition of their public utility 
status (See El Azizi, 2012 and the “Liste Des Associations Reconnues D'utilite Publique” published by the 
Government Secretary General).  
169 Interview with one of the founding members of the Espace Associatif and the Forum des Alternatives 
Marocaine. 
170 “Motivations du dialogue civile non gouvernamental des associations democratiques”, www.debat-
democratique.com 
171 http://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/conseil-de-gouvernement-du-mercredi-05-novembre-2014 
172 “Motivations du dialogue civile non gouvernamental des associations democratiques”, www.debat-
democratique.com 
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attempt to stifle civil society173 and to impose a legal framework for a partnership with the state without 
a real consultation174.   
The major consequence of all these dynamics was the development of reciprocal suspicion and 
a lack of trust between civil society and the government, which in turn affected civil society’s structure 
of opportunity to influence policy-making and to carry out its activities on the ground. In particular, 
whereas the adoption of the new constitution was a major conquest for civil society insofar as it became 
for the first time a constitutionalized actor, the new political context fostered a polarization in state-
civil society relations, with a struggle between increased heteronomy and search of autonomy.     
 
 
6.5.2 The implementation of the ENP in the post Arab Spring Morocco and the role of civil society 
 
The implementation of the ENP in Morocco after 2011 was directly influenced by the 
constitutional prerogatives of civil society, as well as by the increased polarization in state-civil society 
relations and the bigger reciprocal suspicion. The ENPI Program to support gender equality is the most 
relevant in this sense.  
The adoption of the new constitution was seen by civil society as an important juridical victory, 
as for the first time it was included in the constitution and emerged as a constitutionalized actor175. The 
new constitution laid the ground for an environment which enabled the empowerment of civil society, 
in terms of performing a new role of mediator between the state and society (Touhtou, 2014), as well 
as gaining a new foothold in policy-making. This new autonomy and influence on policy-making 
represented a potential asset for the implementation of the ENP in the country, insofar as civil society 
strengthened its role to influence policy decision and to pressure the government for the respect of EU 
conditions and the ENP-supported reforms. This is for example the case of the ENP Program to support 
Equality between Men and Woman, which was launched in 2012 to improve conditions for the 
promotion of gender equality and which included among its expected results and indicators the 
establishment of a juridical framework for women protection. As already mentioned (paragraph 4.2.2), 
at the time of the signature of the financing convention the EU was forced to reduce the amount of the 
first fixed tranche, as the institutional framework for the implementation of the National Equality 
                                                     
173 « Financements Étrangères, les ONGs s’opposent au projet de Choubani ». L’Economiste, n. 4398, 12/11/2014.  
174 “Motivations du dialogue civile non gouvernamental des associations democratiques”, www.debat-
democratique.com 
175 Interview with a Moroccan civil society activist, Casablanca, June 2014. 
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Strategy was still not in place. Indeed, in 2012 the law on violence against women and the reform of 
the penal code had not yet been adopted. Exploiting their long experience of activism for women’s 
rights, Moroccan civil society and NGOs had a key role in campaigning and pushing for the overhaul 
of penal code, with an amendment of the art.475 in early 2014, as well as the adoption of the law on 
violence against women176 (Sadiqi, 2015). Whereas it was not the first time for Moroccan civil society 
to push for key reforms in the domain of women’s rights, the new constitutional acknowledgement of 
civil society’s key role contributed to strengthen the force of proposal behind its bottom-up 
initiatives177. The implementation of the ENP program was thus facilitated by these dynamics, as the 
input provided by civil society could accelerate the complex process of reform of women’s rights, and 
in turn allowing for the fulfilment of EU conditionalities for funds absorption.   
However, in the post 2011 political landscape, the constitutionalization of political participation 
in Morocco and the formal improvement of civil society’s space is jeopardized by the increased 
polarization between the government and non-state actors, in the wake of the PJD’s attempt to 
maintain a tight control and to stifle autonomous associations. The declarations of the Minister for 
Civil Society Choubani, the blockage of state funding for all the bigger autonomous NGOs, as well as 
the launch of a National Dialogue that involved only minor civil society’s actors had two major 
consequences. In terms of policy-making, these manoeuvres increased the reciprocal suspicion 
between the government and civil society, reducing the capacity of the latter to influence policy 
decision and to coordinate with governmental actors on key national policies (thus increasing the gap 
between the high hopes behind the constitutionalization of civil society, and their actual deliver). In 
operational terms, according to most of the interviewees from Morocco’s associative sector, after 2011 
many NGOs were affected by key limitations and lack of funding to carry out their daily activities. By 
contrast, other associations close to the PJD managed to enjoy privileges and funds178. Actually, the 
fact that associations close to the government managed to be financially and operationally favoured is 
not a new and exclusive phenomenon rooted in the post-Arab Spring environment. As already shown 
in the previous paragraphs, the co-optation of associations and the diffusion of GONGOs has always 
been a feature of Morocco’s associational life. However, autonomous associations and big independent 
NGOs could normally carry out their activities (including receiving state funding) with the awareness 
of being sometimes excluded from certain advantages or programs (as for instance the case of many 
                                                     
176 Interview with a civil society activist, Rabat, July 2014; Telephonic interview with a Moroccan civil society 
activist, July 2015.  
177 Ibid. 
178 Interviews with different Moroccan civil society activists, Rabat and Casablanca, June-July 2014.  
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regime-critical NGOs in the context of the INDH). By contrast, after 2011 many independent NGOs 
had to face a real political obstructionism, which affected their funding and the possibility to carry out 
activities on the ground179.  
In this context, the NGOs180 working in sensitive policy sectors such as human rights, health or 
democracy were among the most affected, whereas low policy sectors such as education, culture or 
development were less influenced181. To the eyes of civil society’s activists, these political attempts of 
control were rooted in the PJD’s fear of civil society in light of its new constitutionalized prerogatives182, 
as well as in the idea that big independent NGOs in sensitive sectors pursue foreign “western” 
agendas183 contrary to the ideology of the government184.   
The emergence of operational constraints jeopardized the capacity of many associations to act 
as a service deliverer on the ground, affecting in turn the implementation of ENP programs, especially 
in the most sensitive sectors. This is again the case of the Program for Women’s Equality, if we consider 
that one of the key activities of the program is to promote awareness about gender equality by 
formulating and implementing a plan for equality (UE Fiche d’Action Maroc, 2012). The lack of 
confidence185 between the government and the main (independent) women’s rights associations, as 
well as the limitations on their activities, make the realization of awareness-raising actions much 
harder (with a consequent impact on the fulfilment of EU conditions and performance indicators). The 
work of big specialized NGOs would be indeed fundamental for the realization of these kind of 
activities on the ground.  
The polarized state-civil society relations affected also the implementation of the new 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. Formulated to increase the role of civil society in the 
neighbourhood, in line with the Commission’s communications on the new ENP and on the 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, the Neighbourhood Facility was officially launched 
in Morocco in April 2013. However, at the time of writing, in mid-2015, it is not yet operational and 
                                                     
179 Ibid.  
180 The Adala Justice Association, the Moroccan League of Human Rights, the Moroccan Association of Human 
Rights, the Moroccan Association for the Fight against Aids, the Association of Young Lawyers are some 
examples of the associations that were affected. 
181 Interview with Moroccan civil society activists, note above 
182 Ibid. 
183 Declaration of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, http://www.amdh.org.ma/En/releases/boycott-
fmdh-eng 
184 Interview with Moroccan civil society activist  
185 The decisions of many Moroccan NGOs to boycott the World Human Rights Forum, held in Marrakech 
between 27 and 30 November 2014 is a case in point. The decision was justified as a reaction to the interdiction 
of many of their activities. 
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still under negotiation with the government “pour qu’il puisse l’accepter”186. Therefore, even if the aim 
of the program is to strengthen civil society and to realize a road map for the implementation of its 
new constitutional role, the governmental attempt to control civil society hampered the actual 
realization of the program.   
 
 
6.5.3 Civil Society and the Arab Spring: a new era of associative dynamics in Tunisia  
 
Even if Ben Ali’s repressive strategy was able to stunt Tunisian civil society for decades, by 
elevating the risks of engaging in protest and making collective action much harder to organize 
(Alexander, 1997), Tunisia was the cradle of the Arab Spring with thousands of citizens taking the 
street against the regime. The self-immolation of the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi was able to 
spark massive political upheavals that with the use of the media and social networks reached soon a 
point of no return: in a few weeks, Ben Ali was ousted and forced to leave the country. Moreover, even 
though civil society’s biggest request had been attained, unlike Morocco Tunisian people did not stop 
protesting and pressured for the dismissal of the first transition governments, which were considered 
too much linked to the previous political establishment.  
The strength of Tunisian civil society, which was at the forefront of a profound political change, 
may be surprising in light of the past legacy of repression, heteronomy and containment. Yet, while 
always subject to the efforts of the State to curtail its autonomy, civil society in Tunisia has struggled 
for so long to obtain independence that it was able to develop a kind of political culture in the form of 
“civisme” (Murphy, 1997, p. 120). Moreover, the protests were far from being a revolution of the 
dispossessed, but rather they were supported by the country’s highly educated middle class, which 
was equally tired of the dubious economic growth and absence of freedom (Murphy, 2011).  
President Ben Ali’s hurried exit to Saudi Arabia not only allowed for political and constitutional 
changes, but also for a completely new reframing of state–society relations (Deane, 2013, p. 8) by 
inaugurating a “new era of associative dynamics” (European Union, 2012). First, from the revolution 
onward there was a boom in the number of CSOs with the registration of over 100 new associations 
the very day after Ben Ali’s fall and between 7000 and 10000 new associations, unions, and professional 
organizations that were registered within 10 months after the revolution187 (Freedom House, 2012). The 
                                                     
186 Telephonic interview with Moroccan Activist, July 2015. Telephonic Interview with EU Delegation Official in 
Morocco, July 2015.  
187 Between 2011 and 2013, the annual average was of 2500 new organizations per year.   
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quantitative expansions was complemented by a qualitative expansion, with the creation of 
associations active in different areas and especially in those that were neglected under the former 
regime, such as human rights and democracy (Foundation for the Future, 2013). Moreover, the 
quantitative and qualitative diffusions of CSOs was accompanied by a geographical spreading, beyond 
the traditional concentration in large cities and coastal areas (ibid.). The mushrooming of associations 
was fostered by the adoption of a new legislative framework and new law on associations, which put 
an end to coercive practices188 and allowed for relaxed regulations, including the access to foreign 
funds.  
The emergence of civil society and community empowerment was often credited as one of the 
drivers for Tunisian deep political transformation (Deane, 2013). From the outset, civil society was able 
to impose itself and to contribute to the country’s political transition by actively participating in the 
new High Instance for the Realization of the Revolution’s goals, the Superior Instance for Elections and 
the Commission for Political Reforms and Democratic Transition (European Union, 2012). Similarly, it 
was involved in the activities of the National Constituent Assembly, which opened its doors to 
promote a dialogue with CSOs (Foundation for the Future, 2013). In other cases, Tunisian civil society 
was not only the initiator of political transition, but also its guarantor when the country was at a 
political standstill. This is the case of end-2013 when, following the second political assassination in a 
few months, a moment of crisis and political deadlock emerged with the opposition demanding for 
the dissolution of the Ennahda-led cabinet and the creation of a technocratic government. In such a 
context, civil society emerged as a mediator with the General Labor Union of Tunisian, the Tunisian 
association for defending human rights, Tunisian Lawyers Association, and the Union of Industry and 
Commerce leading a national dialogue to go out from the impasse. In doing so, they succeeded in the 
adoption of a road map that included a plan for the approval of a final draft of the constitution, the 
resignation of Ennahda and the formation of a technocratic government.  
Overall, after 2011 Tunisian civil society became stronger as exemplified by the quantitative 
and sectoral mushrooming of associations, in a much more allowing political and legal context. In 
contrast to Ben Ali’s period, civil society gained key autonomy and a real and stronger foothold in 
processes of change. Yet, problems persist insofar as the efficacy of civil society’s role and the new 
legal framework are dependent on their sound implementation. Moreover, the establishment of a real 
                                                     
188 According to the new law, the Ministry of the Interior is no longer the authority responsible for the creation 
of an association and it is replaced by the General Secretariat of the government. Moreover, no limitation to the 
scope of action was established as to what concerns the sectors for associations’ activities. Finally, the new law 
gives foreigners the opportunity to participate in associations as ordinary or founding members.  
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dialogue between state and civil society is a long process and systematic mechanisms and procedures 
for consultations are still missing. Beyond the definition of institutional structures for concertation, the 
reciprocal lack of confidence as influenced by the legacy of the past impinges upon the establishment 
of a real collaboration. Whereas civil society does not trust the state and strives to keep intact its much-
awaited independence, the state doubts of CSOs’ credibility and capacities (European Union, 2012). 
Divisions affect civil society itself, where a certain polarization persists around modern and 
conservative vision of society (ibid). Finally, in terms of capacities, CSOs are only now starting to build 
their expertise and strengthening their competences. In the mobilization of financial resources, many 
organizations still do not know international donors’ procedures and therefore find many difficulties 
in obtaining the financing of project proposals, with the consequence that many CSOs can rely only on 
limited actions based on the contribution, time and money of their members. 
  
 
6.5.4 The implementation of the ENP in Tunisia and the role of civil society after the Arab Spring 
 
The reframing of state-civil society relations after the Arab Spring affected also the relations 
between the EU and Tunisian civil society. Whereas before the revolution the EU could have only 
limited contacts with CSOs, the post-Arab Spring context broadened the “space” for civil society both 
in strength and autonomy and allowed the EU to apply for the first time a real participative approach. 
Several consultations were launched with Tunisian associations to identify civil society’s reform goals 
and capacities, as well as to adjust EU programs in this sense. The adoption of this démarche participative 
reflected the spirit of the renewed ENP and of the new European Partnership for Democracy, which 
attached great importance to the role of civil society actors in the promotion of bottom-up reforms and 
in their capacity to engage with public authorities. If many of the ongoing ENPI programs had been 
programmed and defined only with the Tunisian counterparts at the Ministerial level, after 2011 they 
were reviewed and readjusted to the new context by the means of a brainstorming with civil society.  
The political landscape as redesigned after 2011 and the stronger and more autonomous role of 
civil society considerably affected the implementation of the ENP in Tunisia and its general positive 
performance. Within the ENPI, the EU could address civil society for the first time and establish a 
direct dialogue with non-state actors. Yet, the instauration of such a dialogue was not always easy. 
Especially in the aftermath of the revolution, Tunisian civil society actors were suspicious and very 
critical of the EU, in light of its past collaboration and appeasement with Ben Ali’s regime. The 
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formulation of the PARJ, which was launched in 2012 to support Tunisian reform of justice, is a case 
in point. For the identification of the program, the EU Delegation in Tunis started to contact different 
civil society partners in order to collect their ideas, needs and opinions about the reform of justice. 
However, the EU faced many difficulties to establish a rapprochement with civil society and to 
construct a solid dialogue. At the Delegation level, the general perception was of a lack of trust by civil 
society actors, who were sceptic about the role of the EU and its attempt to approach a delicate issue 
such as that of justice. Moreover, in the very beginning the biggest challenge was to identify which civil 
society the EU had to engage with, insofar as it was very difficult to understand who was part of the 
old system and who was an opponent. Therefore, when the Delegation organized some conference 
and invited some civil society speakers that it thought to be valuable, it often received thousands of 
mails from other civil society actors, who were blaming the Delegation for having invited someone 
who was actually embedded in the old system189. Despite these initial difficulties, civil society’s actors 
recognized that the EU was one of the first donors to interact directly with them, and to gradually 
develop “good relations of concertation and ideas-exchange on justice”190.  
When the PARJ was finally launched, the EU targeted directly for the first time Tunisian non-
state actors by launching a call for proposal on the reform of justice. More than 200 proposals were 
submitted in light of the booming of Tunisian organizations in the domain of justice and almost all the 
funds committed were engaged. 
The internal divisions within civil society and the suspicion towards the past was another 
element affecting the implementation of EU programs after the Arab Spring. The “Programme d’Appui 
à la Société Civile” (PASC) is a meaningful example. Financed under the SPRING, it was launched in 
2012 to reinforce civil society’s capacities in terms of political dialogue and support to the country’s 
socio-economic development (European Union, 2012). For this purpose, the program was identified in 
a participative way by consulting 150 organizations from Tunisian civil society, in order to point out 
the main needs, constraints and problems. The prevailing lack of confidence in state-civil society 
relations, as well as the divisions among the programs’ implementers, affected the PASC in two ways. 
First, while the program was managed with several regional bureaux across the country, the central 
management unit was established in Tunis where a coordination team was put in place. All the people 
who were recruited were young graduates and civil society’s activists. From the outset, internal 
divisions emerged on the management of the program insofar as the appointed PASC director was 
                                                     
189 Interview with EU Delegation Official, Tunis, February 2015 
190 Interview with Tunisian civil society activists, Tunis, January-February 2015  
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paradoxically an ex RCD and was thus seen by the young activists of the PASC team as a representative 
of the old system and as an actor “trop étatique”191. The growing reciprocal suspicion contributed to 
slow down the execution of activities. Interestingly enough, this tension and difficult relation between 
the team composed of young activists, on the one hand, and the director who symbolized the past and 
“the state”, on the other, mirrored in a smaller way the general dynamics of the broader state-civil 
society relations after 2011. As put it by an EU official during an interview: “the program [PASC] is 
complex, as the goal is to allow civil society and the state to work together. If there is no reciprocal 
confidence, they cannot work together as they do not know each other. This problem was inevitably 
reflected in the program and in its very implementation”.  
Secondly, what emerged clearly from the implementation of the  PASC was civil society’s 
polarization around modern and conservative vision of society: “you have people from civil society, 
especially the young, such as the PASC team, who are hypermotivated and extremely proactive. But 
you have also the “old” school, such as the PASC director, trying to proceed in a moderate way and 
hampering those who want to go too fast in the name of change”192.  Despite the difficulties that slowed 
down the execution of the program, almost all the committed funds were engaged and a call for 
proposal for civil society organizations was launched at the end of 2014, with over 140 proposals 
received.  
In spite of the complex relation with the state, in the new context Tunisian civil society acquired 
an increasing foothold in national debates and policy-making. The GBO and the implementation of the 
corresponding ENP program PAGBO are a case in point. As already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Tunisian administration was a key actor to bring ahead and implement the GBO reform of 
public finances, paving the way to the implementation of the ENP program and to the absorption of 
EU funds. Yet, civil society played also a role in this sense thanks to its post-Arab Spring engagement. 
In 2013, some Tunisian associations produced the first Open Budget Enquiry, showing Tunisia’s 
position in terms of budget transparency. The publication and diffusion of the results became a 
showcase for visibility on the issue of a more transparent and efficient budget management. In this 
context, Ennahda-led government accepted to create a committee with civil society associations to 
guarantee the monitoring of the budgetary reform. Thanks to the role played by civil society, key 
results were achieved with the publication of the budget of local collectivities and of the so-called 
“Citizen Budget”, i.e. a simplified and more accessible version of the Loi de Finance. Civil society was 
                                                     
191 Interview with a Tunisian civil society actor and former member of the PASC Unit, Tunis, February 2015 
192 Ibid. 
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therefore able to exert pressure on the implementation of the GBO and it indirectly contributed to the 
implementation of the ENP program and to the fulfilment of its conditions.  
Overall, despite the difficulties which naturally arose from the legacy of the past, Tunisian good 
implementation performance and absorption capacity after the Arab Spring was also influenced by the 
renewed role of civil society, as shaped after 2011.  
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Conclusions 
Do domestic actors make a difference for the implementation of the ENP on 
the ground? 
 
 
Do local actors in the neighbouring countries make a difference for the implementation of EU 
external policies on the ground? And if it so, how, when and why? The goal of this work was to go 
beyond context-free analyses of EU external action and to put the implementation of the ENP “in 
context”, by taking into account the role of domestic actors in the implementation of EU programs on 
the ground. The starting assumption is that if “there is hardly any other external policy of the EU with 
a larger gap between its stated objectives and actual outcomes” (Lehne, 2014, p. 4), this cannot be 
explained merely in light of the ENP policy design and intrinsic weakness, or only in light of EU 
interests and actorness. While relevant, these explanations, which are at the core of the prevailing top-
down approach to the study of EU external policies, contribute only partially to the explanatory 
picture, as they are not able to explain how implementation works on the local ground. Moreover, they 
fail to capture the reasons behind commitments-payments gaps, as well as the different 
implementation performance of the neighbouring countries.  
By contrast, the analysis carried out in the previous chapters shed light on implementation as 
one of the most problematic and convoluted aspects of external policy-making, where the execution of 
EU programs depends also on the countries that are the final recipient of the policy. Neighbouring 
countries may not necessarily be willing or capable to implement ENP reforms and to adapt to Europe 
(Borzel, 2011). In this sense, domestic actors can make a difference, by either ensuring implementation 
and a smooth absorption of EU funds, or by hindering execution and contributing to widen the gap 
between Brussels’ expectations and actions on the ground. Giving agency to the ENP partner countries 
is thus important to understand how EU initiatives fit into their agenda and capacities, as well as how 
reforms are concretely implemented (Darbouche, 2008). It is only through a thorough understanding 
of the reality on the ground and of the complexities of domestic actors in neighbouring countries, that 
it is possible to have a clearer theoretical picture on EU policy-making and on implementation (Pace, 
Seeberg, & Cavatorta, 2009, p.11). By adopting this perspective, the implementation of the ENP is 
something more than the mere transposition of EU norms or the adoption of its values. Rather, it 
implicates the very capacity of neighbouring countries to implement key reforms, and provides a 
privileged and dynamic observation point on the neighbours’ internal political and policy processes.  
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In accordance with these considerations, to explain ENP implementation on the ground the 
main argument of this thesis was rooted in the importance of three domestic actors in neighbouring 
countries: the role of political actors, the role of administration and the role of civil society. More 
specifically, in order to understand how these domestic actors can make a difference and affect the 
performance of the ENP, political actors were analysed considering their goals, agenda, resources and 
expertise; administration was examined in terms of its administrative capacity while civil society in 
light of its strength and autonomy. Moreover, by adopting a structuractionist approach, domestic 
actors were analysed against the key features of the political system in which they are embedded and 
whose structures shaped –and in turn were shaped by- domestic players.  
The main hypothesis is that there is a direct and positive relation between the key features of 
local actors and the implementation of the ENP on the ground. Namely, in a country where there is a 
high degree of misfit between the goals of domestic political actors and the ENP reform agenda (H1a), 
where administrative capacity is weak (H1b) and where civil society is not strong or autonomous 
(H1c), it is more likely to have implementation gaps.  
In this context, the Arab Spring was a fundamental systemic event, which set the stage for new 
political actors and which transformed the structures where actors move. The Arab Spring was 
therefore analysed as an intervening variable that potentially altered the value of the above-mentioned 
explanatory variables and in turn influenced their causal relation with the implementation of the ENP. 
The second hypothesis, therefore, is that if after 2011 there was a big variance in the way Mediterranean 
countries absorbed and implemented ENPI funds, this was because the Arab Spring altered in a 
different way the value of the three explanatory variables, determining different ENP implementation 
performances. Therefore, if it is true that domestic political actors, administrative capacity and civil 
society have a determinant role in the implementation of the ENP on the ground (H1), the countries’ 
variance in performances after 2011 is explained as a consequence of the Arab Spring’s effect on these 
three specific variables (H2). 
 
 
Comparing Morocco and Tunisia: when, why and how domestic political actors make the ENP work 
 
The cases of Morocco and Tunisia were differently illustrative of the role of domestic political 
actors in the implementation of the ENP and the way they inform the policy dialogue with the EU and 
determine which ENP reforms would be adopted and how, in light of their agenda and support or 
opposition to policy change. In this sense, the key features of Moroccan and Tunisian political system, 
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their political actors and their internal policy-making processes, as respectively informed by the 
dualism between tradition and modernity and by the myth of reformism, influenced the 
implementation of ENP bilateral programs on the ground.  
Between 2007 and 2010, Morocco had an excellent absorption capacity with a high payments-
to-commitments ratio and a NIP covering different policy domains. This good performance was 
affected by the general pro-European attitude (Del Sarto, 2006, p. 209) of the King and in turn of all 
political forces, as well as by the reform agenda of Moroccan authorities, which perfectly matched with 
the ENP agenda. The ENP programs to support the National Alphabetization Strategy and the 
education reform were a case in point. Their good performance was due to the highly consensual 
nature of Moroccan political system and to the broad consensus by all political actors about the 
importance of education and alphabetization as a national priority. The fact the ENP programs 
supported policies which were attached a high priority within the country’s agenda allowed to have a 
good policy dialogue with the EU and to meet disbursement conditions with a good absorption of EU 
funds.  
Similarly, in the case of Tunisia, the features of political actors and their agenda exclusively 
focused on economic reforms influenced the dialogue with the EU and the implementation of the ENP 
bilateral programs. If between 2007 and 2010 Tunisia had a good absorption capacity of EU funds, this 
was because the NIP included only programs of economic development, by focusing on issues such as 
competitiveness, employability and innovation, which were at the top of Tunisian agenda. The cases 
of the ENP Programs PAI and PEE were a key example, revealing that the good implementation 
performance was influenced by Ben Ali’s agenda and the priority given to economic reforms in light 
of Tunisian reformism and of a pro-European attitude committed to demonstrate that Tunisia was a 
“bon élève”. Moreover, Ben Ali’s centralized decision-making and its pervasive control of economic 
operators were key to guarantee the good implementation of the programs, by obliging other actors to 
participate and to commit to the required measures. By contrast, in sensitive domains, such as justice 
or political reforms, which did not match with the authoritarian regime’s agenda, no ENPI Program 
could be launched.     
For the period 2007-2010, the two countries confirmed the hypothesis H1a. Namely, the degree 
of (mis)fit between the goals of domestic political actors and the ENP reform agenda shapes the 
implementation of the ENP on the ground, insofar as the more the policy addresses the orientation 
and the interests of local political actors, the more likely smooth implementation and fund absorption.  
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Domestic political actors were the first to bear the costs of the Arab Spring and, even if with 
different degrees of change and (in)stability, both Morocco and Tunisia experienced a transformation 
of their political arena after 2011, with new elections, leadership changes and renegotiations of the 
rules of the game. In this regard, if Morocco had an excellent performance between 2007 and 2010, after 
2011 it worsened its absorption capacity, with less than the half of EU funds actually disbursed. By 
contrast, in spite of its deeper political transformations, Tunisia was able to maintain a high payment 
rate, faring better than other neighbours apparently less affected by the events. Moreover, if after 2011 
the EU increased its commitments but actually spent less than before because of the peculiar contingent 
conditions of the neighbourhood, Tunisia improved its absorption capacity proportionally to the 
increase in EU funds. The contrasting ENP performance between Morocco and Tunisia, and vis-à-vis 
the precedent period, can be explained in light of the Arab Spring and of the different way it shaped 
and “altered” the variable political actors in the two countries, affecting in turn the implementation of 
the ENP on the ground.  
Both Morocco and Tunisia saw new elections and the creation for the first time of a (coalition) 
cabinet led by an Islamist party. This was one of the main novelties brought by the Arab Spring, insofar 
as the PJD in Morocco and Ennahda in Tunisia had never managed to gain political power, with the 
former never winning national elections, and the latter being officially banned under Ben Ali’s rule. 
The rise of new actors and transformation of the rules of the game with the adoption of a new 
constitution shaped the national agenda and the policy processes in the two countries, with new 
emerging goals. In particular, in Morocco the rise of the PJD brought a new agenda and policy goals, 
which not necessarily matched with the ENP programs, even when those programs had already been 
accepted and negotiated by the previous government. The implementation of the ENP was therefore 
affected by the quality and the difficulties of the dialogue between the PJD and the EU. The degree of 
misfit between the new governmental agenda and the reforms supported by the ENP resulted in a 
reduced implementation performance and absorption capacity of EU funds. In this sense, for some EU 
Officials the perception was that the PJD was not so prone and used to deal with the EU, as well as 
familiar with ENP programs. By contrast, in Tunisia Ennahda’s attitude was completely different and 
much more opened and well disposed towards cooperation with the EU, seeking closer ties with 
Europe. This orientation was rooted in the new rhetoric of “breaking with the past”, which informed 
also the approach of the first three transition governments, and that paved the way to a new agenda 
where the main goal was to meet people’s expectations of political and economic reforms. Tunisian 
increased absorption capacity after 2011 was therefore influenced by the launch of new ENP programs, 
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which included for the first time also political reforms and that perfectly matched the country’s 
emerging post-revolutionary priorities and eagerness to act quickly in the name of change.   
Morocco’s reduced capacity was also influenced by the process of constitutional renewal and 
by the governmental crisis of mid-2013 that diverted attention away from sectoral reforms and made 
it harder to meet EU disbursement conditions. In particular, the PJD’s coalition was reformed with a 
big partisan shift from the Istiqlal to the RNI, generating political deadlock and institutional instability. 
By contrast, whereas also Tunisia was affected by a governmental crisis in 2013, its first cabinet 
reshuffle did not affect the implementation of the ENP in the country insofar as the identity of the 
original troika remained the same with only few changes in the nominations. Finally, whereas Tunisia 
experienced a second moment of instability in 2013, in light of the national dialogue and the difficult 
constitutional reform process, these conditions did not prevent the country from having a good 
absorption capacity of EU funds with the following technocratic government committing to the 
“breaking with the past” narrative and making efforts to meet EU conditions.  
After 2011,therefore, the two cases confirmed the second hypothesis of this work (H2a), i.e. that 
if Morocco and Tunisia had a different performance after the Arab Spring, this was because the latter 
differently shaped their domestic political actors, impinging in turn upon the implementation of the 
ENP on the ground.  
Overall, the comparative analysis allows to identify some key characteristics that explain when, 
why and how domestic political actors make a difference for the implementation of the ENP.  
Goals and Attitude: Political actors’ agenda fitting with the ENP and positive orientation towards the 
EU. If the goals of domestic political actors’ agenda fit with the reform goals promoted by the ENP, it 
is more likely that EU programs will be implemented and funds absorbed. Moreover, a good attitude 
and orientation towards the EU informs positively the policy dialogue and facilitates programs’ 
implementation. By contrast, a misfit between the goals of domestic political actors and those 
promoted by the ENP, as well as a non-positive attitude towards the EU, are more likely to hamper 
the smooth implementation of EU Programs.  
Roles: Veto players as agenda-setter. The ENP programs focusing on issues or policies that are put 
on the national agenda by a veto player are more likely to be implemented without difficulties. The 
INDH in Morocco is a case in point. The good absorption of EU funds was rooted in the importance of 
the INDH as a royal initiative, which informed government’s priorities and parties’ agendas. As such, 
it stood as a policy above the fray of domestic politics and was protected by the King’s shelter and 
legitimacy, with no political party daring to question its position in the agenda. Similarly, in Tunisia 
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Ben Ali was a major agenda setter who set the scope and the pace of reform. For all the ENP Programs 
that matched the prevailing economic “content-goals” of his national agenda, Tunisia was willing and 
able to respect EU conditions and indicators, while it avoided and not implemented any program, 
which might concern issues in contrast with Ben Ali’s agenda. More generally, the ENP Programs 
dealing with issues that are promoted by the stronger relative actor are more likely to work. Post-2011 
Tunisia is enlightening in this sense, with Tunisian people/civil society becoming the stronger relative 
actor and main agenda-setter who informed the country’s main political and economic priorities, and 
who made transition governments dependent on the public acceptance of their policies. As such, 
political actors were eager and committed to implement the ENP Programs, which fully respected 
post-revolutionary goals as redefined by people needs. Similarly, in the case of the subsidy reform in 
Morocco, even if the PJD approach matched with the one promoted by the EU, the goals of the 
Moroccan relative stronger actor prevailed, with the royal establishment opposing the reform and in 
turn hampering the implementation of the corresponding ENP programs. 
Resources: Money and Expertise. The lack of economic resources can contribute to high absorption 
rates of EU funds and foster efforts to meet EU requirements. This is again the case of Morocco and of 
the ENP Programs to sustain the INDH and education. The country’s shortage of resources and the 
need of international money to support the implementation of its national policies prompted the 
smooth cooperation with the EU. By contrast, if foreign money is not a strict domestic necessity, 
political actors may procrastinate or even obstacle implementation. This is what happened when 
Moroccan Minister Bassima Hakkaoui retarded the financing convention with the EU only for formal 
rather than substantive reasons, by conveying the idea that her Ministry was not in need of EU money. 
Finally, expertise is also a key feature, which affects the implementation of EU programs. The 
comparative analysis revealed that expertise in the domain of politics and administration, as well as 
the familiarity with EU cooperation procedures and programs, can facilitate implementation, as 
domestic actors are more acquainted with goals, policy procedures and requirements. By contrast, 
when political actors are missing expertise or do not have past experiences of cooperation with the EU, 
implementation may be hampered or delayed. The PJD lack of expertise and slowness in the 
appointment of the new administration, as well as its poor familiarity with the EU, were among the 
factors that contributed to reduce Morocco’s absorption capacity after 2011.   
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Comparing Morocco and Tunisia: when, why and how administration makes the ENP work 
 
If it is for the political level to make key choices about ENP sectoral reforms, it is up to the 
administration to undertake actions correctly in order to meet policy goals. The lack of administrative 
capacity, intended as the ability of administrative structures to implement specific reforms, could 
therefore generate implementation gaps, through the non-fulfillment of EU’s conditions and 
performance indicators. In this regard, the capacity of administration in Tunisia and Morocco informed 
the implementation of ENP bilateral programs. 
Morocco has always had a less advanced administration capacity vis-à-vis Tunisia, yet the 
experience of some bodies and the good organization of some of its structures contributed to the good 
implementation of the ENP programs before 2011. This is the case of the program for alphabetization, 
which was positively influenced by the capacity and the experience of the DLCA to implement the 
National Strategy of Alphabetization and which allowed to respect some of the EU disbursement 
conditions. Similarly, with a broad administrative structure, clear implementation responsibilities and 
strategic coverage under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, the INDH could be soundly 
implemented, with a good absorption of EU funds. In other cases, such as the ENP program to support 
the health system, the difficult repartition of human resources on the territory and the limited capacity 
of the Ministry of Health to coordinate and ensure the presence of medical personnel in the rural world 
affected the implementation of the program and the capacity to respect some of the EU indicators. 
 By contrast, Tunisia has always had a stronger administration capacity than Morocco, thanks 
to a process of modernization and to the state’s tight control, which allowed to created adequate 
structures and qualified personnel. This skilled administration allowed a good administrative capacity 
for the implementation of EU programs such as the PAI or the GBO, with administrative actors 
committing to the reform goals and being able to ensure the execution of difficult measures, as well as 
the respect of EU disbursement conditions. 
In this context, the Arab Spring affected administration’s capacity in the two countries, by 
generating institutional volatility. In Morocco, it provoked officials’ turnover in light of the 
governmental changes of 2011 and 2013. In Tunisia, it generated institutional instability and frequent 
changes in the administrative personnel in the wake of the rapid succession of transition governments 
and in the wake of the improvise lack of discipline. However, while Morocco’s administrative capacity 
was weaker than Tunisia and directly suffered from the emerging uncertainty, by contrast Tunisian 
administration was able to recover quickly thanks to its well-established structures and experience. 
This is why ENP programs in Morocco after 2011 suffered much more than Tunisia from the increased 
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administrative volatility. This is the case of the alphabetization program whose payments decreased 
until zero in light of the lack of a clear interlocutor and administrative general paralysis; or the case of 
the ENP support to the implementation of IER recommendations, where the reduced capacity of the 
CCDH and its transformation into CNDH affected the implementation of the EU program and 
impeded to spend half of the original budget. Even if the government was willing to proceed with 
these programs, political commitment was not enough revealing that it remains a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for implementation and that administration’s capacity is key in this sense. 
By contrast, Tunisian administration was able to get back to its normal functioning much 
quicker than Moroccan administration and, in spite of the period of uncertainty and turnover, it was 
still able to guarantee the implementation of EU programs. This is the case of the GBO which would 
have never been implemented without the commitment of the administration; or the case of the 
PEFESE, that after an initial instability which led to no disbursement in 2012 was able to quickly 
recover and to have anyway a good absorption capacity vis-à-vis the original commitments.  
Against this background, the cases of Tunisian and Morocco provided evidence for the 
hypothesis H1b, i.e. that the degree of administrative capacity shapes the implementation of the ENP, 
insofar as the more administrative capacity is good, the more likely is smooth implementation and 
funds absorption. By contrast, when administrative capacity is reduced it is more likely to have 
implementation gaps and problems in the absorption of funds. Moreover, if after 2011 the two 
countries had different performances this was because the Arab Spring “altered” their administrative 
capacities in different ways, with Morocco being much more sensible to the general instability and 
volatility produced by the events. This therefore confirms the second hypothesis H2b.  
 Overall, the comparative analysis allows to point out some key characteristics that explain 
when, how and why the administration in the recipient countries can make a difference for the 
implementation of the ENP. 
Experience and Expertise. Well-established administrative structures, acquainted to 
modernization and to juridical positivism, and endowed with skilled personnel make it easier for ENP 
programs to work.  
 Coordination Capacity. Administrative structures able to guarantee an efficient coordination 
among the sectoral ministries, good territorial coverage and key implementation responsibilities 
facilitate the implementation of EU programs. This is the case of the MDCI in Tunisia, or of the Ministry 
of Interior in Morocco. By contrast, limited coordination capacities hamper good implementation and 
absorption capacity of EU funds, such as in the case of Morocco’s Health Program.  
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Stability. Stability and continuity in administration favour implementation of ENP programs, 
as, if the administration is stable, the people involved in the execution remain with high probability 
the same from the launch of the program to its conclusion. This helps to foster clarity of goals and 
roles. Moreover, the people who were involved from the outset in the reform program are more likely 
to commit to the program’s goals than the people who joined the process only at a later stage. The 
implementation of the PEFESE in Tunisia is enlightening in this sense. By contrast, instability, officials’ 
turnover and frequent changes in administration are more likely to affect the implementation of EU 
programs in a negative way, insofar as they generate uncertainty, paralyses and vacuums with 
frequently missing interlocutors and people responsible of the programs.  
 
    
Comparing Morocco and Tunisia: when, how and why civil society can make a difference  
 
Civil society is considered as a key actor in policy-making, in light of its presumed ability to 
foster change and to implement policy reforms, by acting as both a policy advocate and a dialogue 
promoter, as well as a service deliverer and a policy implementer. The configuration of civil society in 
Morocco and Tunisia influenced the implementation of the ENP.  
Morocco has always been considered as one of the countries with the most vibrant civil society 
of the MENA, with a big number of associations able to act in the public sphere and able to be a service 
deliverer in place of the state. The development of an organizationally strong civil society based on the 
extensive diffusion of CSOs facilitated the implementation of the national strategies supported by the 
ENP programs, with NGOs as important service deliverers and tool of policy execution. The ENP 
program to support Alphabetization is again a case in point, as its implementation was positively 
influenced by the strength of civil society as a service deliverer in the domain of alphabetization. 
Similarly, in the case of the INDH the diffusion of several civil society’s organizations, many of which 
created from scratch under the impulse of the INDH, favored the implementation of the program, 
allowing to meet EU indicators in terms of population participation and number of participatory 
diagnostics. However, the role of Morocco’s civil society must also be framed against the consensual 
nature of Morocco’s political system, with the regime channeling voice in established channels and 
civil society accepting to play according to the rules of the game. In this sense, Moroccan regime was 
able to ensure a good implementation of the ENP by often imposing its preferred CSOs as beneficiaries 
of EU programs. For instance, in the case of the INDH, the good absorption of EU funds is rooted in 
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the regime’s attempt to design new spaces of participation, while setting key boundaries for the 
involvement of civil society in the INDH.   
In Tunisia, civil society had a very limited space to operate because of the regime’s successful 
attempt to remove areas of freedom and to penetrate it, as well as exploiting it for its purposes. 
Whereas this weak civil society made it impossible for the EU to implement and formulate ENP 
programs in sensitive domains, insofar as civil society was too fragile and controlled to proceed in this 
sense, in the implementation of the ENP economic reforms the situation was different. The good 
performance was in fact ensured thanks to a pervasive control of the state over civil private sector, 
which was obliged by the state to adopt certain behaviours. 
The Arab Spring shaped in a different way state-civil society’s relations in Tunisia and 
Morocco, with the former seeing the emergence of an independent, autonomous and organizationally 
stronger civil society, and the latter seeing a general worsening of state-civil society relations in terms 
of an increased polarization. Whereas in Tunisia the new strength and autonomy of civil society was a 
major asset for the implementation of the ENP, which could now focus on sensitive issues and launch 
calls of proposal in the domain of justice and civil society’s development, in Morocco the new situation 
was a major blow for implementation. Indeed, even if the new constitution strengthened Moroccan 
civil society and its capacity to exert pressure on the government for key reforms, the increasing lack 
of confidence in state-civil society’s relations, as well as the PJD’s attempts to stifle independent CSOs 
by blocking state funds, affected civil society’s structure of opportunities and its capacity to carry out 
activities on the ground with an impact on the implementation of the ENP programs.    
The opposite cases of Morocco and Tunisia after the Arab Spring, as well as the impossibility 
to implement sensitive reforms in Ben Ali’s Tunisia, provided evidence for the hypothesis H1c.  
Namely, the strength and the degree of autonomy of civil society influence ENP implementation, 
insofar as the stronger and more autonomous is civil society the more implementation and funds 
absorption are likely. However, the analysis revealed also that in some cases the good performance 
and consequent absorption of EU funds was influenced by the heteronomous character of civil society 
in certain policy sectors. This is the case of Morocco where for instance the INDH’s performance was 
influenced by the heteronomous character of associations easily co-opted into INDH structures, as well 
as the case of Tunisian economic reforms.  
Finally, the different implementation performance of Morocco and Tunisia after 2011 provides 
evidence for the second hypothesis H2c. Namely, their different performance after the Arab Spring 
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was  due to the different way the latter affected their state-civil society relations, as well as the strength 
and the space available to civil society.  
Overall, the comparative analysis allows to identify when, how and why, civil society can make 
a difference in the implementation of ENP programs on the ground.  
Strength. A civil society that is organizationally strong with a high number of organizations in 
a certain policy sector favours implementation, as it acts as service deliver and project implementer for 
the execution of reforms at the lowest/on the ground level.  
Autonomy. An autonomous and independent civil society facilitates the implementation of ENP 
programs in sensitive sectors, as civil society actors can pressure decision-makers for the definition of 
priorities. Moreover, it allows a better targeting of EU policy initiatives, insofar as an independent civil 
society has more possibilities to dialogue directly with the EU.  
 
 
What role for the EU? The explanatory power of the governance approach 
 
In accordance with all these considerations, what is the role of the EU in the implementation of 
the ENP? As already mentioned in the second chapter, in the domain of external policies the macro 
level of the EU ultimately overlaps with the micro level of the recipient. EU Delegations in third 
countries are a case in point as they perfectly embody this overlapping, by being EU representatives 
yet deeply embedded in the micro-implementing environment of the recipient country. This means 
that traditional top-down and bottom-up approaches to study implementation encounter theoretical 
difficulties in the domain of external policies, insofar as the first overlook the role of local actors and 
conditions on the ground at the recipient level, while the second downplay the role of the EU. Given 
the peculiar and multilevel character of external policies, the two aspects cannot be neglected. This is 
why a governance approach was adopted to frame the implementation of the ENP and to bypass the 
limits of traditional studies.  
The main merit of a governance approach is that, by drawing on a combination of central 
steering and local autonomy, it emphasizes the multi-actor and multi-level character of action. In this 
context, the implementation of the ENP is framed as a system where responsibility for policy design 
and implementation is distributed between different levels and actors. This permits to consider the 
role of both domestic actors and the EU as well as their reciprocal influence and interaction in the 
implementation of the policy. In particular, whereas the previous chapters demonstrated that domestic 
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actors can make a difference, the performance of ENP bilateral programs and the absorption of EU 
funds are also influenced by the EU approach and its structure of opportunity in the neighboring 
countries.   
For instance, Tunisia’s good absorption capacity before the Arab Spring was influenced not 
only by the goals of Tunisian authorities that matched with ENP agenda or by its administrative 
capacity, but also by the softness of the EU in the assessment of performance criteria and indicators. 
Similarly, the fact the EU decided not to include sensitive reforms in the NIP indirectly favored 
Tunisia’s good absorption capacity. This decision was influenced both by Brussels’ priorities and by 
the EU’s general structure of opportunity in the country. On the one hand, Brussels’ need to maintain 
good diplomatic relations with Ben Ali, who was considered an important ally against terrorism, 
paved the way to a cautious approach which forced the Delegation in Tunis to adopt a diplomatic 
stance and to avoid the application of conditionality. On the other hand, it is also true that the EU 
Delegation on the ground did not really have the possibility to act otherwise, in light of a hostile context 
and a tight control even of EU Officials.  
The Arab Spring represented in this sense a new window of opportunity that enabled the EU 
to push for more reforms, by adopting several new programs and committing more EU funds. 
Moreover, if before the Arab Spring the EU was more prone to turn a blind eye to conditionality and 
to be less strict in its criteria, after the Arab Spring it increased the conditions attached to its 
disbursement of funds. In this sense, it contributed to reduce the already difficult absorption capacity 
of the neighbouring countries after 2011, such as in the case of Morocco. This is for example the case 
of the implementation of the IER recommendations, where the already reduced administrative 
capacity of the CNDH coupled with the strictness of EU procedures, which made it hard to cope with 
EU tight timetable and which impeded to absorb the entire budget originally committed. By contrast, 
in the case of Tunisia, the increased absorption capacity after 2011 is due not only to the role of Tunisian 
domestic actors, but also to the way EU programs were designed, with the budget support measures 
calibrated to meet the transitory governments’ limited mandate and capacity. This permitted 
payments’ conditions to be feasible and to increase the chance to disburse the funds. Therefore, 
whereas domestic actors are fundamental to explain reduced absorption capacities after 2011, EU 
discretional decisions over conditionality and the strictness of its procedures, as well as the way it 
designs policy programs, must also be considered as contributing to explain policy implementation.  
While focusing on the role of domestic actors, the adoption of a governance approach allows to 
analyse the implementation of ENP as a complex process where the execution of bilateral programs is 
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a joint responsibility of different actors at different levels. In this way, it possible to include also the 
way the EU’s action influences policy performance and is in turn influenced by the constraints and 
opportunities of the neighboring countries.   
 
 
Towards a changing topography of the ENP implementation in the Mediterranean?  
 
The analysis of domestic actors in Tunisia and Morocco and the way they can make a difference 
for implementation performance leads to new considerations on the implementation of the ENP in the 
Mediterranean. In particular, it reveals that the topography of the ENP implementation in the area 
seems to have changed after 2011, with the Arab Spring contributing to transform structures and 
paving the way to new obstacles and opportunities. At Brussel level, the general EU perception is that 
the Arab Spring potentially questioned Morocco’s model role in the ENP, worsening its performance. 
By contrast, Tunisia gradually emancipated from its traditional reputation as the “bad” of the 
neighbourhood (Bicchi, 2010b) and moved rapidly up the absorption capacity ratings. As an EU 
Official in Brussel put it during an interview: “Morocco is moving away from its reputation of the bon 
élève of the ENP while Tunisia is gradually improving its performance in absorption capacity and 
policy dialogue”. These developments open new perspectives on the geography of ENP 
implementation in the MENA and become even more interesting in light of the current review of the 
ENP and its future reformulation.    
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ANNEX I 
Table 7- ENPI South Payments and Commitments 2007-2014 (€ Mil.). Source: ENPI Statistical Annex 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algeria 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOT 
Commitments 57 32.5 35.6 59.0 58.0 74.0 50.0 26.3 392.4 
Payments 51.3 46.1 47.9 28.1 42.9 30.3 37.3 33 316.9 
Egypt  
Commitments 137 149 140 192 92 250 47 115 1,122.0 
Payments 170.3 148.1 151 106.2 39.1 93.2 28.2 91.1 827,2 
Israel  
Commitments 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0      - 13.5 
Payments 2.8 2.7 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.6 4.4 27.5 
Jordan  
Commitments 62 65 68 70 116 120 139.6 174.5 815.1 
Payments 46.1 63.6 49 92 76.3 91.6 96.6 56.3 571.5 
Lebanon  
Commitments 50 50 43 44 33 92 143 146.1 601.1 
Payments 32.6 43.5 24.6 26.1 14.1 29.3 79.3 78.2 327.7 
Libya  
Commitments 2 4 - 12 10 25 30 8 91 
Payments - 1.2 1.3 0.6 8 2.9 7.7 11 32.7 
Morocco  
Commitments 190 228.7 145 158.9 166.6 207 334.9 218 1,649.1 
Payments 227.5 224.9 200.7 170.1 151.5 110.1 84.1 76.2 1,245.1 
Palestine  
Commitments 452.7 387 352.6 377.9 413.7 224.0 313.7 309.5 2,831.1 
Payments 381.4 425.9 327.8 325.5 322.3 264.7 305.5 303.7 2,656.8 
Syria  
Commitments 20.0 20.0 40.0 50.0 10.0 12.6 51.0 61.3 264.9 
Payments 34.1 26.5 31.2 18.4 18.8 1.8 29.4 2.0 162.2 
Tunisia  
Commitments 103 73 77 77 180 130 135 169 944 
Payments 97.9 56 74.4 68.5 114.3 145.2 80.3 178.5 815,1 
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Figure 15 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from ENPI Statistical Annex 2015 
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ANNEX II 
 
Questionnaire- Semi Structured Interviews 
Analytical 
Dimension 
Main Questions 
Basic Information Name of the Interviewee:                                        Date of Interview:  
Position in the Organization:                                         Duration: 
Domestic Political  
Actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arab Spring 
 
 
-To what extent was the government supportive of the reform and its 
implementation? 
-Has the political/institutional class propelled or impeded project 
implementation? 
-Which were the actors (parties, institutions) in favour/against the 
reform? Why? Which were the main interests at stake?  
-Was there any misfit between governmental goals and EU ones in the 
definition of the reform? How did this impinge upon implementation? 
 
 
-To what extent did 2011 elections impinge upon implementation? 
-Did 2011 protests affect the interests of the ruling elites and the choices 
concerning the implementation of the program? If it is so, how? 
Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arab Spring 
-What was the role of administration in implementation? 
-Do you think that administrative capacities were enough to 
implement the program? 
-Which were the main obstacles/difficulties in terms of administrative 
capacities for implementation (e.g. lack of information, of 
coordination, of economic resources, of clarity of goals/roles)? How 
have they been solved? 
-Describe coordination activity within the program.  
-Were administrative capacities good enough at the local level for the 
development of local governance/decentralization in the 
implementation of the program?  
-What is the interaction between administration and political class? 
 
-How did 2011 political changes impinge upon administration’s 
capacities and in turn implementation (e.g. turn-over of key ministers, 
of administrative officials, improvement of local governance and 
decentralization processes?) 
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Civil Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arab Spring 
-Which were the main civil society’s actors (NGOs, trade unions, 
interest groups, business associations) involved in the implementation 
of the program and what was their role?  
-Did they influence the formulation of the program? Who was the 
strongest actor? 
-How did civil society actors manage implementation? Which were the 
main difficulties/obstacles?  Has civil society the capacity (resources, 
information, and coordination) to implement the program? 
-Is there a real dialogue between institutional actors and civil society 
in the implementation of the program? Did civil society voice specific 
requests/concerns on implementation? 
-What are the main pros and cons in a “participative” approach to 
implementation?   
 
-How did 2011 protests affect civil society in terms of 
independence/strength vis-à-vis the state? Which civil society actors 
were mostly affected?  
-Did 2011 events improve civil society capacity to implement the 
programs? 
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ANNEX III 
List of interviewed actors by organization 
Brussels: 
Europeaid- DG NEAR 
EEAS 
 
Morocco: 
EU Delegation, Rabat 
World Bank, Rabat 
Agence de Développement Social (ADS), Rabat and Casablanca 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Direction of the EU and of the Mediterranean Processes, Rabat 
Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre l’Analphabétisme, Rabat 
Ministry of Education, Rabat 
Agence Nationale Assurance Maladie 
Forum des Alternatives Maroc (FMAS) 
Moroccan Organization of Human Rights 
ALCS- Moroccan organization for the fight against HIV 
Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights 
Zakoura Foundation for Education 
Espace Associative 
Association for the Protection of the Environment 
ADALA Justice 
Association Marocaine Jeunesse 
Association Marocaine de Solidarité et de développement social 
 
Tunisia: 
EU Delegation, Tunis 
Ministry of National Education, Tunis 
Ministry of International Cooperation 
Agence nationale protection de l’Environment, 
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PASC Unit, 
PEE Management Unit, 
PAGBO Management Unit,  
PARJ Management Unit,  
Association of Magistrats, 
Association Enfants de la terre 
Syndacat des Agricoulteurs,  
Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center 
UGTT 
NUOR Association against corruption 
Different Civil Society Activists 
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ANNEX IV 
 
Table 8- EU Funded Programs for the Period 2007-2013 in Morocco 
ENPI Commitments 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 National Human 
Development Initiative 
60 Mil. € 
 
    25 
Mil. € 
 
Alphabetization& Non 
Formal Education 
17 Mil. €    10 Mil. €    
Basic Medical Coverage 40 Mil. €      50 Mil. 
€ 
Public Administration 
and Governance 
Reform  
73 Mil. €     75 
Mil. € 
 
Reform of the Health 
System 
 64 Mil. € 22 Mil. €     
Support for the 
Implementation of the 
recommendations of 
the IER II 
 8 Mil. €      
P3A3  20 Mil. €      
Energy Program  76. 7 Mil. €      
Investments and 
exportations 
 60 Mil. €      
Education Strategy   73 Mil. € 20 Mil. €   89 Mil. 
€ 
National Sewage   50 Mil. €     
Agricultural Policy    70 Mil. €   60 Mil. 
€ 
Isolated and Northern 
Areas  
   55 Mil. € 20.6 Mil. 
€ 
  
Advanced Status     91 Mil. €  87 Mil. 
€ 
Equality between Men 
and Women 
    45 Mil. €   
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Table 9- EU funded Programs for the period 2007-2013 in Tunisia  
                                                     
193 In the ENPI Statistical Annex, the total amount for 2010 is € 158.9 Mil.  This is because there was a top up of € 
3.9 Mil not indicated in the original Action Fiches.  
Forest Policy      37 
Mil. € 
 
SPRING      80 
Mil. € 
48 Mil. 
€ 
 
TOT Commitments 
per year 
 
190 Mil. € 228.7 Mil. 
€ 
145 Mil. € 155193 
Mil. € 
156.6 
Mil. € 
217 
Mil. € 
334 
Mil. € 
ENPI Commitments 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
P3A2 30 Mil. €       
Gestion Budgetaire 
par Objective 
(PAGBO) 
30 Mil. €       
Environment and 
Energy (PEE) 
33 Mil. €       
EIB-Bonification 10 Mil. €       
Economic 
Integration (PAI) 
 50 Mil €  20 
Mil. € 
   
Economic Revival 
(PAR) 
    90 Mil. € 68 Mil. € 65 Mil. € 
Competitiveness 
and Market (PCAM) 
 23 Mil €      
Education and 
Employment 
(PEFESE) 
  65 
Mil. € 
    
Research and 
Innovation (SRI) 
  12 
Mil. € 
    
PAPS- Water 
Management 
   57 
Mil. € 
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Service 
Competitiveness 
(PACS) 
    20 Mil. €   
Less Developed 
Areas (PAZD) 
    20 Mil. € 12 Mil. €  
Local environmental 
governance and 
industrial activity at 
Gabès 
      5 Mil. € 
Tempus       10 Mil.  
SPRING     50 Mil. € 50 Mil. € 55 Mil. € 
TOT. 
 
103 Mil. 
€ 
73 Mil. 
€ 
77 
Mil. € 
77 
Mil. € 
180 Mil. € 130 Mil. € 135 Mil. € 
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